CONSULTING

of ten, to advance through the review process. 616 However, there are no prospects for restart of
the reactors in the coming year, not least due to multiple outstanding issues including seismic
risks, and the opposition to restart from the Niigata prefectural governor. 617 On
30 November 2015, TEPCO admitted to the NRA multiple safety failures at the Kashiwazaki
Kariwa plant—this followed a warning from the NRA that safety standards under the Act on the
Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors had been broken
during safety-related construction at the plant. TEPCO confirmed that at all seven Kashiwazaki-
Kariwa reactors they had identified 1,745 electric cables found to have problems, including no
separation between safety and non-safety cabling. 618 TEPCO also admitted that in hundreds of
construction projects at the Kashiwazaki Kariwa plant there had been inadequate supervision.
The decision of the NRA to focus on the ABWRs at Kashiwazaki also means that the review of three
other BWRs—Chugoku Electric Power Company’s Shimane-2, Tohoku Electric Power Company’s
Onagawa-2 and Chubu Electric Power Company’s Hamaoka-4—will be pushed back. 619
The credibility and effectiveness of the NRA during the past year has been significantly challenged.
IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS)
In addition to court rulings that have questioned in particular the effectiveness of seismic
assessments of the NRA, in January 2016, the regulator was reviewed by the IAEA Integrated
Regulatory Review Service (IRRS). In the final report, presented to the NRA on 23 April 2016 620 ,
the IAEA praised the establishment of the NRA and acknowledged that it has sought to improve
independence and transparency since it was set up in 2012, it also noted however significant areas
of weakness. These included that the NRA is currently conducting its work outside the
recommendations and guidelines of the IAEA General Safety Requirements (REV 1) and the
inadequacy of NRA inspections of nuclear facilities including nuclear plants—this includes poor
training, limited inspections rights, and extended periods between inspections. In its report the
IAEA concluded:
The unnecessary complexity of the legal framework with respect to inspections was also recognized
during the IRRS mission to Japan in 2007. However, the IRRS team noted that the approach remains
essentially the same 9 years later. During the preparations for the IRRS mission the NRA also
recognized the unnecessary complexity of the legal framework for performing inspections and has
already foreshadowed improvements towards simplification. Such improvements will require
changes in the laws, which will likely take considerable time (...).
616 Reuters, “Japan puts Tepco reactors on priority list for restart screening”, 6 August 2015, see
http://www.reuters.com/article/japan-nuclear-restarts-idUSL3N10H32R20150806, accessed 2 July 2016.
617 Bloomberg, “Tepco Niigata Atomic Plant Safe to Restart in 2016, Adviser Says”, 20 November 2015, see
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-20/tepco-niigata-atomic-plant-safe-to-restart-in-2016-adviser-says,
accessed 2 July 2016.
618 The Mainichi, “TEPCO reports 2,000 incorrectly installed cables at 2 nuclear complexes”,
1 December 2015, see http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20151201/p2a/00m/0na/013000c, accessed
2 July 2016.
619 NW, “Japan’s NRA prioritizing Kashiwazaki-Kariwa review: commissioner”, 20 August 2015.
620 Department of Nuclear Safety and Security, “Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) Mission to
Japan”, IAEA, Tokyo (Japan), 10-22 January 2016, see https://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000148261.pdf, accessed
17 June 2016.
Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. 157 World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2016