The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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(Aland), Hanko and the islands of the Gulf of Finland. These demands were not new to Finland; after the Russian civil war the Bolsheviks tried to get these territories. Moreover, we know of documents from the tsarist archives which contain similar demands. Tsar Peter I. said once, „None of the ladies in Saint Petersburg can sleep in peace, while Finland is in the hand of the enemies”. 6 After the pact The secret protocol was not known after the signing of the pact, but it was easy to guess that the Soviet Union was given a free hand in Eastern Europe and with the Baltic by Hitler. 7 After Germany and its puppet, Slovakia, attacked Poland, the Soviet Union occupied whole eastern Poland, the country collapsed. In this situation a Polish submarine, the Orzel, managed to flee to Tallin, Estonia. The Estonians should have disarmed the vessel in accordance with international war law, but instead, they let it continue on to London on 18 September. This was an excuse for the Soviets to offer military aid to Estonia, saying that by this act the Baltic country proved that they were not confident enough in their own military power. Thus, the Estonian ambassador was summoned to Moscow, 8 and the result of the negotiations was that Estonia and then Latvia and Lithuania (6 and 11 October, respectively) signed the military assistance agreement, but it was a de facto occupation. Although Estonia and Latvia were allies, the small countries did not want to take military action because they wanted to avoid war; they hoped the military assistance would result in peace. 9 Thus, the Soviet forces started to gain control over the Baltic States and built airports and piers. Stalin wanted to gain control over Finland too, so he had ordered the Finnish ambassador to Moscow on 5 October, 1939 and Molotov offered Finland the same contract he had offered to the Baltic States. The Finnish-Soviet negotiations The Finnish government sent State Counselor Paasikivi to Moscow. Field Marshal Mannerheim sent Colonel Paasonen with him as a military advisor, since the Colonel „was a skilled soldier, who knew the Russians’ manners”. 10 Paasikivi was instructed to explain to the Soviets that Finland wanted to avoid 6 JACOBSON, Max: Finnország: mítosz és valóság. (Finland: myth and reality). Minerva, Budapest, 1990. 28. 7 JACOBSON, Max: Finland in the new Europe. The center for strategic and international studies, Washington, 1998. 28. 8 MANNERHEIM, Carl Gustav von: Emlékiratok. A téli háború. (Memoir. The winter war). Püski, Budapest, 1997. 7. 9 Ibid. 8-9. 10 Ibid. 9-10. 68
conflicts. 11 When the Finnish delegation refused to sign the military assistance contract, Molotov came out with the Soviet demands, which were so excessive that they shocked the Finnish government. Stalin wanted to get territories – South-East Karelia and the Fisherman’s Peninsula 12 - near Petsamo, and offered some worthless territories in north-eastern Karelia as compensation. 13 They also wanted to get Hanko as a concession for thirty years because they wanted to use it as a military base and pier; they wanted to deploy there 5000 armed personnel. 14 The city lies a hundred kilometers westwards from Helsinki, so the Finns rejected to give it up because they did not want to allow the Soviets to build a bridgehead behind the fortified borders, in the heart of the country, near their capital. This bridgehead would have engaged a considerably big part of the Finnish army, and the Soviets would have dropped reinforcements from the occupied Estonia. The Soviets insisted on getting Hanko. Stalin reasoned that Finland was an easy target for the great powers and many of them would have liked the idea of getting Finland into their spheres; thus, Finland would have been a „springboard” to attack the Soviet Union. He also said that the Soviet Union was congenial to Germany but „this could be changed in this (war) situation”. 15 The Finnish delegation pointed out that Finland would not let anyone pass the border and they could defend themselves, but it did not gratify Stalin, who replied: „They would not ask you! They would be there, and that’s all. But do not expect that the Soviet Union and the Red Army would allow this and do nothing. No. We would advance and meet them there”. 16 The Finns tried to come to an agreement with the Soviets because they were not prepared for conflicts and therefore they were willing to surrender the islands - except for Ahvenanmaa - and other North-Karelian territories. They accepted the idea that the Finno-Soviet border, running only seven kilometers away from the Soviet Union’s second largest city – Leningrad – should be pushed away further (13 km) from the city, though it remained only a plan. The Soviet Union finally gave up claiming Hanko but still insisted on getting Lapohja port. 17 Molotov explained that these were the minimal claims. 18 These demands would 11 MANNERHEIM, Carl Gustav von: Emlékiratok. A téli háború. (Memoir. The winter war). Püski, Budapest, 1997. 11. 12 Also known as Rybachii Peninsula. 13 MANNERHEIM, Carl Gustav von: Emlékiratok. A téli háború. (Memoir. The winter war). Püski, Budapest, 1997. 11-12. 14 JACOBSON, Max: Finland in the new Europe. The center for strategic and international studies, Washington, 1998. 28. 15 MANNERHEIM, Carl Gustav von: Emlékiratok. A téli háború. (Memoir. The winter war). Püski, Budapest, 1997. 11. 16 JACOBSON, Max: Finnország: mítosz és valóság. (Finland: myth and reality). Minerva, Budapest, 1990. 28-29. 17 This is near to Hanko. 18 MANNERHEIM, Carl Gustav von: Emlékiratok. A téli háború. (Memoir. The winter war). Püski, Budapest, 1997. 15. 69
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ISBN 978-963-284-164-9
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Unknown Clauses: The Background Dea
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CONTENTS Foreword (István MAJOROS,
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Foreword The world remembers in 200
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The Historical Judgement of the Mol
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went often on emotional instead of
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What is much more interesting is th
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such an international agreement as
Page 20 and 21: Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggress
Page 22 and 23: Done in duplicate, in the German an
Page 25 and 26: Lachaise, Bernard Historiography of
Page 27 and 28: Relations) are the focus of special
Page 29 and 30: Russian agreement (…) would allow
Page 31 and 32: Europe and on the French communists
Page 33 and 34: adopted a stance of denying the fac
Page 35 and 36: Ortolan, Guillaume The 70 th annive
Page 37 and 38: government (more than twenty) came,
Page 39 and 40: War. On the contrary, it shows that
Page 41 and 42: this anniversary and more widely of
Page 43: interesting: „Illusions. In summe
Page 47 and 48: Kretschmann, Vasco The ideological
Page 49 and 50: One of the most influential associa
Page 51 and 52: Germanness in the provinces of West
Page 53 and 54: Prętkiewicz, Przemysław The syste
Page 55 and 56: interwar period and the treaty was
Page 57 and 58: situation of rising danger accepted
Page 59 and 60: Manchukuo and broke relations with
Page 61: I would like to finish my article w
Page 64 and 65: party itself but for the whole Slov
Page 66 and 67: In summary, the group of the „Mod
Page 68 and 69: make proposals or suggestions. 6 In
Page 72 and 73: have had a less serious effect on t
Page 74 and 75: not expect strong resistance and ho
Page 77 and 78: Winkler, Paul Adolf Eichmann’s Vi
Page 79 and 80: individual offenders, 10 who used h
Page 81 and 82: esearch. But how could the suppress
Page 83 and 84: expert of this matter 29 and had as
Page 85 and 86: Arendt on the contrary is in the op
Page 87 and 88: the „matter”, where there was a
Page 89 and 90: adoption of the model it became cle
Page 91 and 92: of Eichmann. For that Heydrich deli
Page 93: esistance […] but of logistics. N
Page 96 and 97: British government refused to give
Page 98 and 99: ole in the defence of Madrid in Nov
Page 100 and 101: public doubt the democratic idea of
Page 102 and 103: Republicans. In the refugee camps i
Page 104 and 105: 102
Page 106 and 107: iron? Where can one find more nicke
Page 108 and 109: According to his diaries, the main
Page 110 and 111: announced: „We have no active all
Page 112 and 113: 110
Page 114 and 115: negative, an analysis of the disapp
Page 116 and 117: can let think of an imminent war po
Page 118 and 119: de la guerre [il] ne fait que l'agg
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Party), the enemy of the inside. Of
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120
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Before the Pact M. Coulondre, the F
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Lets us skip a few decades and list
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argain with. Hitler had an offer th
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secret protocol clarified that the
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to reach out for Russia through the
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of a war interesting rather on civi
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At the same moment, we can note an
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Faure 2 , remains hostile to war. I
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war can still be avoided in June 19
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acked by a „belligerent” coalit
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142
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agreement” sound anachronistic. E
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1939 between Germany and the Soviet
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Two ideas emerge from the press: on
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soviets didn’t have motive. Blum
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Moscow's line, with the national an
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154
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2.000 German speaking inhabitants).
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The Eastern Polish border was not r
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Army. The mayor of Lviv did not wan
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162
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Budapest, and for Warsaw. The two c
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could not destroy the Polish Air Fo
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independence, Romania was forced to
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importance for the events considere
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possible future opposition to the S
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ate of communists within the Jews o
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the initial positive feeling toward
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wanted to take revenge for the NKVD
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German Reactions A last point that
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