the process of security sector reform - ISAC Fund

Narcís Serra TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY REFORM: POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK
Narcís Serra TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY REFORM: POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK
of resources for defence and also in the execution of the budget. On the other, by
participating in the elaboration, prior approval, of the basic elements of defence
policy.
With regard to the factors mentioned, a policy of transparency makes it easier
to exert civil control over the army. Secrecy in information must be combated,
above all with regard to economic affairs; it is something which, in today’s
world, simply cannot be justified. Greater transparency, more information, the
obligation to properly account for work done is also part of greater civil control
of military affairs.
With regard to the previously mentioned tasks, it must also be stressed that in
the majority of countries in transition, the lack of politicians and civil servants
who are experts in security questions is one of the most serious deficiencies that
have to be overcome in order to advance in the civil control of the armed forces.
Furthermore, civil posts in the field of defence are not particularly valued and do
not usually help those who have them in terms of future promotion.
Once again, the appointment of a civil minister is only the first step. It must be
followed, for instance, by a robust policy of dialogue with legislative power, in
order to help in the preparation of certain parliamentarians, as well as for greater
promotion of studies in security at universities and the opening up of centres of
higher military studies to ordinary citizens.
Elimination of military privileges.
Here there usually are two major tasks: the reform of military justice and dealing
with groups of enterprises controlled by the army.
With regard to military justice, adapting them to the proper functioning of a
democratic system calls for a series of conditions that would be difficult to
meet in countries that are in the stage of transition to political democracy. The
following are the essential conditions:
• Military justice cannot be applied to ordinary civilians
• It must be limited to military crimes and cannot judge crimes of all types
committed by the military
• It must be integrated within a single judicial power and cannot constitute
an isolated system of law
• The Penal Code applied by judges must be separated from disciplinary
legislation, which must be applied by high ranking military officials.
• The military high command cannot have jurisdictional powers and
functions, i.e., they can’t be judges, preside over or form part of tribunals,
accept sentences, etc.
In many countries the task of adapting military justice usually comes up against
the serious problem of seeking justice for crimes committed during the years of
a military dictatorship. However, these questions are normally resolved in civil
tribunals, and in the case of Serbia, at an International Tribunal. The defence of
human rights in present circumstances calls for tackling the reform of military
justice, and establishing that it should be subordinated to one single system of
justice.
With regard to enterprises controlled by the armed forces, in some countries we
have to distinguish between two situations: enterprises related to arms production
and those run by the army to obtain additional revenues. At present, it doesn’t
make sense to militarise enterprises that manufacture arms or equipment even if
one might wish to maintain some kind of national industry in this sector, since
that will, most likely, require other forms of management.
Evolution of the concept of the military profession.
Those who have studied civil-military relations agree that greater professionalism
in many countries has not necessarily meant the democratic normalisation of
these relations. There is still a need to advance towards a particular type of
professionalism, that is to say, democratic professionalism that accepts that
loyalty and subordination to the democratic civil authorities is the duty of every
military person. It is impossible to achieve this concept of professionalism if the
army enjoys a degree of autonomy superior to what is conferred by civil power
or if they maintain certain values and beliefs that are too different from those of
the society they are supposed to serve.
The transformation of the concept of profession must also be linked to the analyses
carried out in this field by Charles C. Moskos, who distinguishes between an
institutional and an occupational army. The former is characterised, among other
things, by its regulatory values (the native land, honour, the fulfilment of duty),
the latter by the fact that its members consider it a professional career. No army is
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