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immediately following has turned to Rome. Polybius describes the reaction, as at first,
people believe the report that a storm deprived Tiberius of victory followed by their
disbelief, shock and surprise when they learn that Hannibal and his army were not only
safe in their camp but that it was the Romans who retreated (Hist. 3.75.1). 223 The
information that Hannibal was in a camp indicates that he was not, in fact, marching on
Rome and the new consuls, Servilius and Flaminius, have time to organise their
preparations (Hist. 3.72.5-7).
Livy presents a deeper emotional reaction of terror and consternation 224 at Rome to
the news of the defeat at the Trebia and connects it to the theme of Hannibal marching
on Rome through people‟s imagination, not through any action by Hannibal. Nobody
expects Hannibal to remain in his camp, but to appear outside the city at any moment: ut
iam ad urbem Romanam crederent infestis signis hostem venturum (Livy, 21.57.1).
Silius Italicus moves directly from the defeat at the Trebia to the rise of Flaminius,
nor do the Carthaginians remain in their winter camp for very long. Juno, disguised as
the goddess of Trasimene, appears in a dream to Hannibal, convincing him to drive his
men in a forced march across the wintry Apennines and through the marshes toward the
lake. As the men had recently crossed the Alps, they were considered quite capable of
crossing the Appenines in winter (Pun. 4.739-762). In his epic reinterpretation Silius
Italicus maintains a consistent portrayal of Hannibal either working alone or as a tool of
Juno, whereas both Livy and Polybius set aside Hannibal‟s record for making pre-
emptive strikes and credit the Gauls 225 with pressuring him to leave his winter camp to
invade Roman territory at the earliest opportunity (Hist. 3.78.5-6; Livy 22.1.2).
Polybius attests to a Roman assumption that Hannibal would march on Rome and
which route he would take by locating the consul Flaminius near Ariminum preparing to
confront Hannibal and block his progress (Hist. 3.75.1-4). Polybius‟ narrative shows
how these assumptions and plans are confounded by Hannibal‟s decision to take the
more treacherous west coast route through marshland toward Etruria.
223 Polybius shows that by sending out these legions the Romans were protecting their interests, and
attempting to deflect Carthaginian resources away from Italy possibly aiming to draw Hannibal out of the
peninsularr (Hist. 3.75.4). Cf. McCall, 2002, 35 who argues that the Roman losses at the Ticinus and
Trebia rivers were minor given they sent legions to Sardinia and Sicily and garrisons to other towns.
224 Foster, 1949, 168, n1: the description of terror and consternation in Rome at news of the defeat „are not
in Polybius and very likely drawn from Coelius Antipater.‟
225 Livy says that Gauls within Hannibal‟s army wanted booty and those outside pressure him because
they did not want war on their lands (Livy, 22.1-4).
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