the process of security sector reform - ISAC Fund

Dr Timothy Edmunds THE PROCESS OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
Dr Timothy Edmunds THE PROCESS OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
A related second generation SSR issue concerns the ability or capacity of security
sector bureaucracies both to implement policy, and to adequately support the
oversight and transparency functions of parliament. If the Ministry of the Interior,
for example, does not have the resources, mechanisms and qualified staff to
provide a detailed breakdown of where and how the budget for interior ministry
forces is spent, then detailed and effective oversight of that budget is difficult.
Capacity problems can manifest themselves in a number of ways. These include
for example:
• An absence of detailed information on security sector spending;
• Poor analysis of available policy options;
• Unrealistic assessments of the relationship between goals and resources;
• And administrative structures unable or unwilling to implement security
policy.
Capacity problems can also be intensified by a lack of expertise amongst new
civil servants in security sector ministries. This may reinforce the reluctance
of security sector actors to facilitate further reform because of a perception of
civilian incompetence in security sector issues. Again, building capacity is a
long-term component of the SSR process, but without it the consolidation of
democratic procedures is problematic.
In common with these administrative reform problems, second generation
SSR issues are visible within security sector formations themselves. Thus, a commitment
to reform at the highest level of the armed forces will be difficult to
implement if the mid-level officer corps remains unconvinced of or does not
understand the rationale behind the reform process. In these circumstances reform
programmes may not be adhered to in practice because of creative non-compliance
or simply because of ignorance. These problems are likely to be reinforced if – as
is likely – SSR involves a transformation of the role and structure of the security
sector that will threaten jobs or damage individual interests.
The development of security sector education and training programmes may go
some way towards tackling these problems, but in many cases it is likely that
only generation change within the security sector will address them fully.
Similarly, post-conflict downsizing of the security sector can create further
problems, and add to the cost of implementing SSR. While downsizing may
reduce security sector-specific budgets, it often transfers expense to other sectors
of government finances such as welfare. Effective retraining programmes for
demobilised personnel will add further costs to downsizing programmes, but if
they help to effectively prepare former security sector personnel for life in the
civilian economy, will bring benefits to the overall economy in the long-term.
Finally, the effective engagement of civil-society in security sector issues is of
crucial importance to SSR. Civil-society plays three roles in the consolidation
of democratic control of the security sector. First, through the media, nongovernmental
organisations, academics and so on, it provides an alternative, nongovernmental
source of information on security issues for both policy makers
and the public at large. This ensures that security policy decision makers are the
best informed that they possibly can be – rather than, for example, having to rely
on only one source of information and analysis.
Second, civil-society provides the opportunity for popular debate, discussion
and criticism of security issues. Again, this helps widen the scope of the input
into the security making process and means that hopefully any decision that is
made will be the right one.
Finally civil-society can act as an important mechanism for holding other actors
in the security sector to account through exposing malpractice, forming critical
judgements and so on. Essentially, it can provide an additional ‘eye’ to look out
for bad practice, inefficiency or corruption in the security sector itself.
CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS
IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
Because SSR is a process rather than an end point, measuring ‘success’ in SSR
can be problematic. ‘Success’ – or at least ‘performance’ – is only likely to be
visible after time, when the ‘big picture’ can be considered, and while particular
reforms may be seen as ‘successful’, but can be undermined if other elements of
the security sector system are unchanged.
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