The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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acked by a „belligerent” coalition which constitutes a majority in the government, among whom are Paul Reynaud, minister of Finance, Albert Sarraut, minister of the Interior, Georges Mandel, minister of Colonies, and Jean Zay, minister of national Education. 7 Georges Bonnet is now ostracised as attested by the Cabinet reshuffle of 13 September 1939: he loses the Foreign Affairs portfolio and is given the ministry of Justice. This eviction is proof of the government’s determination to go to war and its desire to eliminate a movement hostile to the patriotic consensus. Nevertheless, Edouard Daladier perceives the PCF’s support of the peace side as the main threat, not parliamentary pacifism. The measures taken by the government against the communists must therefore be interpreted in this context. Two days after the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, the government suspends communist newspapers L’Humanité and Ce Soir and, on 26 August, bans the communist press from further publication. One month later, on 26 September, before the communists even adopt the „fight against the imperialist war” stance, the PCF is dissolved, as is its parliamentary group. Subsequently, following the publication of the „letter to Herriot” on 1 October, the government waits until the end of the extraordinary Parliament session, on the 5 th , to launch an investigation into collusion with the enemy before the Paris military tribunal. As the MPs supporting the Germany-Soviet agreements no longer benefit from parliamentary immunity, the police raid the homes of Arthur Ramette and Florimond Bonte that very morning. Communist leaders decide to flee : Duclos and Ramette take refuge in Belgium while Maurice Thorez deserts his regiment and goes to Moscow. The Daladier government has therefore killed two birds with one stone : liquidating the communists whose support of pacifism was perceived as a threat and avoiding the peace debate in Parliament under the pretence of fighting against communists 8 . On 29 September, Paris was aware of the German-Soviet call for an overall resolution of the conflict. The final act of this deterrent policy aimed at preventing the collusion of pacifists against the war takes place at the beginning of December. Further to the Soviet invasion of Finland, Daladier seizes the PCF’s assets. From an external perspective, he supports the action of the LoN 9 which, putting an end to its strict selfimposed neutrality observed since the Pact and the declaration of war, decides to exclude the USSR on 14 December 1939. 7 See the biography by PUYAUBERT, J.: Georges Bonnet (1889-1973), les combats d’un pacifiste. Rennes, 2007. 201-207. 8 For more information on this question see BOURGEOIS, G.: Octobre 1939: sortir de la crise pacifiste pour continuer à faire la guerre. Communication pronounced in the conference Exits of crisis, university of Poitiers, 27-28 November 2008. All our thanks to the author who had the kindness to pass on to us the text of this communication before its publication in the acts of the conference, in autumn 2010. 9 e PAUL-BONCOUR, J.: Entre-deux-guerres. Souvenirs de la III République, t. III: Sur les chemins de la défaite 1935-1940. Paris, 1946. 183. 140
Conclusion In the 1930s, pacifism epitomises a collective mentality which transcends partisan divisions. It is also a transnational phenomenon. The German-Soviet Pact, more so than the declaration of war, deeply upsets the pacifism movement in France. This is the hypothesis we wanted to demonstrate in this brief communication. The resulting progressive ideological switch of the French communists and their return to ultra-pacifism entirely reshaped this movement. In September 1939, self-assured, majority, governmental and anticommunist pacifism switches to anti-governmental and minority pacifism, deeply affected by the communist support. After the Finland war, the communists increasingly focus on revolutionary defeatism, while the other pacifist groups are seen to capitulate by mid-June 1940. A significant number of personalities, who were still campaigning for peace at the end of the summer of 39, join the Vichy ranks and collaborate with Nazi Germany. This is the case of Georges Bonnet, Paul Faure and Jean Mistler, members of the National Council, Marcel Déat, founder of the Rassemblement national populaire in 1941, or the European federalists who perceive their projects as justification of German occupation. 141
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ISBN 978-963-284-164-9
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Unknown Clauses: The Background Dea
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CONTENTS Foreword (István MAJOROS,
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Foreword The world remembers in 200
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The Historical Judgement of the Mol
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went often on emotional instead of
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What is much more interesting is th
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such an international agreement as
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Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggress
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Done in duplicate, in the German an
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Lachaise, Bernard Historiography of
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Relations) are the focus of special
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Russian agreement (…) would allow
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Europe and on the French communists
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adopted a stance of denying the fac
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Ortolan, Guillaume The 70 th annive
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government (more than twenty) came,
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War. On the contrary, it shows that
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this anniversary and more widely of
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interesting: „Illusions. In summe
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Kretschmann, Vasco The ideological
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One of the most influential associa
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Germanness in the provinces of West
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Prętkiewicz, Przemysław The syste
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interwar period and the treaty was
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situation of rising danger accepted
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Manchukuo and broke relations with
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I would like to finish my article w
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party itself but for the whole Slov
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In summary, the group of the „Mod
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make proposals or suggestions. 6 In
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(Aland), Hanko and the islands of t
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have had a less serious effect on t
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not expect strong resistance and ho
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Winkler, Paul Adolf Eichmann’s Vi
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individual offenders, 10 who used h
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esearch. But how could the suppress
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expert of this matter 29 and had as
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Arendt on the contrary is in the op
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the „matter”, where there was a
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adoption of the model it became cle
Page 91 and 92: of Eichmann. For that Heydrich deli
Page 93: esistance […] but of logistics. N
Page 96 and 97: British government refused to give
Page 98 and 99: ole in the defence of Madrid in Nov
Page 100 and 101: public doubt the democratic idea of
Page 102 and 103: Republicans. In the refugee camps i
Page 104 and 105: 102
Page 106 and 107: iron? Where can one find more nicke
Page 108 and 109: According to his diaries, the main
Page 110 and 111: announced: „We have no active all
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Page 114 and 115: negative, an analysis of the disapp
Page 116 and 117: can let think of an imminent war po
Page 118 and 119: de la guerre [il] ne fait que l'agg
Page 120 and 121: Party), the enemy of the inside. Of
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Page 124 and 125: Before the Pact M. Coulondre, the F
Page 126 and 127: Lets us skip a few decades and list
Page 128 and 129: argain with. Hitler had an offer th
Page 130 and 131: secret protocol clarified that the
Page 132 and 133: to reach out for Russia through the
Page 134 and 135: of a war interesting rather on civi
Page 136 and 137: At the same moment, we can note an
Page 138 and 139: Faure 2 , remains hostile to war. I
Page 140 and 141: war can still be avoided in June 19
Page 144 and 145: 142
Page 146 and 147: agreement” sound anachronistic. E
Page 148 and 149: 1939 between Germany and the Soviet
Page 150 and 151: Two ideas emerge from the press: on
Page 152 and 153: soviets didn’t have motive. Blum
Page 154 and 155: Moscow's line, with the national an
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Page 158 and 159: 2.000 German speaking inhabitants).
Page 160 and 161: The Eastern Polish border was not r
Page 162 and 163: Army. The mayor of Lviv did not wan
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Page 166 and 167: Budapest, and for Warsaw. The two c
Page 168 and 169: could not destroy the Polish Air Fo
Page 170 and 171: independence, Romania was forced to
Page 172 and 173: importance for the events considere
Page 174 and 175: possible future opposition to the S
Page 176 and 177: ate of communists within the Jews o
Page 178 and 179: the initial positive feeling toward
Page 180 and 181: wanted to take revenge for the NKVD
Page 182 and 183: German Reactions A last point that
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The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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