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David K.H. Begg, Gianluigi Vernasca-Economics-McGraw Hill Higher Education (2011)

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CHAPTER 13 Welfare economics<br />

0 Firm A chooses the optimal quantity to produce (QA) at which the marginal revenue is equal to the marginal<br />

cost of producing that quantity: p = iJTCA!dQA"<br />

Similarly, the optimal quantity of pollution that maximizes profits is where marginal revenue of pollution<br />

(in this case, zero) is equal to the marginal cost of pollution:<br />

_ arcA O =<br />

(}pA<br />

The firm chooses a level of pollution such that the cost of an extra unit of pollution is zero. Since higher is the<br />

pollution, lower is the total cost of the firm, we should expect that the level of pollution that solves that<br />

condition to be quite high.<br />

Firm B has the following total cost function: TCB = TCs( QB, PA) with the following properties: iJTCB!dQB > 0<br />

and iJTC8/dPA > 0.<br />

This means that the total cost of firm B increases with output produced and with the pollution made by<br />

firm A. The externality problem is the following: firm A in deciding how much to pollute does not take into<br />

account the effects that its decision has on firm B. Denote by f the market price of fish for firm B. The profit<br />

of firm B is given by: nB = fO.s - TCs( QB, PA).<br />

Suppose we give the right to pollute to firm A. Firm A can sell its right to firm B.<br />

The profit function of firm A becomes nA = pQA - TCA(QA, PA) + qPA, where q is now the price that firm A can<br />

get by selling its right to pollute to firm B.<br />

For firm B, the profit function is now 1t8 = fQ8 - TC8(Q8, PA ) - qPA.<br />

For firm A, the optimal level of pollution that maximizes profits is given by the condition:<br />

arc A arc A<br />

--<br />

+q =O = q<br />

()pA<br />

()pA<br />

That condition simply says marginal cost is equal to marginal revenue from polluting (now equal to q).<br />

For firm B, the quantity of pollution that maximizes its profit is given by the condition:<br />

(1)<br />

arcB - q =O-arcB = q<br />

i}pA<br />

()pA<br />

(2)<br />

Equations (1) and (2) imply that the price q should satisfy the following: -dTCA/dPA = iJTC8/dPA.<br />

In deciding the optimal level of PA , firm A now takes into account the effect that its decision has on firm B.<br />

In particular, it must set a level of pollution such that the marginal private cost of polluting (-dTCA/dPA) is<br />

equal to the marginal social cost of polluting (dTCB/dPA). So, by assigning the property rights we can obtain<br />

the efficient level of pollution. You can try to work out the case in which firm B has the right not to be polluted<br />

and can sell this right to firm A; does the result above still hold?<br />

Environmental issues and the economics of climate change<br />

When there is no implicit market for pollution, pollutants are overproduced. Private producers ignore the<br />

costs they impose on others. In equilibrium, social marginal cost exceeds social marginal benefit.<br />

The most topical environmental externality we are currently facing is global warming, or climate change;<br />

that is, the rise in global temperature due to human activity. In particular, global warming is an externality<br />

in two main dimensions:<br />

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