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David K.H. Begg, Gianluigi Vernasca-Economics-McGraw Hill Higher Education (2011)

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10.8 UK wages and employment<br />

Table 10.5<br />

UK iobs and real earnings, males {0/o cumulative change)<br />

Real earnings, 1997-2009 Jobs, 1997-2009<br />

Whole economy +1 0 +8<br />

financial services +1 4 +27<br />

Construction +20 +22<br />

Energy and water +1 0 -1 7<br />

Source: ONS.<br />

In financial services (such as banking and insurance), wages and employment both increased. Demand<br />

increases were more than sufficient to offset any tendency for information technology or global outsourcing<br />

to reduce the need for workers.<br />

Technical progress and capital investment in the basic utilities - energy and water supply - meant that jobs<br />

continued to contract sharply in the sector. With so much capital per worker, workers are very productive<br />

and are highly paid. High energy prices - in part caused by global rises in the price of oil - meant that<br />

energy companies declared record profits. The competition for workers meant that incomes in the industry<br />

rose sharply.<br />

Wage discrimination: wage differences between men and women<br />

Wage discrimination refers to a situation whereby equally productive workers are paid differently. Few<br />

women do manufacturing jobs; most have jobs in services. Yet the pattern of employment is not the major<br />

cause of the fact that women on average earn 80 per cent as much as men. Sector by sector, women<br />

systematically get paid substantially less than men. The main reason that women earn less is that they earn<br />

less than men whatever job they do.<br />

The percentage of women in professional or managerial occupations is comparable with that for men but<br />

few women are on the boards of major companies. Why do firms promote or train women more slowly?<br />

Suppose firms bear some of the cost of training. The firm makes a hard-nosed investment decision.<br />

Assuming men and women are of inherently equal ability and educational attainment, it costs the firm the<br />

same to train either sex.<br />

Suppose firms believe women are more likely than men to interrupt, or even end, their careers at a young<br />

age. As a matter of biology, women have babies. Firms may conclude that the extra productivity benefits in<br />

the future are lower for women than men simply because many women work fewer years in the future. It<br />

is more profitable to train and promote men.<br />

Some women plan to have a full-time career, either remaining childless or returning to work almost<br />

immediately after any children are born. It would make sense for firms to invest in such people. How is a<br />

firm to tell which young women are planning to stay? Asking is pointless. There is no incentive for young<br />

women to tell the truth.<br />

Suppose firms offer young workers the choice between a relatively flat age-earnings profile and a steep<br />

profile that begins at a lower wage but pays a much higher wage later in a worker's career. In this way, firms<br />

can make the two profiles of equal value to someone planning a lifetime career. The early sacrifice (low<br />

wages) is recouped with interest later (high wages). Someone planning to quit the labour force, say at the<br />

age of 30, will never opt for the steeper profile.<br />

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