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David K.H. Begg, Gianluigi Vernasca-Economics-McGraw Hill Higher Education (2011)

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CHAPTER 13 Welfare economics<br />

benefits, a topic we discuss in Activity 13.1. The decision about how much to discount the welfare of future<br />

generations affects the present value of the benefits of tackling climate change today, and hence both the<br />

optimal pace of action and estimates of the cost of inaction. Although the quantitative conclusions change,<br />

the qualitative conclusions do not.<br />

Stern view of discount rates<br />

II<br />

Figure 13.8 showed a 1000-year history of temperatures on the planet. Suppose we could all<br />

agree on the science of global warming. This would allow statements of the form, 'if we continue<br />

producing emissions at the current rate, global temperatures will rise according to the following profile, with<br />

the following consequences in terms of flooding, volatile weather, drought, and so on:<br />

Suppose too that there was only one country in the world, so we did not have to worry about whether the US<br />

or India participated in trying to slow down climate change. The central issue then would be, 'how much pain<br />

should we inflict on today's generation in order to mitigate the problem for future generations?'<br />

The lower the discount rate we use in this calculation, the greater the present value of the benefits of helping<br />

future generations; the lower the discount rate we use, the less today we care about helping future generations.<br />

The Stern Review's recommendation that we should take urgent action to reduce emissions substantially<br />

follows inexorably from its analysis provided we agree with its assumption that we should not discount the<br />

welfare of future generations in making this policy decision today.<br />

Others, such as Professor William Nordhaus of Yale University, have argued that today's decision makers<br />

should discount the welfare of future generations - not least because they are still likely to be richer than us<br />

and have better options than we face - in which case, the optimal policy response to climate change is a<br />

slower mitigation of emissions today, albeit then requiring that future generations will have to take much<br />

more drastic action.<br />

The discount rate is not an academic abstraction. It affects key valuations and decisions, whether in the stock<br />

market or in the politics of controlling global warming.<br />

Questions<br />

(a)<br />

If we wish to weight equally the utility of current and future generations, what discount rate should we<br />

apply to future utility?<br />

(b) Still weighting utility equally, suppose future generations are richer than us and we believe in the<br />

principle of diminishing marginal utility of consumption. Will a unit of consumption be worth more<br />

today when we are poor, or tomorrow when we are rich?<br />

(c)<br />

Suppose, by sacrificing consumption today, we invest in physical capital that would make future<br />

generations richer. Say, on average, this investment has a rate of return of 5 per cent a year in real terms.<br />

What return would an environmental investment (e.g. preventing climate change) have to yield in order<br />

for future generations to be pleased with the decisions we made today?<br />

To check your answers to these questions, go to page 684.<br />

Other missing markets: time and risk<br />

The previous two sections were devoted to a single idea. When externalities exist, free market equilibrium<br />

is inefficient because the externality itself does not have a market or a price. People take no account of the<br />

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