The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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de la guerre [il] ne fait que l'aggraver”. 20 We find here another reason of the MPs silence. This Commission was as an arena where passions broke out, as mush first steps to the internal quarrels which mark the French political life during the day which follow. However, this Commission did not make echo, that probably explain by the fact that one to tear to pieces in slides but it is necessary to make good figure and post unit during the Parliament session in these time of extreme international tensions. The House remains rather hermetic with any form of debates, relayed in the appendices of the Parliament and deprives to us thus an essential dimension in order to understand the quietness of the MPs on the pact subject. Perhaps is necessary it to continue research out of the Palais-Bourbon walls and to delay in the political press columns of the Third Republic. 21 If the speeches global board of representatives of the various political parties can be reduced to a white page, it is obvious that this additional silence of the MPs is not insignificant. More general studies about political parties, 22 even if they devote to it some lines, as well as Jean-Paul Brunet’s article about the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact in the French press, 23 grant to say that the surprise strikes a large part of parliamentary body. And it is Blum which expresses the better this state of mind because he is, moreover, the only one to formalize his „stupeur” 24 ; this stupor which does it sometimes to mislay in conjecture when he tries to replace this diplomatic volte-face in an international context in order to give it an explanation. If must see here the main reason of the MPs quietness at the time of the signature pact announced. Event is clearly posted in the press: the headlines express a feeling of a dramatic turn of events and it there no reason to the MPs escape that, taking into account the explanations has which we gave higher. But the surprise does not last. The Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, 20 The officiel statement and motion written by the Commission are retranscribed completely in the article of Le Temps, August 27 th 2009. 21 The studied newpapers all are of the political newpapers, press agencies official party : Le Populaire, L'Humanité, or politized: La Dépêche, Le Temps and Le Figaro. The studied numbers are published between August 20 th included and on September 5 th included. The choice of the dates is subjected to a will of effectivness, in order to not to move away from the selected subject and to a temporal constraint, time have suddently missed to undertake a research of information on a broader chronology. The number of newpapers studied is subjected to the same constraints altought us were tried to provide a sufficient range of titles in order to cover the political orientations of extreme left to the right-hand side. 22 On the Radical Party, to see: BERSTEIN, Serge: op. cit., 1982. On the SFIO, to see: CASTAGNEZ-RIGGIU, Noëlline: Socialistes en République : les parlementaires SFIO de la IV e République. Presses Universitaires de Rennes, Rennes, 2004. Altough the title can make appear anachronistic work compared to the subject of the communication, the author approaches, certainly rather briefly, the problem of the reception of the German-Soviet pact. On PCF, to see: VIDAL, Georges: La Grande Illusion ? Le Parti communiste français et la Défense nationale à l'époque du Front populaire. Presses Universitaires de Lyon, Lyon, 2006. 23 BRUNET, Jean Paul Brunet: op. cit., 1974. 24 Le Populaire, August 23 rd 1939. 116
object of all non-reactions, is then hoarded by MPs and political parties to transform it into pretext reviving the old demons of the French political life. The Ribbentrop – Molotov pact, an internal politics quarrels vector: between „districtism” and settling of scores In the days which follow the pact signature, the political subject that it represents leaves the field of reflexion and the parliamentary debate, although it is never been there. Instead of seizing problem, making a political study object and giving a founded and argued analysis, French MPs transform the information to an argument, a pretext to release a threats and internal quarrels process without real direct links with international circumstances and issues of the beginning. And if the international context is evoked, it is to become quickly a weapon or an asset for private interests. When we put side Le Temps report and the Blum’s leading article, it remains nothing. No French MPs during a session tried a global interpretative step and any great political figure used the press as opinion column. It is thus definitively visible the MPs political reactions are not about international order. Diverting impact of the pact signature to the French political life, MPs expressed a form of abstract and indirect reaction consequently which shows the first and true significance of what is at the beginning a diplomatic reversal. In fact, to MPs, the things are presented in such way that the international crisis was acted by the institutions, the national policy has a guiding way established since March 1939 but the ideological and political internal struggle remain open. This attitude lets show the MPs interests limits, proclaimed by them, thus their action sphere which exceeds very seldom their district and some places of political power, such as the Assembly. This functional pattern common to the French MPs majority of the Third Republic proceeds of a „districtism” still very marked with the elected representatives – more the share are „districtist”, closer to the local interests defence than the great national questions and even less international. 25 We can find the proof about the subjects of the MPs questions to the government during the September 2 nd session which place themselves almost on the level of the individual problem and the local quarrel. 26 Thus the Third Republic MP is a representative of his district and his party before to be a national elected. This priorities definition of elected representatives explains partly the MPs attitude in front of the pact signature: after the surprise, none debate, the information is immediately used at internal political ends as much national scale as party scale. In fact, only direct and frank reaction that the MPs majority had, was to open a genuine heavy fire on the PCF (French Communist 25 MAYEUR, Jean-Marie, CHALINE, Jean-Pierre, CORBIN, Alain (dir.): Les Parlementaires de la Troisième République. Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris, 2003. 26 JODRF, September 3 rd 1939. 117
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ISBN 978-963-284-164-9
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Unknown Clauses: The Background Dea
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CONTENTS Foreword (István MAJOROS,
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Foreword The world remembers in 200
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The Historical Judgement of the Mol
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went often on emotional instead of
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What is much more interesting is th
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such an international agreement as
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Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggress
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Done in duplicate, in the German an
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Lachaise, Bernard Historiography of
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Relations) are the focus of special
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Russian agreement (…) would allow
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Europe and on the French communists
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adopted a stance of denying the fac
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Ortolan, Guillaume The 70 th annive
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government (more than twenty) came,
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War. On the contrary, it shows that
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this anniversary and more widely of
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interesting: „Illusions. In summe
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Kretschmann, Vasco The ideological
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One of the most influential associa
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Germanness in the provinces of West
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Prętkiewicz, Przemysław The syste
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interwar period and the treaty was
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situation of rising danger accepted
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Manchukuo and broke relations with
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I would like to finish my article w
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party itself but for the whole Slov
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In summary, the group of the „Mod
Page 68 and 69: make proposals or suggestions. 6 In
Page 70 and 71: (Aland), Hanko and the islands of t
Page 72 and 73: have had a less serious effect on t
Page 74 and 75: not expect strong resistance and ho
Page 77 and 78: Winkler, Paul Adolf Eichmann’s Vi
Page 79 and 80: individual offenders, 10 who used h
Page 81 and 82: esearch. But how could the suppress
Page 83 and 84: expert of this matter 29 and had as
Page 85 and 86: Arendt on the contrary is in the op
Page 87 and 88: the „matter”, where there was a
Page 89 and 90: adoption of the model it became cle
Page 91 and 92: of Eichmann. For that Heydrich deli
Page 93: esistance […] but of logistics. N
Page 96 and 97: British government refused to give
Page 98 and 99: ole in the defence of Madrid in Nov
Page 100 and 101: public doubt the democratic idea of
Page 102 and 103: Republicans. In the refugee camps i
Page 104 and 105: 102
Page 106 and 107: iron? Where can one find more nicke
Page 108 and 109: According to his diaries, the main
Page 110 and 111: announced: „We have no active all
Page 112 and 113: 110
Page 114 and 115: negative, an analysis of the disapp
Page 116 and 117: can let think of an imminent war po
Page 120 and 121: Party), the enemy of the inside. Of
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Page 124 and 125: Before the Pact M. Coulondre, the F
Page 126 and 127: Lets us skip a few decades and list
Page 128 and 129: argain with. Hitler had an offer th
Page 130 and 131: secret protocol clarified that the
Page 132 and 133: to reach out for Russia through the
Page 134 and 135: of a war interesting rather on civi
Page 136 and 137: At the same moment, we can note an
Page 138 and 139: Faure 2 , remains hostile to war. I
Page 140 and 141: war can still be avoided in June 19
Page 142 and 143: acked by a „belligerent” coalit
Page 144 and 145: 142
Page 146 and 147: agreement” sound anachronistic. E
Page 148 and 149: 1939 between Germany and the Soviet
Page 150 and 151: Two ideas emerge from the press: on
Page 152 and 153: soviets didn’t have motive. Blum
Page 154 and 155: Moscow's line, with the national an
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Page 158 and 159: 2.000 German speaking inhabitants).
Page 160 and 161: The Eastern Polish border was not r
Page 162 and 163: Army. The mayor of Lviv did not wan
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Page 166 and 167: Budapest, and for Warsaw. The two c
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could not destroy the Polish Air Fo
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independence, Romania was forced to
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importance for the events considere
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possible future opposition to the S
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ate of communists within the Jews o
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the initial positive feeling toward
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wanted to take revenge for the NKVD
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German Reactions A last point that
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