3071-The political economy of new slavery

Emma Dowling 209
‘Chilean Model’ (between 1991 and 1998 the Chilean government placed
reserve requirements of a limited duration on capital imports, Patterson,
2002, p. 11). 5
I would like to emphasize that questions of ‘how’ are most important
even from an early stage as, given the unequal distribution of power and
wealth in the international system, great care must be taken to hinder
any implementation of the tax favouring those already in power. This
is especially important when it comes to discussing revenue and who
should collect and distribute it in what way. Those that need help must
have a say now in how the tax is implemented or else they run the risk
of being ignored at a later stage. The problem, therefore, is not one that
only financial technocrats should be discussing.
Within the existing literature, discussions about how the tax can deal
with such obstacles is taking place. 6 Nevertheless, the debate is presented
as one in which it is argued whether the tax would work, which
supposedly then provides a justification for whether the tax is desirable.
Not everything we can do, also provides us with an action we should
implement and vice versa. Continuing along such lines of argumentation
can become circular if we do not disaggregate what ideological
assumptions and visions of society underlie the different arguments
within this debate. Through an analysis of the language used to justify
certain positions, one can begin to unpack the underlying motivations
of the participants in the debate in order to lay bare the divergent
political projects. Using insights from Gramscian theory one can think
about where power plays a role in fostering consent in situations in
which an alternative is deemed impossible, rather than undesirable. 7
Deeming something impossible is a stronger argument than deeming
something undesirable. In order to disentangle power, knowledge and
ideology, I proceed to analyze why and how the proponents and opponents
of the Tobin tax argue the way they do. By doing so, I hope to give
a clearer picture of why opposition to the tax is more powerful at present
and what the possibilities for change within the existing system are.
Constraints to the implementation of the Tobin tax
As Kenneth Kasa of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco argued in
1999, ‘whether a Tobin Tax is desirable depends on your beliefs about
the efficiency of international financial markets’ (Kasa, 1999, p. 1). The
fact that Kasa used the word ‘beliefs’ is quite revealing as it shows that
there is an underlying problem of ideology, namely, what does one