Latvijas Vēsturnieku komisijas raksti - 21.sējums - Valsts prezidenta ...

Inesis Feldmanis. Nacistu okupācijas politika Baltijā (1941–1945): koncepcija un izpausmes
extent, the master of the situation within the scope of his authority, showing respect only
for the competence of Hermann Göring, the “economic dictator” of Germany, and Heinrich
Himmler, SS Reichsführer and Chief of the Police. A. Hitler made his choice of the Nazi
chief ideologist Alfred Rosenberg.
On 20 June 1940, A. Rosenberg, in his report during the meeting of Vehrmacht
representatives and higher officials of the State and Party, underpinned the conception
of rearranging the Eastern space, the core of which was the decomposition plan of the
Soviet Union. To prevent the threats of Russia as a superpower, A. Rosenberg suggested
that independence and liberty struggles of Non-Russian peoples should be supported by
ensuring “a certain form of statehood” for them. These states had to be separated from the
Soviet Union and fortified against Moscow, while the territory of Russia was to be essentially
reduced setting limits in the space between St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Urals.
A. Rosenberg actively maintained the need for a differentiated approach and differentiated
policy. According to him, Ukraine soon had to become an independent state, an ally of
Germany, so that it would be possible “to check Moscow and protect the Greater German
space from the East.” The Baltic States, on their turn, had to become part of Germany, or an
area for colonization by Germany, which updated the issue of suitability of the local peoples
for Germanisation. A. Rosenberg evaluated the Estonians the highest in this aspect pointing
out that 50% of them were Germanised to a considerable extent and were to be deemed
a kindred nation. According to him, in Latvia, the proportion of assimilable population was
considerably smaller – therefore, displacement of the population on a much larger scale
was to be planned. The situation in Lithuania was similar to that of Latvia.
A. Rosenberg treated the intelligentsia of the Baltic States, especially of Latvia, with
sharp distrust. He was afraid that the intelligentsia would actively resist the designed
Germanisation policy. Therefore, he was a supporter of repressions and maintained the
deportation of the major part of Latvian intelligentsia to the central regions of Russia. For
the most part, it was planned to deport the part of Latvian intelligentsia who were oriented
towards Great Britain – these were about 30,000–40,000 people. The Nazi considered
them to be especially unwanted.
After the occupation of the Baltic, A. Rosenberg and the Ministry for the Occupied
Eastern Territories headed by him failed to ensure a united and coordinated policy. He
had no opportunities to determine decisively the main essence or trend of this policy in
many spheres, or achieve the realization of several of his designs. The situation that was
formed in the Baltic during the German–Soviet war as well as the military failures of the
Nazi forced A. Rosenberg to decline immediate preparation works for Germanisation and
colonization of the Baltic. Deportation of the local inhabitants unsuitable for Germanisation
was not implemented, and mass resettling of Germans in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia did
not take place either. Also, the design to carry out mass repressions against the Latvian
intelligentsia remained only in written form.
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