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characteristic that Polybius notes in two literary portraits of Hannibal, albeit qualified
with the remark that the accusations of greed for personal wealth largely derive from
Hannibal‟s enemies (Hist. 9.22; 9.25.1-4).
In Livy‟s versions of events, Capuan wealth is not an over-riding factor, nor do the
Capuans invite Hannibal to their town. Livy emphatically describes the Capuans as
surrendering when Mago announces to the Carthaginian senate, in direct speech, that the
Capuans surrendered, se tradidisse, and Mago clearly distinguishes Capua from the
communities which defect to Hannibal after Cannae:
Bruttios Apulosque partem Samnitium ac Lucanorum defecisse ad
Poenos. Capua quod caput Campaniae modo sed post adflictam rem
Romanam Cannensi pugna Italiae sit, Hannibali se tradidisse.
Livy, 23.11.10-11.
That the Bruttians and Apulians and some of the Samnites and
Lucanians had revolted to the Carthaginians, that Capua, which was
the capital not only of Campania, but, since the Roman defeat by the
battle of Cannae, of Italy also, had surrendered to Hannibal.
Moore, 1951, 37.
Surrender, from the Roman point of view, is considered worse than defeat. Thus Livy
presents to his audience a different example to Polybius of Capuan moral degradation.
On the other hand, Livy‟s use of Mago to announce the surrender in a speech to the
Carthaginian senate allows his Roman audience to read the statement as a lie. Many
modern scholars read se tradidisse (Livy, 23.11.11) and se traditurum (Livy, 23.1.1) as
„handing over‟ or „delivering‟ rather than the possible „surrendering‟ in order to fit
Livy‟s text more closely to Polybius‟ presentation and promulgate the notion that the
Capuans defected. 329 Any historical circumstances of force majeure are rarely, if ever,
considered.
329 Rossi, 2004, 368; Heurgon, 1942, 115: „pour châtier sa défection;‟ 144; De Sanctis, iii, 2,214;
Warmington, 1969, 205; Sherwin-White, 1973, 41; Salmon, 1957, 153; Mankin, 1995, 247; Crawford,
2001, 1974, 30; Watson, 2003, 491. Frederiksen, 1977, 183 notes Hannibal‟s camp above Capua but
Frederiksen, 1984, 227, 238, 241, consistently refers to defection, only once conceding the Capuans may
have been unable to resist; von Ungern-Sternberg, 1975, argues that Capua‟s revolt was the act of a united
state seeking independence. This means that the Capuans were prepared to risk the lives of all those
Capuans serving in the Roman army including 300 equites based in Sicily (Livy, 23.5.1). Lancel, 1998,
114 argues that these men effectively became hostages once the siege of Capua began. Yet it seems that
they remained loyal to Rome after Hannibal took control of Capua. Sicily was strategically critical to
prevent supplies from Carthage reaching Hannibal and not a location for soldiers of doubtful loyalty to
Rome, as acknowledged when these men were later granted Roman citizenship and had their residency
transferred from Capua to Cumae, backdated to the day before Capua came under Hannibal (Livy,
23.31.10).
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