The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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such an international agreement as a genius decision that was concluded by two totalitarian empires over the head of millions of Polish, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Romanian, and Ukrainian people without their consent, against their wish, deciding upon their fate and their future, which is still unacceptable seen from the western democracies’ viewpoint. 19 That is why the majority of the Baltic republic’s population expressed their opinion about Stalin’s genius decision as soon as it was possible, namely on August 23, 1989, at the 50 th anniversary of signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. 20 Who Were the Agreements Most Beneficial to? The German-Soviet agreement apparently delayed the war between Moscow and Berlin making them accomplices in dividing the territories lying between them. The German invasion of September 1, 1939 and the Soviet attack starting on September 17 against Poland were only the first step of accomplishing the division of the area – more delicately the demarcation of their spheres of interest – comprised in the secret clause of the agreement, which was modified on September 28. The Germans acquired the parts of Poland owing to them, while the Soviet Union annexed East-Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, 21 then commenced a war against Finland, and demanded Bessarabia successfully from Romania in 1940. With these actions, Stalin practically stepped on the way of traditional imperial expansion, the aim of which was to gain buffer territories to be used for beating off a potential attack against the Soviet Union. All in all, we can lay down that these territories were lost for Moscow even in the first few weeks of the war and their temporary possession did not influence the outcome of the war considerably. 22 At the same time, the Soviet expansion spoiled the agreement with the British and the Americans, who did not intend to support Stalin’s expansion. On the other hand, Hitler exploited the existence of the agreement concluded with the Soviet Union more than Stalin expected; though, he also had to explain himself to his allies 23 but only temporarily. After having secured his back from the east, his army occupied France, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg in less than one year. Though the occupation of these countries tied up significant German military power, the possession of 19 Let there be no mistakes about it: in the course of their history, these democracies also concluded several treaties that are unacceptable from our present-day viewpoint, and that completely ignored the opinion of especially the colonial areas’ population. 20 URBAN, Thomas: 15 Minuten Freiheit. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23 rd August 2009.; VESER, Reinhard: Eine Last für die Nachgeborenen. FAZ, 20 th August 2009. 21 RAUCH, Georg von-MISIUNAS, Romuald J.-TAAGEPERA, Rein: A balti államok története. Osiris-Századvég, Budapest, 1994. 179-183. 22 An exception in the Baltic region is the issue of Estonia, the possession of which made the German march against Leningrad really difficult at the beginning of the war. 23 ORMOS, Mária-MAJOROS, István: Európa a nemzetközi küzdőtéren. Osiris, Budapest, 2003. 404. 16
their war industry and raw materials made Hitler much stronger than Stalin imagined. We can mention in his excuse that such German success was not supposed to be achieved. In 1939, it was also imaginable – and Stalin probably believed in it as well – that an extended position war could evolve on the western borders of Germany, in which all parties would get exhausted and from this situation the Soviet Union could emerge with much strength. 24 This did not happen, and the Soviet Union had pay for it seriously. Still, they might have had to pay this price too if they had entered the war earlier, and particularly in a way that the British and the Americans would not have been compelled to form an alliance against the Nazi Germany. Natural Co-operation of Totalitarian Systems or a Typical Agreement of Imperial Politics? As we already pointed out, the co-operation between Moscow and Berlin between 1939 and 1941 warmed up spectacularly. However, could that cooperation be considered such an allied relation based on which we can speak about the two totalitarian systems’ close collaboration? The answer to this question is no. There was no friendship between Hitler and Stalin or between their countries; even if they had some common characteristics or there was military co-operation between them and their commercial relations were developing continuously. The reason is that they did not create a world order with principles fixed in a common declaration. The meeting of Molotov and Ribbentrop on November 12-13, 1940 could have been a starting point for that; nonetheless, the two diplomats realized the differences between their conceptions about the international settlement. 25 The relevance of these negotiations is decreased by the detail that Hitler ordered the preparation of the eastern operation before them. The fact that the co-operation of the two totalitarian states was not close does not exempt either of them from the responsibility of applying imperial policy right in the middle of Europe and introducing their own political system and laws bluntly on the territories controlled by them. When more and more friction took place between them, the Third Reich, being at the zenith of its strength, denounced the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact concluded because of tactical reasons and, consequently, the alliance working based on the pact; and finally the war between them broke out. 24 DIÓSZEGI István: A hatalmi politika másfél évszázada. História-MTA TTI, Budapest, 1994. 430. 25 Ribbentrop wished to call the Soviets’ attention to the British colonies and the Middle-and Near East to involve the Soviet Union in an attack against the British, while Molotov was formulating Soviet (or we could equally say: traditional Russian) interests in the Balkans and the straits clarifying for their German partners that the Soviet Union claimed far more territories than ensured for them by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. ORMOS, Mária-MAJOROS, István: Európa a nemzetközi küzdőtéren. Osiris, Budapest, 2003. 429-430. 17
Page 2 and 3: ISBN 978-963-284-164-9
Page 5 and 6: Unknown Clauses: The Background Dea
Page 7 and 8: CONTENTS Foreword (István MAJOROS,
Page 9 and 10: Foreword The world remembers in 200
Page 11: The Historical Judgement of the Mol
Page 14 and 15: went often on emotional instead of
Page 16 and 17: What is much more interesting is th
Page 20 and 21: Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggress
Page 22 and 23: Done in duplicate, in the German an
Page 25 and 26: Lachaise, Bernard Historiography of
Page 27 and 28: Relations) are the focus of special
Page 29 and 30: Russian agreement (…) would allow
Page 31 and 32: Europe and on the French communists
Page 33 and 34: adopted a stance of denying the fac
Page 35 and 36: Ortolan, Guillaume The 70 th annive
Page 37 and 38: government (more than twenty) came,
Page 39 and 40: War. On the contrary, it shows that
Page 41 and 42: this anniversary and more widely of
Page 43: interesting: „Illusions. In summe
Page 47 and 48: Kretschmann, Vasco The ideological
Page 49 and 50: One of the most influential associa
Page 51 and 52: Germanness in the provinces of West
Page 53 and 54: Prętkiewicz, Przemysław The syste
Page 55 and 56: interwar period and the treaty was
Page 57 and 58: situation of rising danger accepted
Page 59 and 60: Manchukuo and broke relations with
Page 61: I would like to finish my article w
Page 64 and 65: party itself but for the whole Slov
Page 66 and 67: In summary, the group of the „Mod
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make proposals or suggestions. 6 In
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(Aland), Hanko and the islands of t
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have had a less serious effect on t
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not expect strong resistance and ho
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Winkler, Paul Adolf Eichmann’s Vi
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individual offenders, 10 who used h
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esearch. But how could the suppress
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expert of this matter 29 and had as
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Arendt on the contrary is in the op
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the „matter”, where there was a
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adoption of the model it became cle
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of Eichmann. For that Heydrich deli
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esistance […] but of logistics. N
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British government refused to give
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ole in the defence of Madrid in Nov
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public doubt the democratic idea of
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Republicans. In the refugee camps i
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102
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iron? Where can one find more nicke
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According to his diaries, the main
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announced: „We have no active all
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110
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negative, an analysis of the disapp
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can let think of an imminent war po
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de la guerre [il] ne fait que l'agg
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Party), the enemy of the inside. Of
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120
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Before the Pact M. Coulondre, the F
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Lets us skip a few decades and list
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argain with. Hitler had an offer th
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secret protocol clarified that the
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to reach out for Russia through the
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of a war interesting rather on civi
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At the same moment, we can note an
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Faure 2 , remains hostile to war. I
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war can still be avoided in June 19
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acked by a „belligerent” coalit
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142
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agreement” sound anachronistic. E
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1939 between Germany and the Soviet
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Two ideas emerge from the press: on
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soviets didn’t have motive. Blum
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Moscow's line, with the national an
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154
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2.000 German speaking inhabitants).
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The Eastern Polish border was not r
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Army. The mayor of Lviv did not wan
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162
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Budapest, and for Warsaw. The two c
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could not destroy the Polish Air Fo
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independence, Romania was forced to
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importance for the events considere
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possible future opposition to the S
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ate of communists within the Jews o
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the initial positive feeling toward
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wanted to take revenge for the NKVD
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German Reactions A last point that
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