The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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independence, Romania was forced to deliver up Bessarabia and North Bukovina. 24 In spite of the fact, that the OSCE 25 shared the responsibility for starting the Second World War between Germany and the Soviet Union, many historians denied the role of Soviet state. According to their opinion, the Soviets wanted only create a defensive zone on the western border to increase their safety. The left-wing historians state that the Soviet Union was not an aggressor, but they neglect the fact that the League of Nations excluded the Bolshevik state after the sneaky attack against Finland. the European Council With these conquests the Soviet Union almost restored the formerly western borders of the Russian Empire in 1914. Hory went on leave and choose to go home, to Budapest. He met also with Teleki, but he did not mention any interesting detail about the discussion. It is worth commenting on, that in his memoir Hory did not mention the raising of the Hungarian Legion, and the rejecting behaviour of Hungarian foreign policy in case of the cooperation with the Germans against Poland. When he finished his work in 1959, he wanted also publish it. This was the reason, that the retired diplomat did not criticize sharply the Soviet behaviour in 1939/40. Like his contemporaries, and the whole circle of Hungarian historians until 1989, Hory gloss over the unpleasant fact, that Germany and Soviet Union made an alliance, which resulted that the liberty in Eastern Europe ceased to exist. In October 1939, few weeks after the Polish Armageddon, Hory saw in Vienna a newsreel about the war, and he recognized that the building of the Hungarian embassy in Warsaw was completely destroyed by German bombs. Hory felt that the Nazi offensive smashed achievements of his life-work. Although he maintained his societal status and he retained his importance in the Hungarian foreign policy until his retirement in 1941, he was among the first Hungarians, who could envision the coming fate of Hungary in the mirror of the Polish collapse in 1939. For Hory himself the Polish catastrophe broke his diplomatic career and in Warsaw he lost many part of his properties. In 1962 the elder diplomat could leave Hungary and settled in Vienna, where he died in 1971. He could not live to publish his memoir. The worst consequence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact for Eastern Europe was that the Soviet annexations of 1939-1940 were recognized by the western Allies, too 26 and Poland got the same Soviet occupation for reward which Hungary, and Romania for punishment. Therefore the Soviet overwhelming political and military presence was unquestionable in Eastern Europe until 1990. 24 In case of North Bukovina the Soviet revisionism turned into pure expansionism: this region belonged to Austria-Hungary before the First World War. 25 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 26 In 1945 „on the terriorial issues to the west Stalin’s minimal aid was to preserve the old Russian imperial frontiers which had stood before the German assault, and, indeed, were recognised in the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.” ROMSICS: 221. 168
Grether, Sandra Pogroms in Eastern Poland after the German Occupation The Reich‘s attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 broke the treaty both countries had signed just two years earlier, guaranteeing each other neutrality and secretly dividing Eastern Europe into two areas of interest, the so-called Hitler-Stalin-Pakt, or, more accurate, Molotow-Ribbentrop-Pakt. 1 Following roughly sketched borderlines, the territory of the Second Polish Republic was divided between the two partners in mutual interest - and left it to further negotiations whether these regions were to be incorporated into the Reich and the Soviet Union or to be given some state of independence. The Hitler-Stalin- Pakt had guaranteed the Reich the Soviet Union‘s neutrality in case of its attack on Poland, which took place only a couple of days after the signing and was followed by the invasion of Soviet troops into the Eastern parts of the country within two weeks. Both countries installed regimes in their respective zones of former Poland, forming them according to their plans and also forming the people living in these regions. In 1941 the Wehrmacht thus first conquered territories that had been occupied by the Red Army in 1939 in accordance with the Pakt and the Eastern Polish people‘s reaction to the invasion were in large parts due to their treatment by the Soviet occupants. One especially prominent phenomenon in this context is the willingness locals showed in taking part in German units‘ atrocities against Jews. With German soldiers arriving, Poles, Ukrainians and White Russians unleashed pogroms against their Jewish neighbours, often triggered by German units, but more often without. Their motivation has been the basis of a widespread discussion a few years ago, initiated by Bogdan Musial. 2 The events leading to these pogroms and the question why the Jewish population of Eastern Poland fell victim to their neighbours in June and July of 1941 was the basis for a presentation I gave in December 2009 as part of a conference on the Molotow-Ribbentrop-Pakt and is the basis for this paper. I would like to show how the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland 1939-1941 deepened contradictions within the local societies and how these tensions led to anti-Semitic riots once the Red Army left and the German armies approached. As this paper‘s main focus of interest are events in the summer of 1941, the German occupation of Poland from 1939 on as well as developments after the German invasion of the Soviet Union will only be taken into account when of 1 Non-aggression treaty between the Reich and the Soviet Union („Nichtangriffsvertrag zwischen Deutschland und der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken”), 23rd August 1939, cited from http://mdzx.bib-bvb.de/cocoon/1000dok/dok_0025_pak.html?object=translation&lang=de, 19.3.2009. I will use the term Hitler-Stalin-Pakt because it is more common. 2 MUSIAL, Bogdan: „Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschießen” - Die Brutalisierung des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges im Sommer 1941. Berlin 2001. 169
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ISBN 978-963-284-164-9
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Unknown Clauses: The Background Dea
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CONTENTS Foreword (István MAJOROS,
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Foreword The world remembers in 200
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The Historical Judgement of the Mol
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went often on emotional instead of
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What is much more interesting is th
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such an international agreement as
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Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggress
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Done in duplicate, in the German an
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Lachaise, Bernard Historiography of
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Relations) are the focus of special
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Russian agreement (…) would allow
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Europe and on the French communists
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adopted a stance of denying the fac
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Ortolan, Guillaume The 70 th annive
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government (more than twenty) came,
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War. On the contrary, it shows that
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this anniversary and more widely of
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interesting: „Illusions. In summe
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Kretschmann, Vasco The ideological
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One of the most influential associa
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Germanness in the provinces of West
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Prętkiewicz, Przemysław The syste
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interwar period and the treaty was
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situation of rising danger accepted
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Manchukuo and broke relations with
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I would like to finish my article w
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party itself but for the whole Slov
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In summary, the group of the „Mod
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make proposals or suggestions. 6 In
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(Aland), Hanko and the islands of t
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have had a less serious effect on t
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not expect strong resistance and ho
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Winkler, Paul Adolf Eichmann’s Vi
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individual offenders, 10 who used h
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esearch. But how could the suppress
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expert of this matter 29 and had as
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Arendt on the contrary is in the op
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the „matter”, where there was a
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adoption of the model it became cle
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of Eichmann. For that Heydrich deli
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esistance […] but of logistics. N
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British government refused to give
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ole in the defence of Madrid in Nov
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public doubt the democratic idea of
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Republicans. In the refugee camps i
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102
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iron? Where can one find more nicke
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According to his diaries, the main
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announced: „We have no active all
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110
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negative, an analysis of the disapp
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can let think of an imminent war po
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de la guerre [il] ne fait que l'agg
Page 120 and 121: Party), the enemy of the inside. Of
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Page 124 and 125: Before the Pact M. Coulondre, the F
Page 126 and 127: Lets us skip a few decades and list
Page 128 and 129: argain with. Hitler had an offer th
Page 130 and 131: secret protocol clarified that the
Page 132 and 133: to reach out for Russia through the
Page 134 and 135: of a war interesting rather on civi
Page 136 and 137: At the same moment, we can note an
Page 138 and 139: Faure 2 , remains hostile to war. I
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Page 142 and 143: acked by a „belligerent” coalit
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Page 146 and 147: agreement” sound anachronistic. E
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Page 150 and 151: Two ideas emerge from the press: on
Page 152 and 153: soviets didn’t have motive. Blum
Page 154 and 155: Moscow's line, with the national an
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Page 158 and 159: 2.000 German speaking inhabitants).
Page 160 and 161: The Eastern Polish border was not r
Page 162 and 163: Army. The mayor of Lviv did not wan
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Page 166 and 167: Budapest, and for Warsaw. The two c
Page 168 and 169: could not destroy the Polish Air Fo
Page 172 and 173: importance for the events considere
Page 174 and 175: possible future opposition to the S
Page 176 and 177: ate of communists within the Jews o
Page 178 and 179: the initial positive feeling toward
Page 180 and 181: wanted to take revenge for the NKVD
Page 182 and 183: German Reactions A last point that
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The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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