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The enemy at the gates in 211
Hoyos argues that, if Hannibal had been serious about taking the city, he was „…five if
not six years too late.‟ 197 This point is less important to authors than taking the only
opportunity in the Second Punic War to present the city of Rome itself under attack.
Any comparison between Hannibal‟s attack on Rome and the most famous event
from ancient epic, the siege of Troy, seems, on the face of it, to be limited, but Silius
Italicus draws a comparison in Punica 1. The brief description of the Palatine as
surrounded and besieged by Hannibal goes somewhat beyond what other texts record of
Hannibal‟s attack:
sed medio finem bello excidiumque vicissim
molitae gentes, propiusque fuere periclo
quis superare datum: reseravit Dardanus arces
ductor Agenoreas obsessa Palatia vallo
Poenorum ac muris defendit Roma salutem.
69
Pun. 1.12-16
But in the second war each nation strove to destroy and exterminate
her rival and those to whom victory was granted came nearer to
destruction: in it a Roman general stormed the citadel of Carthage, the
Palatine was surrounded and besieged by Hannibal and Rome made
good her safety by her walls alone.
Duff, 1996, 5.
Dardanus is an archaism that alludes to the Trojan myth cycle, and in Homeric poetry,
Troy was famed for the strength of her walls. Hence the description of Rome being
saved by the strength of her walls alone (line 16) indicates that Rome is the stronger of
the two cities.
Whether or not the historical Hannibal‟s overall strategy included taking the city of
Rome remains an open, and probably unresolvable, question but historical issues are not
main point of this discussion. 198 There are fundamental structural differences between
Livy, Polybius and Silius Italicus arising, in part, from the relative importance each
author places on Hannibal‟s march on Rome in 211.
197 Hoyos, 2003, 136.
198 Hannibal had neither the resources in manpower or equipment to attack a well-defended city such as
Rome without additional support from Carthage or other allies. Walbank, 1.421, Lazenby, 1996, 41, and
Shean, 1996, 180-1 argue that he did not intend to attack Rome. Lancel, 1998, 96 agrees, noting that
Hannibal was equipped for a war of mobility, not a static war against a well-fortified city. Hoyos, 2003,
116 argues that the Carthaginian fleet off Pisa, Hist. 3.96.8-10, intended to link with Hannibal for a
combined attack on Rome.