the process of security sector reform - ISAC Fund

Narcís Serra TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY REFORM: POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK
Narcís Serra TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY REFORM: POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK
army instead of tackling the question of police reform can be serious for the
functioning of democracy.
There are other fields of the administration, normally linked to air and sea transport:
ports, airports, air control, meteorology, etc. It is not such an urgent and important
priority to give them a more civil character. This makes it difficult to achieve
any integrated running and management of certain fields of the administration
and they usually carry connotations linked to prerogatives of previous eras, such
as uncontrolled income, and open the way for mechanisms of corruption in the
armed forces.
In this period it is also necessary to tackle the issue, normally essential for the
maintenance of dictatorial regimes, of the control of information services. There
are no simple or common solutions to this question. It must be pointed out,
however, that linking these activities directly to the President of the Republic is
often a way for the military to achieve autonomy if they continue to direct these
services.
THE SECOND PHASE: DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
In this phase, we must analyse four tasks which are key to the development of
this phase: the elaboration of military policy by government, the elimination of
military privileges, the evolution of the concept of a military profession, and the
definition of the new missions to be carried out by the armed forces.
Elaboration of a military policy.
Here, the essential element is what the Minister of Defence does, as well as giving
the Ministry the organic structure necessary to carry it out. The civil minister
must be seen as an element necessary for defence policy and for military policy
in the present international context. An effort must therefore be made to make
sure that his mandate coincides with the presidential mandate, and so avoid the
practice of defence ministers whose mandate is so brief that they aren’t allowed
to gain even minimum knowledge of the situation, let alone take important and
far reaching decisions.
When we say that the civil minister must be seen by the military as a necessary
element, what we mean is that certain functions, which are absolutely necessary
today, must be underlined, such as his role as arbiter between armies over
differences regarding budget allocations or the different focuses given to
the doctrine of joint action. His work in the field of international relations, so
crucial today, must also be underlined, whether with reference to organisations
or bilaterally, vis-à-vis other countries. Other factors further reinforce the role
of the civil minister, such as the connection between defence policy and legislative
power. Another very important and crucial task of the civil minister and
his Department is to promote greater awareness of military questions among
academics, parliamentarians and journalists, and so stimulate debate on themes
of defence in the society. Finally, it must also be stressed that the civil minister
must undertake the task of the defence of the legitimate professional interests of
the military, in the light of the limitations that exist with regard to the rights of
association and union affiliation of the military.
Once a civil defence minister has been appointed, the second requisite is the
creation of a Ministry with a real capacity for the running of military policy and
which is, within the circumstances of each country, more or less on par with those
that exist in consolidated democracies. Latin America provides many examples
of processes that have been halted precisely at this point, since virtually all the
Latin American countries today have civil defence ministers, but in the majority
of cases, they lack the administrative means necessary to direct military policy,
i.e., they do not have a real Ministry of Defence.
The creation of a ministry of defence is an arduous process of overhauling
certain areas of decision considered as inherently military territory. For that precise
reason it should be carried out in at least two phases. A first phase would
see to the creation of an initial nucleus around the Minister, on which certain
tasks are directly dependent, such as defence policy, contact with the media
and intelligence; as well, a progressive mechanism of budget control should be
created. The second phase should establish functional dependence on the organs
of the army vis-à-vis those of the central apparatus of the Ministry itself.
Thirdly defence policy must be visibly perceived as the policy of the entire
government, and every opportunity should be taken to show coordination with
foreign policy and other corresponding sectorial policies.
Fourthly, the involvement of the legislative power in these tasks must be guaranteed,
at least in two directions. On the one hand, by controlling the allocation
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