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that your beliefs can. It can only be appropriate or inappropriate "depending on whether
or not the mind-to-world direction offit ofthe beliefis really satisfied." (Searle 1983:9)
But that does not give it a direction offit.
In the third instance, whenever an illocutionary act is performed with a
propositional content, a certain Intentional state is expressed with that propositional
content "and that Intentional state is the sincerity condition of that type of speech act.
(Searle 1983:9) Promising to do something means expressing an intention to do so. All
these abovementioned states are internal and are not just accompanying the
performance of speech acts. However, when you perform a speech act, you are
expressing a corresponding internal state, therefore it is not logical to perform a speech
act while denying the corresponding Intentional state as exemplified by Moore's
paradox: "I apologise for insulting you, but I am not sorry that I insulted you." (Searle
1983:9) This is not possible.
However, one does not always have to have the Intentional state that one
expresses, as when one is lying or is being insincere. But it must be noted that there is a
close parallelism between illocutionary acts and their expressed Intentional sincerity
conditions.
In the fourth place, in both speech acts and Intentional states conditions of
satisfaction apply. Searle (1983:10) makes the following example:
"A statement is satisfied if and only if it is true, an order is satisfied if and only
ifit is obeyed, a promise is satisfied if and only ifit is kept."
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