The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

iron? Where can one find more nickel, more coal, more manganese, more
molybdenum? Ukraine is the source of manganese to which even America goes
for its supplies. And, on top of that, so many other possibilities! The vegetable
oils, the heave plantations to be organized. With 100,000 acres devoted to the
growing of rubber, our needs are covered”. 4
Among reasons which Hitler was given to explain eastern territorial
expansion was also strong racial attitude and memories of German control over
Ukraine in 1918 5 . That experience reinforced his belief that the Ukrainians are
precarious and untrustworthy allies, almost bolshevists, and even the
Belarusians were much more prized by him 6 . In the final analysis, Nazi view of
Ukraine, that so-called „new Indian Empire” 7 , was affected by both the image
of unused economic potential, which includes Ukraine’s considerably role in
petroleum transit from Caucasus, and Hitler’s immense contempt for Slavs
living there, who were find incapable of efficient self-organization. According
to Nazi ideology Slavs were directly created to either the post of labor force or
just to undertake diversionary actions against the Soviet Union.
Surprisingly, Germany enjoyed respect in Ukraine. The issue that inflamed
pro-German attitude of Ukrainian independence movement in general was in
fact experience of World War I, namely German intervention in 1918 and
proclamation the Hetmanate by Pavlo Skoropadskyi. That short period bore no
resemblance to the bolshevists repressions of that time. On the contrary, the
German occupation resulted in relative restoration of economic institutions as
well as comparative political stability. 8 Many Ukrainians pointed to the rise of
chaos after backdown of the German army in November 1918 as cautionary
tales of what can happen without their protection. The Germans were very
often declared to be exponents of higher civilization and counterbalance for the
wild Russians. Therefore, in the 1920s it was Berlin that has became an
important centre of Ukrainian emigration.
Moreover, the Ukrainians found it prudent to cooperate with Germans
during the 1930s 9 because of mutual resentment. Both Germany and Ukraine
4 Bormann-Vermerke. cz. I (tzw. „gawędy domowe” Hitlera z lat 1941-1944). In:
ZABOROWSKI, Jan (ed.): „Generalplan Ost”. Koncepcje i plany polityki wschodniej Adolfa
Hitlera (wybór tekstów). Warszawa, 1997. 107.
5 HRYCAK, Jaroslav: Tezy do dyskusji o UPA. In: Idem. Nowa Ukraina. Nowe interpretacje.
Wrocław, 2002. 92.
6 HITLER, Adolf: Rozmowy przy stole 1941-1944. Charyzma 1996. 88.
7 Bormann-Vermerke, cz. I…, 110.
8 MEDRECKI, Włodzimierz. Niemiecka interwencja na Ukrainie w 1918 roku. Warszawa,
2000. 306-307.
9 Although Ukrainian nationalists have kept in touch with NSDAP since 1921, their mutual
relations developed during next decade, especially when Nazis came to power in Germany in 1933.
Hitler put the Ukrainians to use in undertaking diversionary actions against the USSR and in
forming intelligence network in East Europe and Balkans. The cooperation was much strengthened
in 1933, when in Munich Ukrainian National Federation (UNO) was designed. UNO was formally
liable for caring for the Ukrainians living in Germany, but its authorities was totally subordinated to
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