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David K.H. Begg, Gianluigi Vernasca-Economics-McGraw Hill Higher Education (2011)

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Summary<br />

lower imports shift the IS1 curve to the right. If wage and<br />

price flexibility is high enough, there may be no need for<br />

fiscal policy. However, many European labour markets are<br />

quite sluggish. Sensible use of fiscal policy may speed up<br />

the process.<br />

One final point. If there is no discretionary change in tax<br />

rates and spending levels, fiscal relaxation in a recession<br />

is limited to the automatic stabilizers. However, these cannot<br />

see into the future. Only after income falls is revenue from<br />

income tax reduced. In 2001 Europe was hit by two<br />

demand shocks: the US recession as the dotcom bubble<br />

burst and the confidence collapse after 11 September.<br />

Because the real economy is sluggish, it took time for these<br />

to feed through into lower output, lower employment and<br />

lower inflation. But by 12 September everyone knew these<br />

were coming. Ideally, demand policies should have been<br />

eased to offset these demand shocks. If fiscal policy is<br />

largely confined to backward-looking automatic stabilizers,<br />

the only channel for a forward-looking policy response is<br />

through interest rate cuts.<br />

Hence, the fiscal framework in the EMU raises the burden<br />

on monetary policy to react to shocks even before they<br />

have fed fully through into output and inflation.<br />

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c<br />

Yo<br />

Y, Y0<br />

Output<br />

LM<br />

A small EMU member faces a horizontal LM curve at<br />

the interest rate set by the ECB. If the IS curve shifts<br />

to IS,, interest rates will be reduced only if the whole<br />

of EMU is affected by the shock. Otherwise, the<br />

country faces a slump that gradually reduces its prices<br />

and wages, boosting competitiveness and shifting IS,<br />

to the right. A fiscal expansion could induce this shift<br />

more quickly.<br />

Figure 29.3<br />

A member of the eurozone<br />

Summary<br />

• Under the gold standard, each country fixed the par value of its currency against gold, maintained the<br />

convertibility of its currency into gold at this price and linked the domestic money supply to gold<br />

stocks at the central bank. It was a fixed exchange rate regime.<br />

• Without capital flows, countries with a trade deficit faced a payments deficit, lower gold stocks and a<br />

lower money supply. Domestic recession then bid down wages and prices, raising competitiveness - an<br />

automatic adjustment mechanism. Trade surplus countries faced a monetary inflow, higher prices and<br />

lower competitiveness. In practice, this adjustment mechanism was hampered by capital flows.<br />

• The post-war Bretton Woods system was an adjustable peg in which fixed exchange rates were<br />

sometimes adjusted. It was a dollar standard. But domestic money supplies were no longer linked to<br />

forex reserves, so the adjustment mechanism of the gold standard was weakened.<br />

• Purchasing power parity (PPP) is the path of the nominal exchange rate that would maintain constant<br />

competitiveness by offsetting differential inflation across countries. In the long run, floating exchange<br />

rates return to the PPP path if no real shocks occur.<br />

• In the short run, the level of floating exchange rates is determined largely by speculation. Exchange<br />

rates adjust to ensure interest differentials are offset by expected exchange rate changes. This chokes<br />

off large speculative flows. In the short run, exchange rates can depart significantly from their long-run<br />

level.<br />

679

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