the process of security sector reform - ISAC Fund

George Katsirdakis SECURITY SECTOR REFORM FROM A NATO VIEWPOINT
George Katsirdakis SECURITY SECTOR REFORM FROM A NATO VIEWPOINT
attacks in the United States. The perception was that terrorism and asymmetric
threats cannot be countered effectively by simply using traditional armed forces
or traditional forces of law and order and internal security. The need for a
systemic approach was evident. What was not clear, however, was how this
systemic approach to adapt the entire security sector to the new security challenges
could be implemented in practice. Some Allies were of the view that
since NATO was established as a collective defence organisation, its role in the
overall reform process of the security sector should be limited only to one part
of the security sector where NATO was generally considered most competent
– the defence sector. These Allies maintained that the reform of the non-defence
sector organisations was not in NATO’s competence and should be left to other
international organisations such as the European Union and the OSCE.
Other Allies challenged that view by saying that in the fight against terrorism and
asymmetric threats there is a need to have a systemic approach and integrated and
well coordinated plans to be able to succeed and in that approach the role of the
armed forces and that of the security forces should be seamlessly integrated and
act as an integrated system and not along the lines of organisational competencies.
As they argued, we cannot share intelligence with military intelligence services
only because civilian intelligence services should be working with the EU and
not with NATO. If NATO is to be in charge of an operation it should be able to
utilise the whole potential of the security sector and, therefore, the SSR would be
a strategic necessity for NATO operations in the future against terrorist or other
organisations that pose a serious threat against the security of an Ally or a Partner.
And, if organised crime was supporting terrorism, as the general perception was,
then NATO operations to combat terrorism could not exclude operations against
organised crime.
To this day, unfortunately, this debate has not culminated to a consensus approach
and although some progress has been made towards adopting SSR as a legitimate
area of NATO activity, more work will be required in the near future.
Against this background, the first official reference to SSR in NATO documentation
was made in the Prague Summit Declaration, in November 2002, where
the Heads of State and Government, referring to the developments in the Balkans,
agreed “to improve their capacity to contribute to Albania’s continued reform,
and to further assist defence and security sector reform in the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia”.
During the same Summit meeting, the Heads of State and Government agreed
a very important document for the future of the Partnership, the Report on the
Comprehensive Review on EAPC and PfP. The report anticipated the development
of a specially designed Partnership Action Plan (PAP) as “an issue-specific, result
oriented mechanism for practical cooperation involving Allies and interested
Partners”. The Review further states that Allies should “…consider possible new
measures to facilitate and harmonise operational co-operation between security
structures including those beyond the responsibilities of respective MODs”.
The discussions in NATO in relation to the requirement stated in the Prague Summit,
focussed on issues of restructuring, capabilities, cooperation and training
of the various organisations of the broader security sector that might need to
work closely to fight the new security threats.
In an effort to bridge the gap in the views of Allies on the SSR issue, all Allies
agreed that there is a need for cooperation of NATO with the EU and the OSCE
to ensure coordination. In the same light, it was agreed that NATO’s primary
interest in a cooperative approach with other international organisations, would
be in the Defence Sector and in an effective interface with the security sector’s
other actors.
The debate also considered a possible introduction of a new area of cooperation
in the Partnership Work Programme (PWP) on Border Security considering
that NATO had been repeatedly and extensively involved in the issue of Border
Security both in the Balkans and in other Partnership regions. The close
coordination between NATO, the EU, the OSCE, the Stability Pact, the See-
GROUP, and DCAF for the case of the Ohrid Conference on border security,
in the summer of 2002, indicated that this might be a genuine area of security
sector activity where all the co- organisers – being international entities – could
work closely together and coordinate their activities.
In the internal debate as to how to proceed with the issue of SSR, another important
development was the consideration of the possibility of agreeing on a
Partnership Action Plan on Defence and Security Sector Reform PAP-DSSR.
In the same vain, another option could be the use of the Planning and Review
Process (PARP) to explore the possibility of developing and proposing to
Partner-nations of some Partnership Goals on DSSR. Furthermore, realising
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