The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

More documents

Recommendations

Info

secret protocol clarified that the treaty refers to a possible German attack only. Thereafter, an attack upon Poland would mean an attack upon Britain also. 16 The most embarrassing factor to British policy was the fact that they were aware of secret clauses existing in the Pact, but they did not know their nature. Notice that these articles only came into light for a broader public in 1945. The Cabinet urged the Military Mission in Moscow to ask the Russian Government whether the Pact let them to negotiate with Britain against Berlin in case of German aggression. 17 Another attempt was made to clarify the German position. British Ambassador to Berlin, Sir Neville Henderson was ordered to meet Hitler in Berchtesgaden. Henderson did everything to mollify Hitler and to get information about German attempts. Henderson had reached out his brief, did everything he could, but his mission had failed. The problem was in the German attitude: when Count Ciano asked Ribbentrop what they wanted, Danzig or the Corridor, Ribbentrop replied: „Not any more. We want war.” As this was the case, no British ambassador could have succeeded in reaching the goal of mollifying Germany. As the Germans proved to be adamant on the issue of Poland, and the war with Germany began, the British decided to redouble their efforts to approximate Moscow. People in the Foreign Office, who were long-standing anti-Soviet in heart, such as Sargent, Cadogan, Halifax or Butler, now put their faith in this opportunity. 18 A series of trade talks were initiated. 19 Despite their previous efforts, after the Soviet invasion of Poland on the 17 September, the Anglo-Soviet relations had further detoriated instead of being normalized. The invasion had recapitalized the fact that Russia could not be taken as a reliable actor in international politics. As Harold Nicolson observed, „It may be that within a few days we shall have Germany, Russia and Japan against us. […] It is not so much a question of us encircling and blockading Germany; it is a question of them encircling and blockading us. […] In a few days our whole position might collapse. Nothing could be more black”. 20 As Churchill saw, the USSR seemed „no longer an ally, not even neutral, possibly to become a foe”. 21 It was clear that the Anglo-Polish Military Assistance Treaty does not 16 The British war blue book: Miscellaneous no. 9 (1939) Documents concerning German- Polish relations and the outbreak of hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939. Farrar and Rinehart, 1939. 49. 17 CAB 23/100 42 (39) 2. 355. 18 CARLEY, Michael Jabara: A Situation of Delicacy and Danger: Anglo-Soviet Relations, August 1939—March 1940. In: Contemporary European History 1999/2. 178. 19 The reason behind trade talks was twofold: to open a channel of communication with the Soviet, and to obtain timber in exchange for British goods, especially machine tools, tin, and cupper. However, both parties were reluctant: the Soviets did not want to alienate the Germans, while Britain feared of public opinion in the course of the Finnish War, and they did not want to be seen as ‘too anxious’ to start negotiations. Cf. DOERR, op. cit., 429. and 435. 20 17 September 1939. NICOLSON, Harold: The War Years. Volume II of Diaries and Letters. (ed. Nigel NICOLSON). Atheneum, New York, 1967. 34. 21 COLLINS, op. cit., 26. 128
efer to the present invasion of Eastern Poland by the Soviet. However, the British cabinet cautiously expressed their „indignation and horror” to the Russian action, and their commitment to restore the Polish state after the war. 22 There were also some positive aspects in the fact that the Soviet Union and Germany had become neighbors. As Ronald Adam, Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff had pointed out this could lead to a quick rupture in Russo-German relations. 23 Edmund Ironside, Chief of the Imperial General Staff was on the same opinion as Adam: their new neighborhood might „compel the Germans to maintain a very considerable garrison on the Eastern frontier”. 24 Thus, a serious attack on the West will be certainly avoided. In these days, the British repeatedly interviewed Mr. Ivan Maisky, Russian Ambassador to Moscow. These meetings were not really effective, as Permanent Under-Secretary of State Cadogan had pointed out: „Maisky very embarrassed. Of course he knows nothing”. 25 Anthony Eden suggested that Stafford Cribbs should be appointed to special negotiator Moscow, since he is a committed Marxist. Maisky refused the appointment of Cripps: in his view, any negotiator must bear the full trust of his government. 26 Despite Maisky’s warn, Cripps was sent to Moscow in September, as an individual person, whose duty was to stay in touch with the Russians. Cripps even suggested to the Foreign Office that a non-aggression pact should be concluded with Russia. This proposal was immediately torpedoed by Cadogan, who said that the „word nonaggression pact are somewhat stinky since 23 August”. 27 There was another path to reach the Soviet, and this was through the Turkish Government. As Russo-Turkish negotiations were pending, it seemed to be an amenable way. Turkish Foreign Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu was residing in Moscow from 27 September to 18 October. Any progress in these negotiations was cumbersome, because a proposed alliance between Ankara and London was also pending, and the Soviets demanded ‘extreme control’ over the Straits. The way the Russians treated Saracoğlu frustrated him completely: as his visit overlapped that of Ribbentrop, he was not able to meet higher official for a very long time. 28 As Saracoğlu had to refuse Russian attempts to take over the control of the Straits, the Russo-Turkish talks were unsuccessful. This also put an end to the British attempt 22 LANE, Thomas: The Soviet Occupation of Poland through British Eyes” In: HIDEN, John, LANE, Thomas (ed.): The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992. 143. 23 DOERR, op. cit., 424. 24 Ibid. 426. 25 Ibid. 428. 26 EDEN, Anthony Eden: The Reckoning. Cassel, London, 1965. 75-76. 27 DOERR, op. cit., 428. 28 GÜCLÜ, Yücel: The Uneasy Relationship. Turkey’s Foreign Policy towards the Soviet Union at the Outbreak of the Second World War. In: The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations (Milletlerarası Münasebetler Türk Yıllığı). Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, Ankara, 1998. 132-135. 129
Page 2 and 3:
ISBN 978-963-284-164-9
Page 5 and 6:
Unknown Clauses: The Background Dea
Page 7 and 8:
CONTENTS Foreword (István MAJOROS,
Page 9 and 10:
Foreword The world remembers in 200
Page 11:
The Historical Judgement of the Mol
Page 14 and 15:
went often on emotional instead of
Page 16 and 17:
What is much more interesting is th
Page 18 and 19:
such an international agreement as
Page 20 and 21:
Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggress
Page 22 and 23:
Done in duplicate, in the German an
Page 25 and 26:
Lachaise, Bernard Historiography of
Page 27 and 28:
Relations) are the focus of special
Page 29 and 30:
Russian agreement (…) would allow
Page 31 and 32:
Europe and on the French communists
Page 33 and 34:
adopted a stance of denying the fac
Page 35 and 36:
Ortolan, Guillaume The 70 th annive
Page 37 and 38:
government (more than twenty) came,
Page 39 and 40:
War. On the contrary, it shows that
Page 41 and 42:
this anniversary and more widely of
Page 43:
interesting: „Illusions. In summe
Page 47 and 48:
Kretschmann, Vasco The ideological
Page 49 and 50:
One of the most influential associa
Page 51 and 52:
Germanness in the provinces of West
Page 53 and 54:
Prętkiewicz, Przemysław The syste
Page 55 and 56:
interwar period and the treaty was
Page 57 and 58:
situation of rising danger accepted
Page 59 and 60:
Manchukuo and broke relations with
Page 61:
I would like to finish my article w
Page 64 and 65:
party itself but for the whole Slov
Page 66 and 67:
In summary, the group of the „Mod
Page 68 and 69:
make proposals or suggestions. 6 In
Page 70 and 71:
(Aland), Hanko and the islands of t
Page 72 and 73:
have had a less serious effect on t
Page 74 and 75:
not expect strong resistance and ho
Page 77 and 78:
Winkler, Paul Adolf Eichmann’s Vi
Page 79 and 80: individual offenders, 10 who used h
Page 81 and 82: esearch. But how could the suppress
Page 83 and 84: expert of this matter 29 and had as
Page 85 and 86: Arendt on the contrary is in the op
Page 87 and 88: the „matter”, where there was a
Page 89 and 90: adoption of the model it became cle
Page 91 and 92: of Eichmann. For that Heydrich deli
Page 93: esistance […] but of logistics. N
Page 96 and 97: British government refused to give
Page 98 and 99: ole in the defence of Madrid in Nov
Page 100 and 101: public doubt the democratic idea of
Page 102 and 103: Republicans. In the refugee camps i
Page 104 and 105: 102
Page 106 and 107: iron? Where can one find more nicke
Page 108 and 109: According to his diaries, the main
Page 110 and 111: announced: „We have no active all
Page 112 and 113: 110
Page 114 and 115: negative, an analysis of the disapp
Page 116 and 117: can let think of an imminent war po
Page 118 and 119: de la guerre [il] ne fait que l'agg
Page 120 and 121: Party), the enemy of the inside. Of
Page 122 and 123: 120
Page 124 and 125: Before the Pact M. Coulondre, the F
Page 126 and 127: Lets us skip a few decades and list
Page 128 and 129: argain with. Hitler had an offer th
Page 132 and 133: to reach out for Russia through the
Page 134 and 135: of a war interesting rather on civi
Page 136 and 137: At the same moment, we can note an
Page 138 and 139: Faure 2 , remains hostile to war. I
Page 140 and 141: war can still be avoided in June 19
Page 142 and 143: acked by a „belligerent” coalit
Page 144 and 145: 142
Page 146 and 147: agreement” sound anachronistic. E
Page 148 and 149: 1939 between Germany and the Soviet
Page 150 and 151: Two ideas emerge from the press: on
Page 152 and 153: soviets didn’t have motive. Blum
Page 154 and 155: Moscow's line, with the national an
Page 156 and 157: 154
Page 158 and 159: 2.000 German speaking inhabitants).
Page 160 and 161: The Eastern Polish border was not r
Page 162 and 163: Army. The mayor of Lviv did not wan
Page 164 and 165: 162
Page 166 and 167: Budapest, and for Warsaw. The two c
Page 168 and 169: could not destroy the Polish Air Fo
Page 170 and 171: independence, Romania was forced to
Page 172 and 173: importance for the events considere
Page 174 and 175: possible future opposition to the S
Page 176 and 177: ate of communists within the Jews o
Page 178 and 179: the initial positive feeling toward
Page 180 and 181:
wanted to take revenge for the NKVD
Page 182 and 183:
German Reactions A last point that
Page 184:
182
show all

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?