the process of security sector reform - ISAC Fund

Narcís Serra TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY REFORM: POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK
Narcís Serra TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY REFORM: POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK
fully institutional, and, even less so, fully occupational. The Spanish experience,
as well as that of other southern European countries, indicates that the change to
democratic professionalism cannot be achieved without a shift from positions
akin to an institutional army to more occupational positions, the impetus for
which must come from civil authority. Movement in that direction can come
through a diversity of measures. As examples, we can cite encouraging military
personnel to live in ordinary houses in any town or city instead of special military
barracks, the establishment of mechanisms of promotion that reward lifelong
training and preparation, the elimination of indirect forms of retribution such as
special supermarkets or other benefits not included in salaries, the establishment
of working hours similar to those of any ordinary working day, the introduction of
women in the army, the change in training plans, the introduction of the defence
of human rights in training plans, tight control to oversee the proper treatment of
soldiers and cooperation with different international security bodies.
Civil control of the armed forces in this phase therefore requires action with
regard to the very concept of the military profession, which is no longer exclusively
defined by the military themselves, in order to be adapted to present
circumstances through a policy deliberately applied from the government. The
introduction of new missions to give more reasons of existence to the armed
forces contributes to this change in the professional content necessary for the
establishment of civil-military relations in democracy.
Definition of new missions.
The definition of the missions to be carried out in the present circumstances is a
question that has to be addressed given that with the new international situation
the missions carried out thus far by armies in most countries have been placed in
a situation of crisis, since this new international situation has meant the practical
disappearance of conflicts between states. All of that has created a situation of
perplexity and lack of definition in which armies have tended towards internal
actions in a bid to find justification for their existence.
It isn’t the case of Serbia, which has lived through a very long interstate conflict,
and which is a clear paradigm of what has been called new wars. For that
reason, a political debate is necessary in order to properly define these missions;
it should not be done precipitatedly. The recent “Strategic Concept” approved
in Spain shows how far this country has come; it has established only three
missions: defence of territorial integrity within the framework of the EU and
NATO; contributing to international peace operations; and the cooperation
deemed necessary in operations of civil security, such as control by sea of ships
that are likely to be transporting drugs, of safety and rescue operations, in natural
disasters, etc.
The missions must be decided by the government, with the necessary legislative
backing wherever possible. Missions linked to domestic security must be
temporary, not permanent, support to the police forces, should be carried out
under civil control and subject to civil legislation.
In the event of cooperation in domestic security tasks, there must be a limit that
must not be transgressed: there must be no actions that demand or justify tasks
of interior intelligence, vigilance or information about citizens.
THE THIRD PHASE: CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACY
In this stage, civil control refers to the definition of the field of autonomy
considered convenient by each government for adapting armed forces to the
domestic and international reality of our day, which is undergoing constant
changes. Civil control of the armed forces is not stably resolved as a problem
between two agents. If we don’t introduce the society and provide social support
for progressive formulae of what can be termed democratic normalisation, we
cannot design any stable framework for the solution of the problem of military
control. None of that is easy against a backdrop of the still unresolved conflicts
that have plagued the former Yugoslavia. The definition of missions that are
accepted by citizens is another important challenge.
In this sense, international projection or the creation of measures of confidence
with neighbours become the normal elements for the instrumentation of military
policy in countries that have reached this stage.
To summarise, the reform of the military in a transition to a democracy is indeed
a long process that will take, at least, a decade to be completed. Moreover, the
reform has to be taken step by step, in a continuous manner. That is why tenacity
becomes not only a convenient virtue but almost a necessary requirement. To
succeed at each stage of the process is essential to be able to reach the final target,
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