The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

According to his diaries, the main reason of Ribbentrop’s attitude was anger
with Hungarian attempts of imperial policy 13 . In January 1939 at the closed
meeting with German generals he presented his vision of the future fate of
Ukraine. He said: „The Ukrainian question allows us coup de grace of Poland as
well as the USSR to be inflicted. Taking everything into consideration, we can
carry on implementing the ideological purpose of our eastern policy, which is to
create „Great Ukraine” consisting of all ethnographic Ukrainian territories in
the USSR, Poland and Transcarpathia. (…) Obviously, this country will survive
only thanks to unconditional devotion to Germany. The division of Poland and
the USSR will result in the augmentation of our activity in the east and finally
make us to rule according to the maxim „divide et impera”. We are aware that
the first step to bring it off is „Carpatho-Ukraine” 14 .
It’s worth mentioning that Ribbentrop’s conception was characterized by
variation of the famous Alfred Rosenberg’s idea. Rosenberg, in the 1940s head
of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, observed that the
Soviet Union was not a monolithic state, but rather a conglomerate of many
small nations. He suggested that Germany should appeal to the non-Russian
nationalities’ quest for freedom, arguing that such an appeal would reduce the
force of Soviet resistance. There is the mistaken impression that Rosenberg as
well as Ribbentrop acted in opposition to Hitler. Ihor Kamenetsky rightly
mentioned, that „in reality, there is not a substantial difference in their attitudes
and actions regarding German Lebensraum” 15 . The ultimate goal of all of them
was to make Ukraine to be subordinated to Germany on the one hand and to
adapt eastern territories to the needs of German colonists on the other.
The Carpatho-Ukrainian experiment lasted only five months and even
proclamation of independence in a symbolic gesture of Voloshyn did not stop
Hungarian annexation of that territory in March 1939. There are at least three
reasons of its failure:
1. Firstly, there was absolutely no support from Western powers. France
and England as well as the Soviet Union declared desinteressment.
Furthermore, it was not just Hungary who has ordered territorial changes.
Carpatho-Ukraine had to struggle with Polish objections, too. Both Poland and
13
On 28th October, 1938 Ciano noted in his diary: „Ribbentrop’s attitude is hostile towards
Hungary, whereas Czechs are unashamedly supported by him”, and Italian minister has in mind
the Carpathian issue itself. In November Ciano described negotiations between Italy and
Germany, which eventually resulted in First Vienna Award. The Italians advocated Hungary
which strongly requested a recapture of Carpathian Ruthenia, whereas the Germans, represented
by Ribbentrop, sought to tone down Hungarians’ pretensions. CIANO, Galeazzo: Dziennik 1937-
1943. Edited by T. WITUCH. Pułtusk, 2006. 258.
14
TORECZKI, Roman: Kwestia ukraińska w polityce III Rzeszy (1933-1945). Warszawa,
1972. 161-162.
15
KAMENETSKY, I.: German Colonization Plans In Ukraine during World War I and II.
In: TORKE, Hans-Joachim, HIMKA, John-Paul (ed.): German-Ukrainian Relations in Historical
Perspective. Toronto, 1994. 101.
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