the process of security sector reform - ISAC Fund

Dr Timothy Edmunds THE PROCESS OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
Narcís Serra TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY REFORM: POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK
• SSR cannot be imposed from above, and the development of locallyowned
strategies for reform is important. In many respects, the reform
process itself is more important than the imposition of a particular endpoint.
• SSR must be problem driven rather than institution driven, and as such
must address all security sector actors of relevance. In particular, the difficulties
of conducting SSR in ‘difficult’ areas such as interior ministry
forces or the intelligence services must be grappled with.
Narcís Serra
President of the CIDOB Foundation, Barcelona
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY
AND MILITARY REFORM:
POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK
In the last twenty-five years of the XX century, all the dictatorial regimes of
southern Europe and Latin America went through a process of democratisation.
Together they constitute the core what Samuel Huntington called the “third
wave”. This, along with the fall of the Berlin wall, has come to constitute one of
the greatest collective instances of advancement towards democracy in recent
times. As well, in the nineties, the Eastern European countries also began a long
and difficult process of transition towards democracy.
A feature common to all the Latin American countries is that such a transition to
democracy was effected, without exception, from military regimes. More or less
the same can be said, with the odd nuance, of the countries of southern Europe.
In all the Eastern European countries there have been problems of adaptation
of the armed forces to the normal functioning of democracy and in all of those
countries this has given rise to problems of a change in values and a shift in
professional and ideological profile given the relationship between the army and
the Communist Party prior to such changes.
An analysis of civil-military relationships would therefore seem essential if we
wish to trace the democratic evolution of these countries, where the process of
creation of democratic institutions and mechanisms for control over the military
is crucial.
With regard to Serbia and Montenegro it would be interesting to examine the
extent to which these cases can help to decide the most adequate means of
guaranteeing civil control over the armed forces and explore whether they provide
guidelines for proceeding that can be applied to the Federation.
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