The Translator's Invisibility: A History of Translation

Canon 69
intelligent readers will probably be uniform. But, as it is not to be
denied, that in many of the examples adduced in this Essay, the
appeal lies not so much to any settled canons of criticism, as to
individual taste; it will not be surprising, if in such instances, a
diversity of opinion should take place: and the Author having
exercised with great freedom his own judgment in such points, it
would ill become him to blame others for using the same freedom
in dissenting from his opinions. The chief benefit to be derived
from all such discussions in matters of taste, does not so much
arise from any certainty we can obtain of the rectitude of our
critical decisions, as from the pleasing and useful exercise which
they give to the finest powers of the mind, and those which most
distinguish us from the inferior animals.
(ibid.:vii–viii)
For Tytler, it is possible both to translate successfully and to evaluate
translations because he assumes that linguistic and cultural
differences do not exist at a fundamental level, invoking a universal
“reason and good sense” that distinguishes a public sphere of
cultural consensus (“readers”) but extends to the species,
“intelligent” human beings. 10 Yet he subsequently narrows this
sphere, first excluding consensus (“settled canons of criticism”) and
then appealing to the “freedom” of “individual taste.” Tytler’s
“common sense” approach to translation rests on a liberal
humanism that is stated with a fugitive democratic gesture (a public
sphere of cultural debate), but lapses ultimately into an individualist
aesthetics with skeptical consequences: “in matters where the
ultimate appeal is to Taste, it is almost impossible to be secure of the
solidity of our opinions, when the criterion of their truth is so very
uncertain” (ibid.:11).
The strain of individualism in Tytler’s treatise is so powerful,
however “uncertain” the contours of subjectivity may seem, that he
never shows the slightest skepticism about aesthetic judgment and
in fact constructs a concept of “correct taste” based on “exquisite
feeling.” The translator’s every choice should be governed by it—
even to the point of violating the “laws” for good translation. These
include, first, “That the Translation should give a complete
transcript of the ideas of the original work,” and, second, “That the
style and manner of writing should be of the same character with
that of the original” (Tytler 1978:16). The “man of exquisite feeling,”
however, is invested with the “liberty” of “adding to or retrenching