the process of security sector reform - ISAC Fund

Dr Timothy Edmunds THE PROCESS OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
Dr Timothy Edmunds THE PROCESS OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
inappropriate or partisan advice – it does bring advantages. These include training
for security sector personnel (including civilians) both at home and abroad – and
the provision of local advisors and financial support for the reform process. This
kind of technical assistance – which is available though programmes like PfP
– can help to short cut domestic shortages in expertise and provide a sometimes
helpful roadmap for reform.
As with many first generation reforms, participation in western sponsored activities
– such as sending officers to western staff colleges – can provide a visible
demonstration of a country’s engagement in SSR which can be easily publicised.
In addition, participating in peacekeeping or multinational security sector activities.
These help to expose security sector personnel to the norms and operating
procedures of other countries and are high profile opportunities to communicate
good practice and professionalism to domestic and international audiences.
Local strategies: SSR cannot be imposed from outside. While models of security
sector organisation from other countries may be useful as reference points
for particular SSR programmes, it is unlikely they will be successful if they are
used as rigid blueprints for reform.
Different historical, political, structural and social legacies create environments
which require specific local, context-specific strategies for reform. So, for
example, the British constabulary model of policing differs greatly from the gendarmarie
tradition in France, the carabineiri model in Italy. Simply transferring
one of these models from one country to another is unlikely to be particularly
helpful.
In addition, long-term SSR entails the development of expertise, and effective
mechanisms for security sector planning. In this respect, the local process of
developing appropriate democratic security sector arrangements can be at least
as important as the policy end-point itself. Imposing an externally generated
blueprint for reform avoids the (sometimes difficult) domestic security sector
planning process, which in itself is a fundamental part of SSR more widely.
Finally, reform needs reformers. If the SSR process is not driven from within the
local context then it is likely that it will remain superficial, and will not tackle
the underlying problems of the security sector. Often, of course, reformers will
be hard to find in the security sector itself – particularly if it perceives that its
interests will be threatened or damaged by SSR. Under these circumstances,
it can be useful to consider where reform is happening in other policy sectors
(such as in finance ministries for example) and about how to harness and utilise
this momentum and experience to help encourage reform in the security sector
itself.
PROBLEM AREAS
SSR entails changing often powerful and influential institutions with established
traditions, interests and agendas of their own. Because of this it is always likely
to be challenging. There are two particular difficulties associated with SSR
though that need to be recognised and cannot be avoided.
First, tends to be expensive, particularly in the short to medium-terms. In the
long-term SSR will bring economic advantages for the reasons outlined above,
but during the transitional phase professionalising and downsizing the security
sector will often lead to an increase rather than a decrease in state budgets. If
SSR is to be successful therefore it requires a realistic financial commitment
from the government concerned.
A second SSR problem concerns a tendency to concentrate on reform of the
regular armed forces, to the exclusion of security sector actors such as interior
ministry forces or the intelligence services. Secretive institutions such as the
intelligence services are inherently more difficult for civilians to penetrate and
engage with than other elements of the security sector. However, often it is
these other security sector actors who pose the most difficulty in relation to their
engagement in domestic politics or their exclusion from democratic mechanisms
for oversight and transparency.
If SSR is to occur in a coherent, effective and successful manner therefore, it
is critical that future reform efforts also include the more ‘difficult’ areas of the
SSR agenda.
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