The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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have had a less serious effect on the Finnish industry, but the government did not approve them 19 since the Finns did not want to be dependent of the Soviet Union. Eventually, on 13 November the negotiations broke down. Political Situation The Finnish Social Democratic government had the country’s support, which could be best shown by the fact that when the delegation went to the Soviet capital, at the Helsinki Railway station was a support demonstration which indicated that the unity within Finland was solid. 20 Two months later when the Soviets tried to win the people's trust, the strong unity of the Finns became a crucial factor. The idea of a Soviet protection was just as unacceptable to the Finnish people as to their government. In his talks with the Anglo-French delegation Vyacheslav Molotov proposed that the three powers (Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union) should guarantee the security of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland, so the English and the French government did not believe that the Soviets would attack the Finns. They told the Finnish ambassador that the Soviets only wanted to avoid the German advance. 21 The Finnish government did not believe either that the Soviets would attack; they thought that the nonaggression pact between Berlin and Moscow could revise their relations with the Soviet Union. 22 At the end of the Polish war, on 2 October the Finnish ambassador to Berlin, Vourimaa, wanted to clarify the Finnish-German relations. Weizsäcker, Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, said Germany would not intervene into Soviet-Finnish relations. 23 The Germans suggested that the Finns should be sensible and give in. 24 Not satisfied with this answer, the Finnish government now turned to the western democracies. First, they tried to get the help of the Scandinavian countries, but Stockholm told them not to expect military aid, only military equipments (such as airplanes, for example) and supplies. 25 The Finnish government considered protesting to the League of Nations, but finally they decided not to provoke the Soviets' anger. It 19 JACOBSON, Max: Finland in the new Europe. The center for strategic and international studies, Washington, 1998. 29. and MANNERHEIM, Carl Gustav von: Emlékiratok. A téli háború. (Memoir. The winter war). Püski, Budapest, 1997. 16. 20 MANNERHEIM, Carl Gustav von: Emlékiratok. A téli háború. (Memoir. The winter war). Püski, Budapest, 1997. 11. 21 JACOBSON, Max: Finland in the new Europe. The center for strategic and international studies, Washington, 1998. 28. 22 MANNERHEIM, Carl Gustav von: Emlékiratok. A téli háború. (Memoir. The winter war). Püski, Budapest, 1997. 7. 23 HELLER, Michail, NEKRICH, Alexandr: Orosz történelem (Russian history) vols II. Osiris, Budapest, 2003. 318. 24 MANNERHEIM, Carl Gustav von: Emlékiratok. A téli háború. (Memoir. The winter war). Püski, Budapest, 1997. 29. 25 Ibid. 26. 70
must be emphasized that the western democracies of Europe could not help, and when the USA stuck up for Finland, Molotov warned Roosevelt to „care about the freedom of the Philippines and not that of Finland.” 26 The Finnish government realized that they were alone, but as mentioned earlier, they did not believe that the Soviets would attack, so they rejected the demand to give a port away to them. They wanted to continue the negotiations, but the Soviet propaganda-machine started a broadside against the Finns. On 28 November the Soviets violated the non-aggression pact and launched their attack on 30 November, 1939. 27 Military arrangements Both sides prepared for a war against each other. The Finnish army was on constant standby. Mannerheim succeeded in having the government call back the reservists on 1 September. 28 Later on the reserve officers, who were disarmed in 1938, were also called back. 29 During the summer and the autumn, a defense line (named after Mannerheim) was built on the Karelian Isthmus, which was one of the territories the Soviets claimed. However, the Soviets demanded that it should be destroyed and offered that they would destroy their defense lines in return. The offer was disadvantageous for the Finns, because it would have been meaningless to attack the Soviets and they would have lost a most vital means of defense. 30 Finland held an overall military exercise on 14 October, but it was in fact an overall mobilization of the Finnish troops. 31 The Finns noticed that the Soviets rallied a large amount of troops on the border and made infrastructural repairs on roads and rails. 32 Stalin ordered the military commander of Leningrad to barrage on the Soviet village of Majnil, 800 meters from the Finnish border in order to blame Finland. 33 The winter war The Finnish government offered to investigate the incident, but the Soviet troops launched a full-scale attack in the direction of Helsinki. The Soviets did 26 MANNERHEIM, Carl Gustav von: Emlékiratok. A téli háború. (Memoir. The winter war). Püski, Budapest, 1997. 13. 27 HELLER, Michail, NEKRICH, Alexandr: Orosz történelem (Russian history) vols II. Osiris, Budapest, 2003. 318. 28 They were disarmed in August. 29 MANNERHEIM, Carl Gustav von: Emlékiratok. A téli háború. (Memoir. The winter war). Püski, Budapest, 1997. 10. 30 Ibid. 15. 31 Ibid. 10. 32 Ibid. 18. 33 HELLER, Michail, NEKRICH, Alexandr: Orosz történelem (Russian history) vols II. Osiris, Budapest, 2003. 318. 71
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ISBN 978-963-284-164-9
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Unknown Clauses: The Background Dea
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CONTENTS Foreword (István MAJOROS,
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Foreword The world remembers in 200
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The Historical Judgement of the Mol
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went often on emotional instead of
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What is much more interesting is th
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such an international agreement as
Page 20 and 21:
Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggress
Page 22 and 23: Done in duplicate, in the German an
Page 25 and 26: Lachaise, Bernard Historiography of
Page 27 and 28: Relations) are the focus of special
Page 29 and 30: Russian agreement (…) would allow
Page 31 and 32: Europe and on the French communists
Page 33 and 34: adopted a stance of denying the fac
Page 35 and 36: Ortolan, Guillaume The 70 th annive
Page 37 and 38: government (more than twenty) came,
Page 39 and 40: War. On the contrary, it shows that
Page 41 and 42: this anniversary and more widely of
Page 43: interesting: „Illusions. In summe
Page 47 and 48: Kretschmann, Vasco The ideological
Page 49 and 50: One of the most influential associa
Page 51 and 52: Germanness in the provinces of West
Page 53 and 54: Prętkiewicz, Przemysław The syste
Page 55 and 56: interwar period and the treaty was
Page 57 and 58: situation of rising danger accepted
Page 59 and 60: Manchukuo and broke relations with
Page 61: I would like to finish my article w
Page 64 and 65: party itself but for the whole Slov
Page 66 and 67: In summary, the group of the „Mod
Page 68 and 69: make proposals or suggestions. 6 In
Page 70 and 71: (Aland), Hanko and the islands of t
Page 74 and 75: not expect strong resistance and ho
Page 77 and 78: Winkler, Paul Adolf Eichmann’s Vi
Page 79 and 80: individual offenders, 10 who used h
Page 81 and 82: esearch. But how could the suppress
Page 83 and 84: expert of this matter 29 and had as
Page 85 and 86: Arendt on the contrary is in the op
Page 87 and 88: the „matter”, where there was a
Page 89 and 90: adoption of the model it became cle
Page 91 and 92: of Eichmann. For that Heydrich deli
Page 93: esistance […] but of logistics. N
Page 96 and 97: British government refused to give
Page 98 and 99: ole in the defence of Madrid in Nov
Page 100 and 101: public doubt the democratic idea of
Page 102 and 103: Republicans. In the refugee camps i
Page 104 and 105: 102
Page 106 and 107: iron? Where can one find more nicke
Page 108 and 109: According to his diaries, the main
Page 110 and 111: announced: „We have no active all
Page 112 and 113: 110
Page 114 and 115: negative, an analysis of the disapp
Page 116 and 117: can let think of an imminent war po
Page 118 and 119: de la guerre [il] ne fait que l'agg
Page 120 and 121: Party), the enemy of the inside. Of
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120
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Before the Pact M. Coulondre, the F
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Lets us skip a few decades and list
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argain with. Hitler had an offer th
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secret protocol clarified that the
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to reach out for Russia through the
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of a war interesting rather on civi
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At the same moment, we can note an
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Faure 2 , remains hostile to war. I
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war can still be avoided in June 19
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acked by a „belligerent” coalit
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142
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agreement” sound anachronistic. E
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1939 between Germany and the Soviet
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Two ideas emerge from the press: on
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soviets didn’t have motive. Blum
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Moscow's line, with the national an
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154
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2.000 German speaking inhabitants).
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The Eastern Polish border was not r
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Army. The mayor of Lviv did not wan
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162
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Budapest, and for Warsaw. The two c
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could not destroy the Polish Air Fo
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independence, Romania was forced to
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importance for the events considere
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possible future opposition to the S
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ate of communists within the Jews o
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the initial positive feeling toward
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wanted to take revenge for the NKVD
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German Reactions A last point that
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