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3071-The political economy of new slavery

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Nigel Dower 187<br />

its critique are relevant to the concerns <strong>of</strong> development ethics, both in<br />

regard to the goal <strong>of</strong> poverty reduction, but also in regard to the general<br />

policies <strong>of</strong> development, especially in poorer countries.<br />

<strong>The</strong> range <strong>of</strong> questions relevant to development ethics<br />

A central focus <strong>of</strong> development ethics has been an ethical critique <strong>of</strong><br />

the two key goals: poverty reduction and development itself. A better<br />

understanding <strong>of</strong> just what makes poverty an evil will give us a more<br />

sophisticated understanding <strong>of</strong> what kinds <strong>of</strong> measures will really reduce<br />

poverty. If, for instance, poverty is evil because <strong>of</strong> the undermining<br />

<strong>of</strong> autonomy as well as or as much as lack <strong>of</strong> food or health, then<br />

measures that really empower the poor are more deeply satisfactory than<br />

measures that merely provide food or medicine (O’Neill, 1989). Likewise<br />

measures which reduce or remove economic <strong>slavery</strong> as a particularly<br />

acute form <strong>of</strong> disempowerment or undermining <strong>of</strong> autonomy will be<br />

given a good rationale for being included in poverty reduction strategies.<br />

A better understanding <strong>of</strong> what the processes <strong>of</strong> development<br />

are really about in terms <strong>of</strong> an adequate characterization <strong>of</strong> the criteria<br />

<strong>of</strong> flourishing and progress will lead to more sophisticated models<br />

<strong>of</strong> development than economic growth or even growth with equity<br />

(Sen, 1999). Thus, we have the great debate between neo-Aristotelians,<br />

Kantians, human rights thinkers and welfarists (Aman, 1991).<br />

Development ethics has also attended, though less vigorously, to other<br />

questions. For example, if environmental values matter too, how can<br />

we integrate these with development values into a coherent ethical<br />

package? How important is the ‘process’ value <strong>of</strong> participation, not<br />

only as effective means to other goals but as a development goal itself?<br />

If corruption is an impediment to development – as the fair distribution<br />

<strong>of</strong> increasing benefits or more basically as economic growth itself – how<br />

can we best understand it and the values which can effectively limit<br />

it and counter its corrosive effects? What is the ethical basis <strong>of</strong> aid,<br />

whether it is given by individuals or by governments? Looking more<br />

generally at the economic relations between countries, what are the<br />

ethical guidelines for these? Is economic liberty adequate? If not, what<br />

principles <strong>of</strong> social justice should inform the market or the ways states<br />

co-operate with one another?<br />

That these and many other ethical questions are relevant to development<br />

ethics and ought to be accorded more attention is one <strong>of</strong> the<br />

points I want to stress in this chapter. Even if we took the primary<br />

rationale <strong>of</strong> development ethics to be the goal <strong>of</strong> poverty reduction –<br />

a narrowness <strong>of</strong> subject matter I would personally resist – any ethical

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