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Back to the Future 207<br />
are programmed with sophisticated algorithms to buy and sell stocks<br />
in rapid- fi re succession. The goal is to take advantage <strong>of</strong> small price<br />
differentials that exist for fractions <strong>of</strong> a second (think day traders on<br />
silicon steroids). These robotrades now account for at least 60 percent<br />
<strong>of</strong> all trading activity—the trading equivalent <strong>of</strong> spam.<br />
The practice is so lucrative and the trading speeds so fast<br />
that high- frequency traders, from Goldman Sachs to privately<br />
held GetGo LLC, pay the New York Stock Exchange tens <strong>of</strong> thousands<br />
<strong>of</strong> dollars a month to “colocate” their black boxes in the<br />
exchange’s new electronic data center in New Jersey. The couple<strong>of</strong>-<br />
millisecond advantage that physical proximity buys allows the<br />
robotraders to sniff out and act on data before anyone else has<br />
a chance to see it. For its part, the NYSE hopes colocation opportunities<br />
will help it win back trading business that has shifted to<br />
the “dark pools,” where institutional investors can anonymously<br />
buy and sell large blocks <strong>of</strong> shares.<br />
The robotraders say they are doing a service by increasing<br />
liquidity so that there is always a ready market for stocks. Critics<br />
accuse them <strong>of</strong> “ front- running,” or jumping ahead <strong>of</strong> other<br />
trades, and distorting the markets by fl ooding the system with<br />
faux buy and sell orders—in other words, cheating. At best, there<br />
is little social utility to these high- frequency trades. At worst, the<br />
algorithm- based black boxes can behave in unpredictable and<br />
dangerous ways. It’s one thing to have a computer fi ring <strong>of</strong>f zillions<br />
<strong>of</strong> trades a second, but multiply that times hundreds <strong>of</strong> computers,<br />
and you’re talking serious potential for chaos.<br />
Exhibit A: the fl ash crash <strong>of</strong> May 6, 2010. On an otherwise<br />
slow afternoon, the market suddenly began an alarming drop.<br />
The Dow Jones Industrial Average plunged more than 600 points<br />
in a matter <strong>of</strong> minutes, only to quickly recover. It took months<br />
to pinpoint the cause: the sale <strong>of</strong> $4.1 billion worth <strong>of</strong> futures<br />
contracts by a Kansas mutual fund. As high- frequency trading<br />
programs kicked in, the contracts changed hands an astonishing<br />
27,000 times in 14 seconds—or almost 2,000 trades a second. 14<br />
Once again, regulators are scrambling to keep pace with Wall<br />
Street “innovations.” (And the innovators are trying to buy their<br />
way out <strong>of</strong> regulation: High- frequency trading fi rms contributed