3071-The political economy of new slavery
3071-The political economy of new slavery
3071-The political economy of new slavery
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Emma Dowling 213<br />
support. Yet the fact that most governments, except for France and<br />
Canada, 9 discuss the topic 10 and then do not implement the tax, shows<br />
that they are under much more pressure to satisfy business interests<br />
than those <strong>of</strong> their respective electorates. One might even argue that they<br />
benefit through collaboration with them. One <strong>of</strong> many examples is that<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fshore banking. According to the Association for Accountancy and<br />
Business Affairs (AABA), the UK government could raise up to an extra<br />
£85 billion a year by tackling this leakage <strong>of</strong> revenues into tax havens<br />
(ATTAC London, 2002; Attac).<br />
If a Tobin tax were implemented, governments might have more <strong>of</strong><br />
an incentive to clamp down on <strong>of</strong>fshore transactions; however the<br />
existence <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fshore areas is used as a reason not to implement the<br />
tax. Furthermore, if governments were really concerned about <strong>of</strong>fshore<br />
transactions, they could introduce a fee for transactions from such areas,<br />
which would make it more expensive for traders to retrieve their money<br />
(Wahl and Waldow, 2001, p. 7). Such behaviour does imply that business<br />
has a great hold over governments. As Hans Eichel, the German<br />
Minister <strong>of</strong> Finance explains, in reality, nobody in the industrialized<br />
states wants the Tobin tax (Eichel, cited in Schaefer, 2001, p. 1).<br />
In 1999, the European Parliament decided against the Tobin tax,<br />
stating that a ‘reimposition <strong>of</strong> restrictions on capital movement would<br />
signify a reversal <strong>of</strong> globalization’ (Patterson and Galliano, 1999, p. 6).<br />
Within the <strong>of</strong>ficial document there was no clarification <strong>of</strong> what the<br />
parliament means by ‘globalization’ and I can only conclude that they<br />
had a neo-liberal interpretation that emphasizes free trade and the<br />
deregulation <strong>of</strong> financial markets. Such an interpretation assumes that<br />
the market is best left alone and will ensure a fair distribution <strong>of</strong> goods<br />
and services (Rodrik, 1999, p. 1). <strong>The</strong>re are two important points in<br />
this context. One is the fact that the term ‘globalization’ is used unquestioningly<br />
which signifies an insensitivity to the idea that ‘globalization’<br />
is a term that can be employed to signify different kinds <strong>of</strong> processes<br />
and more importantly is not a process that is experienced in the same<br />
way by all <strong>of</strong> those affected (Steans and Pettiford, 2001, p. 145). Second,<br />
it is not questioned whether ‘globalization’ is actually a desired process.<br />
As van den Anker argues in Chapter 1 <strong>of</strong> the present volume, globalization<br />
is <strong>of</strong>ten posited as a process in which we cannot intervene<br />
successfully, rather than a <strong>political</strong> and economic project. <strong>The</strong> example<br />
used above shows that at this time, the European Parliament made a<br />
decision that benefited those who support the neo-liberal discourse that<br />
has such negative consequences, especially for the world’s poor. <strong>The</strong> free<br />
flow <strong>of</strong> capital is presented as the solution to the woes <strong>of</strong> poor people