The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

If we accept that a document’s content is what is written in it, we can state that
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact itself is a non-aggression treaty between the
Communist Soviet Union and the Nazi German Empire, which accurately
demarcated their spheres of interest in a secret clause in order to avoid any
controversial issues. In this sense we can call this treaty a typical example of
classic imperial policy, for which we can find numerous examples especially in the
colonial area. Everything else beyond this can be interpreted only in a broader
context and does not result merely from the pact. The treaty of September 28, 1939
is a boundary and friendly treaty according to its title, even if the concept of
friendship in a political context shall be handled carefully in historical criticism.
Why Did They Sign the Treaty?
Since the treaty was signed just before the outbreak of World War II, the
document is said to have provided Hitler the opportunity to wage a war without
risking fighting a dual theatre war. This explains why the question of
responsibility is such a significant issue of the debate about the pact.
Analyzing Hitler’s responsibility is almost superfluous as his motives were
well-known: he reckoned that time had come for a localized war against Poland
and he wanted to avoid a dual-theatre war, 6 which he regarded the biggest
strategic fault of the imperial Germany even in „Mein Kampf”. For the sake of
his purpose, he had to come to an agreement either with his western or his
eastern enemies. 7 As he could not expect remarkable diplomatic success against
the British and the French a year after Munich, 8 he had to come to an agreement
with Moscow under the given circumstances, which did not prove to be very
difficult (in view of the facts). We have to emphasize, however, that this
cooperation could only be temporary for Hitler: since their coming into power,
the Nazis advocated the necessity of eliminating Communism and the „Mein
Kampf” – irrespectively of its political system – set the program of
germanising the Eastern Slavic territories as a long-term purpose. Still, the
„peaceful cohabitation” of the two world orders – like in the case of the USA
and the Soviet Union later – could certainly have been imaginable for even
decades; nevertheless, this is not the world of historians but that of sci-fi. The
German Empire obviously wanted the war and regarded the Soviet Union an
enemy in the long run. The relation of the two powers was far from friendly, as
pointed out properly even by Tamás Krausz in his above cited article. 9
PACZKOWSKI, Andrzej-COURTOIS, Stéphane: The Black Book of Communism: Crimes,
Terror, Repression. Harvard University Press, 1999. 5.
6 RÁNKI György: A második világháború története. Gondolat, Budapest, 1973. 7.
7 Arising from the nature of Nazism and German superiority, Hitler had no „friends,” only
enemies and temporary allies.
8 ORMOS, Mária-MAJOROS, István: Európa a nemzetközi küzdőtéren. Osiris, Budapest, 2003. 402.
9 KRAUSZ Tamás: Néhány megjegyzés a Molotov-Ribbentrop paktum értelmezéséhez. IN:
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