The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

the „capitalist fascist” camp”. „Here the transformation is fundamental. No
doubt this policy still poses a problem today since it is much less
understandable than the precise point of a simple pact of non-agression” 10 .
More recently, it is the alliance which is highlighted by French historians.
Thus, François Furet writes: „the pact of August 23 inugurates the period of
alliance between the USSR and Nazi Germany. An alliance and not simply an
agreement of non-agression, according to the first presentation which was
made at the time…” 11 . As for Stéphane Courtois, in his introduction (which
gave rise to so many reactions) to the Black Book of Communism, devoted to
„the crimes of Communism”, he asserts that: „Stalin undeniably committed this
type of crime („against peace”), even simply by secret negotiations with Hitler,
through two peace treaties on August 23 and September 28, 1939, the division
of Poland and the annexion of the Baltic states, of Northern Bukovine and of
Bessarabia by the USSR” 12 .
Thus, in half a century, the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact has been read less and less
as a „simple” diplomatic treaty but as a strong political act implying Staline, the
USSR and Communism by insisting on the serious Soviet responsibility. The
second analysis has gained a predominant position since the 1990s, which is to say
after the fall of the USSR, in the context of the collapse and of the denunciation of
past Communist history. The wording used by Stéphane Courtois in his conference
of the summer of 2009 is, in this respect, explicit and summarizes this evolution:
the „German-Soviet pact” was replaced by „the Soviet-Nazi alliance”. These terms
of course point to different interpretations of the reasons which led to the signing of
the texts during the summer of 1939.
At the origins of the „German-Soviet pact” or „the appearance of the
defendants” (Y. Santamaria): Staline as the main culprit?
From the first texts on the German-Soviet pact, historians wondered about
the motivations of the signees, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, „two states
whose deep inimity had been, since the coming to power of Hitler, a constant in
international politics” 13 . But they also questioned more and more the
responsibilities of Western democracies and of Poland.
Concerning the reasons which led Hitler to accept the negotiations and then the
agreement with Staline, at the request of Ribbentrop, historiography has not really
evolved. Indeed, „differences in opinion on Hitler’s assessment of the Soviet
threat” 14 do exist. But, very early on, a wide consensus appeared: as P. Renouvin
wrote: „the motives of the German policy were not dubious” since the „German-
10 GIRAULT, René: art.cité, 112.
11 FURET, François: op.cit., 365.
12 COURTOIS, Stéphane: Le livre noir…op.cit., 15.
13 RENOUVIN, Pierre: Histoire des relations…op.cit., 180.
14 SANTAMARIA, Yves: op.cit., 121.
26