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David K.H. Begg, Gianluigi Vernasca-Economics-McGraw Hill Higher Education (2011)

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CHAPTER 29 Exchange rate regimes<br />

competitiveness can change because domestic prices can adjust relative to foreign prices. Second, by<br />

curtailing the role of monetary policy, a monetary union raises the significance of fiscal policy for individual<br />

member countries that wish to manage aggregate demand independently of the rest of the monetary union.<br />

Third, monetary union is therefore easier when wage flexibility in member states is greater.<br />

<br />

A_n_ a _di_us_ta _ bl_ e _p e _g<br />

An adjustable peg is a fixed<br />

exchange rate, the value of<br />

which may occasionally be<br />

changed.<br />

In operation during 1945-73, the most famous example of an adjustable peg was<br />

called the Bretton Woods system, after the small American town where US and<br />

UK officials met in 1944 to agree its details. Because countries agreed to use dollars<br />

as well as gold as foreign reserves, the system was also called the dollar standard.<br />

Each country fixed its exchange rate against the dollar. The price of gold was fixed in dollars. Currencies<br />

were convertible against dollars or gold, which together were foreign exchange reserves. At the fixed<br />

exchange rate, central banks were committed to buy or sell domestic currency for foreign exchange<br />

reserves. They intervened in the forex market to defend the exchange rate against the dollar.<br />

Unlike the gold standard, the dollar standard did not require 100 per cent forex reserve backing for<br />

domestic currency. Governments could print as much money as they wished. The designers of the Bretton<br />

Woods system feared that the world gold supply could not increase quickly enough to keep up with the<br />

rising demand for money that they hoped would accompany post-war prosperity.<br />

Giving governments the discretion to print money solved that problem but created two others. First, it<br />

inhibited the adjustment mechanism built into the gold standard, in which countries with a balance of<br />

payments deficit lost gold and their domestic money supply fell, thereby bidding down their prices and<br />

boosting their competitiveness. Under the dollar standard, countries with a payments deficit lost money,<br />

but the government could print more money again. This prevented higher unemployment in the short run,<br />

but also prevented long-run adjustment by stopping the fall in prices that raised competitiveness.<br />

Such policies were not feasible for ever. If the balance of payments deficit persisted, the country ran out of<br />

foreign exchange reserves. Then it had to devalue its exchange rate to raise competitiveness and remove the<br />

underlying imbalance in international payments.<br />

Speculators faced a one-way bet. When a country was in payment difficulties, either the exchange rate<br />

would stay the same a bit longer or it would be devalued at once. Speculators might as well bet on<br />

devaluation, since the exchange rate was unlikely to appreciate. Sometimes speculative pressure made<br />

devaluation happen earlier because countries lost reserves not only from a current account deficit but also<br />

because of a financial account outflow. Foreseeing this difficulty, the architects of the Bretton Woods system<br />

decided to solve the problem of speculative capital flows by making private capital flows illegal.<br />

Perfect capital mobility implies interest parity. Interest differentials must be offset by expected exchange<br />

rate changes to equate expected returns in different currencies. Fixed exchange rates imply expected<br />

exchange rate changes are zero. Hence, interest rates have to be equal. Countries cannot retain the<br />

sovereignty to set interest rates.<br />

Fixed exchange rates, perfect<br />

capital mobility and monetary<br />

sovereignty are the impossible<br />

triad. All three cannot co-exist<br />

at the same time.<br />

In 1944 the architects of Bretton Woods decided that fixed exchange rates were<br />

important, but that countries were not ready to surrender monetary sovereignty. Hence,<br />

capital mobility had to be suspended. Capital flow controls were severe until 1960,<br />

when controls on long-term capital flows were relaxed. After the adjustable peg<br />

was abandoned in 1973, the need for capital controls diminished. Capital controls<br />

were gradually dismantled and integration of global financial markets intensified.<br />

The dollar standard had a second drawback. It led to a world of sustained inflation. Dollars had become<br />

the world's medium of exchange. A US payments deficit could be financed by printing more dollars. In the<br />

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