3071-The political economy of new slavery

Nigel Dower 185
a society of states, within which they legitimately pursue their national
interests within a framework of respecting the sovereignty of other
states, upholding international law and being willing to intervene in
other parts of the world – traditionally giving aid, more recently intervening
to protect human rights. Those involved in the economy are
likewise entitled to pursue the maximizing of profit, but within a certain
framework of norms of fair dealing and complying with such laws – like
environmental or labour laws – as are applicable. Individuals are entitled
to pursue their own ‘life projects’ or conceptions of the good (including
devotion to particular others and/or to particular associations/groups,
such as a church) within a framework of respect for others and duties
of justice, including a limited obligation of general benevolence towards
others. NGOs give expression to a sense of wider responsibility that some
individuals feel, though this sense of responsibility and membership of
such bodies are both to be seen as optional and voluntary.
A further common assumption then is made that insofar as the world
is clearly not a place in which the goals I specified are fully realized –
I need not rehearse the shortfalls – it is not because there is anything
wrong with the model. The key actors have their allotted roles; the normative
profiles are perfectly satisfactory. What is wrong is that actors,
either as individuals or acting within their institutional roles, simply do
not live up to the norms – possibly by: indifference to others and/or
an idea of selfishness that denies even limited benevolence; bias and
prejudice in cases of racism, sexism and religious bigotry; willingness to
do what is known to be wrong or unjust, as in the cases of nepotism,
bribery and many other forms of corruption; or by practising or conniving
at institutional slavery (often made acceptable and widespread
by the prevailing culture).
There is a fair degree of ethical consensus in the above model. It is
not that ethical values are denied or regarded as irrelevant (though a few
years ago this was more common in International Relations thinking
and the corporate world). They are rather assumed to be fairly selfevident.
Policy disagreements are taken to be mainly over institutional
and technical issues about what works and so on – hence the global
framework of international order and co-operation according to agreed
norms is seen as an instrumentality or a means towards agreed ends.
There is, however, little place for ethics as a critical intellectual enquiry
into the ethical bases of these practices or into the justification of policies
in the light of rival ethical positions. There’s no need since there’s
broad agreement anyway: ethical enquiry is only necessary if there is
controversy or challenge. This complacency, however, is precisely what
I want to dispute. The field is rife with ethical issues (not just technical