Gedankenexperimente Eine Familie philosophischer Verfahren

Beginnen wir mit drei Beispielen für problematische Gedankenexperimente, die Fodor selbst
anführt:
Beispiel zwei:
A philosopher interested in determining the logically characteristic features of occurrences of
„know“ might require the following of his informant: “Suppose a man were capable of correctly
answering any problem in elementary number theory but claimed neither to be able to state how
he arrived at his solutions nor ever to have been taught any mathematics. Would you say that he
knows number theory?” If the informant’s answer is negative, then it would appear that explicit
access to the rules employed in computation is a logically necessary condition upon knowledge of
such things as number theory. If the informant’s answer is affirmative, then it is only a
psychological fact that people who know number theory are able to articulate their knowledge. 296
Or a philosopher interested in dreams might ask the following sort of question: “Suppose we
observe a sleeper to have passed a restless night; we have seen him toss and turn and heard him
mutter and cry out in his sleep. Upon awakening (and thereafter) he firmly and sincerely claims
not to have dreamed. Would you say that he has dreamed and forgotten his dream or that he has
not dreamed at all?” 297
Und Beispiel drei:
Or conversely: “A man passes what, to casual observation, appears to be a quiet night. Moreover,
EEG readings show no alteration of slow waves, his eye movements during sleep are not
patterned, and he exhibits no change in GSR, perspiration, and so forth. Nevertheless, upon
awakening, the subject reports terrible nightmares and anxiety dreams. Assuming that you know
the subject’s report to be sincere, would you say that the subject did, in fact, dream?” 298
Beispiele zwei und drei sind nur Szenarien, an die jeweils eine Frage angelegt wurde. Sie sollen
aber Beispiele für dasselbe philosophische Verfahren sein, daß auch durch Beispiel eins illustriert
wurde:
According to the strategy currently under investigation, if speakers claim that they would say in
the second case that the subject had dreamed and in the first case that he had not, then it must
follow that what is logically characteristic of occasions upon which we say of someone that he
dreamed is a positive dream report. That is, the relation between “S dreamed” and “S exhibited
alteration of slow waves during sleep” is at best a symptomatic relation, though the symptom is,
ex hypothesi, perfectly reliable in this case. 299
Eigenschaften von empirisch charakteristischen trennen möchte. Fodors Text läuft am ehesten auf diese Lesart
hinaus.
296 Fodor [oKww] 203f.
297 Fodor [oKww] 204.
298 Fodor [oKww] 204.
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