the process of security sector reform - ISAC Fund

István Gyarmati MILITARY REFORMS OF THE 1990s: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES
István Gyarmati MILITARY REFORMS OF THE 1990s: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES
simply that it is very difficult and costly to meet these requirements: no single
country – with the possible exception of the United States of America – is able to
do so. Therefore, international military cooperation becomes indispensable.
People and institutions first, weaponry later
Defense reform is a long and difficult process. In the best of the cases it lasts
for six to eight years. To ensure long-term success, it is essential to create the
the best possible circumstances for attracting the necessary personnel, including
the large number of non-commissioned officers (NCOs). Costly investments in
weaponry can, and indeed should, wait until the personal is in place and trained
and the necessary structures and command lines are created.
SEVEN KEY ELEMENTS OF A MILITARY REFORM
1. Establish a comprehensive and appropriate legal framework
An adequate legal framework is indispensable for the reform. First, effective
democratic political and civilian control must be established, including the introduction
of the concept of „citizen in uniform”, which ensures that the human
rights of every soldier are protected and ensured without endangering the effective
functioning of the force–a huge task in itself. Next comes the necessary
legislation regarding the peacetime functioning of the force, mobilization and
wartime use. This is a vital and, at the same time, daunting task, which covers
close to all aspects of legislation, since the armed forces are decisively different
from the rest of the society. The necessary legislation should cover, in addition
to the “logical” ones, major areas of law: policing (for the military police), the
judiciary system (for the court-martial system), healthcare and pensions (for the
specific needs of the military in military healthcare and the special retirement
rules for the military), education (for military training schools), etc.
2. Create a modern and flexible command structure
It is essential to create a modern and flexible command structure, paying special
attention to maintaing the unity of command, which will make it possible to
command the forces in peacetime and, with few changes, in wartime. The
command structure must take into account the perspective of an eventual
international cooperation both in peace-time and in conflicts and will make it
possbile, easy and effective. It is importnt that a civilian Ministry of Defense
be created (that doesn’t mean that all employees of the Ministry of Defense
must be civilians from the very beginning, but the institution itself and its legal
status must be civilian and a significant numb er of its employess should also be
civilians). The command and planning and organizational functions should be
separated and this separation shluld be reflected institutionally as well.
3. Develop an efficient defence planning system
There is a need for a serious defense planning system, which should be created
under the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. The former monopoly of the
General Staff in planning must be replaced by a cooperative effort, in which
the civilian element takes the lead in determining the capabilities needed and
cooperates with the military element in translating these capabilities into forces,
as well as determining the price tag for all projects.
The defense planning process starts with the determination of the needs. These
needs must then be translated into specific programs, with a rigorous determination
of the amount of resources necessary to implement these programs.
The results of this process must be compared and harmonized with the budgetary
and other resources available. Such a process provides a clear picture of
the costs of certain capabilities, and this information enables the Parliament to
make informed decisions on what capabilities will eventually be sacrificed, if
budgetary constraints have to be imposed. The budget itself should be centered
on these needs and programs and must be transparent.
4. Create a new system of human resources management
An essential element of any reform is the reform of the human resource management
system. The heritage of Communist human resource management is
usually an army, which is top-heavy, meaning that it is overburdened by highranking
officers (generals, colonels and lieutenant-colonels) and lacks junior
officers and especially non-commissioned officers. The role of NCOs in this
system is limited to auxiliary roles; they are not part of the real command
structures at all.
The new human resources management system must provide for a sound and
predictable career model, with enough incentives to attract the quality of people
needed for the modern military. It must also be flexible enough to provide the
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