the process of security sector reform - ISAC Fund

István Gyarmati MILITARY REFORMS OF THE 1990s: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES
István Gyarmati MILITARY REFORMS OF THE 1990s: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES
necessary mix of long-term commanders and experts and shorter-term foot
soldiers. All of this must be achieved in strong competition with other employers
in a competitive labor market.
5. The military budget: matching resources to missions and ensuring transparency
The military budget is an essential element of reform: budgetary means available
must be sufficient or otherwise the reform will fail. A failed reform produces
worse results then no reform, therefore it must be approached with extreme care.
This is not to suggest that all requirements, expectations, demands and wishes
of the military must be fulfilled. Sufficiency of means, in this context, means
that only those objectives can be set which are supported by budgetary means.
Should the budget be limited, the objectives should also be limited: balance is
essential.
It is also important to ensure that the budget be transparent. The budget is one
of the most important means in the hands of the political leadership, including
the executive and the legislative, to exercise control over the military. It is
also essential in terms of establishing and maintaining pubic support, which is
indispensable for the reform and the long-term maintenance of defense forces
in any one country.
As mentioned above, the budgetary system should provide clear information
about what different military capabilities cost in reality and in their entirety. This
will make budgetary decisions easier to make, since decision-makers − and the
public − will know what are the real consequences of cuts or increases. Not only
does transparency enable the political leadership to make decisions based on
more complete information, it also places the responsibility for these decisions
where it belongs: on elected politicians. This relieves the military of taking
decisions which must be reserved for the political leadership and Parliament.
6. Pursue technical modernization, but at the right time
Technical modernization is an important element of reform, but it is not the
reform itself. The military tends to equate modernization with the acquisition of
new weapons and other systems: this is simply not true. Technical modernization,
of course, is an important pre-requisite for establishing and maintaining modern
armed forces. Technology, however, can only work if the environment is capable
of using it properly. This means that reforms aimed at the “software”
of the military (training, doctrine, etc.) must precede technical modernization,
otherwise the old structures will never be able to make use of new technology.
Pursuing technological modernization too early is counterproductive: on the
one hand it diverts financial resources from other areas, like personnel; on the
other hand, it creates the impression that reform is indeed happening and thus
provides an excuse not to do anything else.
7. Make a careful decision regarding conscription vs. all-volunteer forces
The decision between conscription or all-volunteer armed forces is an important
one: public pressure will mount in every democracy to get rid of conscription.
This is also supported by professional arguments: modern armed forces hardly
can rely on short-term conscripts. An all-volunteer force is, however, very
difficult to establish and maintain. It is expensive. It requires a real sense of
purpose of the force to be able to recruit the necessary quality and quantity of
personnel, and it necessitates very strong political control in order to ensure that
the forces never act on their own. This decision should not be taken hastily. All
of the pros and cons must be considered, including the budgetary implications.
Moving to an all-volunteer force must not be seen as a way to save money!
LESSONS FROM THE EXPERIENCES
OF OTHER COUNTRIES:
1. For a defense reform to succeed, national consensus on its main objectives
and some essential elements is indispensable. The consensus must
include rough forecast for military spending and should cover the most
important elements of the reform.
2. Defense reform cannot be elaborated by the military: the process must be
driven by the political/civilian leadership. It must, however, not alienate
the military either. This does not mean, however, that one should require
the support of recent senior military for the reforms: it would be irrational
to expect military leaders educated in another system to be open to
radical reform. It is the second and third level of military leaders, who
will support reform, if – and that is another essential requirement – the
reform offers them a perspective of a better military and a better life.
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