3071-The political economy of new slavery

42 Migration and Security
Even though globalization is not as new a phenomenon as the amount
of current literature on the topic would seem to suggest (Doomernik,
Penninx and van Amersfoort, 1997), by the end of the twentieth
century a number of factors have created a social reality previously
unknown to mankind: the conjunction of economic integration and
the offshoring of production to middle- or low-income countries; the
free flow of information by radio, television, the Internet and (being
symbolic for where they come from and stand for) consumer goods;
cheap and frequent modes of global transport; and the seemingly
unlimited mobility of people. Mentioning the last aspect, I inserted
the word ‘seemingly’. I did this because limits to mobility are almost
imperceptible for citizens of the most developed nations. To the large
masses of people in the developing world, however, mobility knows
many limits. Yet, they are touched by all the other aspects of globalization
(Adelman, 1999). As distorted and inaccurate as it may be (see, for
example, Smith, 1997), they have a clear image of what the world beyond
their horizons looks like, thus creating considerable incentives to move
to the rich West, especially if they are confronted with economic hardship
and few perspectives for positive change. In terms of root causes:
the effects of economic globalization by integrating ever larger parts
of the developing world (not too long ago still largely self-sufficient),
rendering them dependent on the world market and its violent swings
between production, demand and prices combined with very rapid
population growth 6 have in many countries led to economic decline
rather than development. This produces rapidly increasing emigration
pressure. This is even more the case when people are the victim of
civil strife or full-blown war. These conflicts, too, tend to be the result
of direct or, more frequently, indirect forces of globalization. 7 In effect,
the present-day world is faced with very powerful, and to a considerable
extent autonomous, forces that uproot millions of people. That at least
a number of those persons make their way to European and Northern
American shores should thus not greatly surprise us. Currently, no more
than 28 per cent of the world’s refugees seek refuge in the Western world
(UNHCR, 2002, p. 25). There is no reason to assume any reduction in
the volume of uprooted people within the coming generations or to
expect fewer of those to seek resettlement in the industrialized parts of
the world. In fact, demographic imbalance in the underdeveloped world
will, in all likelihood, even lead to a considerable increase in volume.
War, too, will be with us for years to come. The answer receiving states
try to formulate in response to this increased migration pressure is
largely one-sided. Instead of addressing the fundamental causes – in as