CONSULTING

2010 Strategic Energy Plan, which had planned for 50 percent by 2030, 589 and also below the
actual pre-Fukushima Daiichi accident level of 29 percent in March 2011.
Challenges to the proposed nuclear share were evident inside the drafting subcommittee, with
dissenting expert opinions that the nuclear share did not reflect a 2014-commitment to reduce
nuclear power to the extent possible. 590 In response, the then Industry Minister, Yoichi Miyazawa,
stated that high energy costs from renewables would require a nuclear share of at least 20-
22 percent. 591 To attain that nuclear share, all 26 reactors that have applied for NRA review would
have to be operating, plus most of those yet to be reviewed, a prospect that in reality is
unattainable. Miyazawa stated that achieving this percentage would require the operation of
35 reactors by 2030, a target that does not reflect the reality of the many challenges facing Japan’s
aging nuclear reactor fleet 592 (see also Figure 42).
If anything, the prospects for attaining the current 2030 nuclear share have worsened during the
past year. The Otsu District Court in Shiga prefecture, in issuing the injunction sought by
29 citizens living within 30-70km of the Takahama reactors 593 , signaled to Japan’s utilities and
government that even with reactors approved for restart and operating, there is a possibility of
future injunctions forcing the shutdown of reactors. As with the Otsu judgement, this could
include a court located in neighboring prefectures outside the immediate area of the location of
the nuclear power plant. It remains unclear what the final legal outcome will be in the Takahama-
3 and -4 dispute, however, Kansai Electric is clearly determined to use all legal means to try to
overturn the specific judgement 594 . The significance and medium to long term impact of the Otsu
judgement is difficult to overstate, given the uncertainty as to which reactor could be next. The
fact that Kansai Electric were not prepared for the ruling and its shock impact (its share price
dropped by 15 percent, the largest plunge since October 1987) was highlighted by the reaction of
the vice chair of the Kansai Economic Federation: “Why is a single district court judge allowed to
trip up the government’s energy policy?” 595
Within the utility industry, it is acknowledged that it will be a challenge to reach the government
target and that 15 percent by 2030 is more realistic. And even attaining this figure looks
589 METI, “The Strategic Energy Plan of Japan—Meeting global challenges and securing energy futures”,
Revised June 2010.
590 Asahi Shimbun, “Nuclear power crucial as renewable energy too costly, ministry says”, 27 May 2015.
591 Ibidem.
592 Asahi Shimbun, “Japan needs 35 nuclear reactors operating by 2030, says industry minister”,
11 June 2015.
593 Kansai Electric Power Company, “Decision of a provisional disposition preventing the operation of
Units 3 and 4 of Takahama Nuclear Power Station”, 9 March 2016, see
http://www.kepco.co.jp/english/corporate/pr/2016/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2016/03/09/2016_mar9_2.pdf,
accessed 17 June 2016.
594 Kansai Electric Power Company, “Appeal of an Objection to the Provisional Disposition to Suspend
Operation of Takahama Units 3 and 4”, 14 March 2016, see
http://www.kepco.co.jp/english/corporate/pr/2016/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2016/03/14/2016_mar14_1.pdf,
accessed 17 June 2016.
595 Asahi Shimbun, “Editorial: nuclear power proponents still scoffing at public safety concerns”,
28 March 2016, see http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/aj201603280014.html, accessed 12 May 2016.
Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. 152 World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2016