the process of security sector reform - ISAC Fund

George Katsirdakis SECURITY SECTOR REFORM FROM A NATO VIEWPOINT
George Katsirdakis SECURITY SECTOR REFORM FROM A NATO VIEWPOINT
unnecessarily resorting to the need for secrecy over the activities of the actors
of the security sector. Although it is understandable that because of the nature of
the activities of some of the actors of the security sector an element of secrecy is
necessary, for some of their activities and structures, this should not be extended
to almost the totality of their functions. It should be clearly understood by all
the state-related actors that the civil society actors have the right to be fully
informed and the responsibility to scrutinise both the activities of the security
sector and its use of available resources.
POTENTIAL NON-CONVENTIONAL ACTORS (SEE)
In the relevant literature on the security sector there is sometimes reference to
some other non-conventional actors of the security sector, particularly relevant
to countries of South East Europe during the recent years of instability in some of
the countries of the region. These actors exist only under conditions of instability
and have no reason of existence in stable and well governed democratic states.
Such actors are “Liberation Armies”, guerrilla armies, various forms of militias
including political party militias.
WHY SSR?
After describing in general terms what is SSR and the various actors of the
security sector, the obvious question that arises is “why should a state embark
on SSR?”
The first point that could be made in this respect is that in a democratic society
there is no place for an unreformed security sector. Bluntly put, an unreformed
security sector may be dangerous for the stability of the state and for its democratic
institutions. The recent history examples of the validity of this statement are,
unfortunately, so many that no self-respecting democratic state can afford to
disregard them.
Another practical reason necessitating SSR is the cost of maintaining and running
the various actors of the broader security sector. The armed forces, the police, the
gendarmerie, the internal security forces, the border guards, the coast guards etc,
are as an aggregate by far the biggest spenders of the state budget and, where
this case may apply, of the state investments budget. Especially in the case of
countries in transition, where resources tend to be even more scarce than in other
countries, there is an inescapable necessity of reducing the budget expenditures,
in some cases dramatically, to balance expenditures with the receipts of the state
budget. However, although the principle of reducing expenditures to the security
sector to economise on resources may look like a sound approach, governments
should be extremely careful, before deciding to cut funds. They must first have
developed a realistic and affordable strategy of reform of the security sector to
ensure that the organisations of the sector, despite rationalisation, will remain
effective and fully functional and capable to carry out their missions. If this is not
done with the utmost care and as a top priority issue the result will be a negative
impact on the security sector organisations, serious decline of morale, inability to
function properly and in this respect the state would actually have to face a much
bigger problem than the one it would try to resolve.
One more point that could be made is that an unreformed security sector tends
to be fragmented, highly compartmentalised, uncoordinated and thus totally
inefficient and of little use to the state. This is particularly true if the state has
to deal with highly complex and multi-dimensional security challenges such
as the security challenges of international terrorism and of asymmetric threats
especially in the cases that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are involved.
In the post-September 11 security environment there simply is no space for defence
and security services that do not fully cooperate and coordinate with each other
and that do not try to work in the most effective way possible to be successful in
their missions. What is required under the new security threats is very thorough
and effective inter-departmental coordination and cooperation, effective use of
resources, effective sharing of intelligence and of other relevant information, task
force organisational structures, proper technological equipment and re-definition
of the missions, structures, organisation, resourcing, functioning and oversight of
the security sector actors if a state wants to have a chance in effectively dealing
with the new security challenges. All these cannot be achieved unless the entire
security sector is reformed, redesigned and re-oriented from the “business as
usual” approach to the “homeland defence” approach.
In the case of countries transitioning from a totalitarian regime to a democratic
state the need for reform of the security sector is even more imperative because of
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