The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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German Reactions A last point that must not be underestimated is the output the Germans took from these incidents. On the one hand they started a large propaganda-campaign in which the Soviets were depicted as murderers, on the other hand they could easily gain the local people‘s support in persecuting Jews from the start on. When the German units took over control they had to rely on the population‘s help because, as Martin Dean noticed, they would not have been able to identify Jews on their own. 56 The Germans did not put an end to the riots but let them go on or even motivated them. 57 Initially the Wehrmacht had been ordered to shoot political commissioners and the Einsatzgruppen had to persecute Soviet political personnel and especially Jewish cadres. After they discovered the NKVD‘s victims, the range of victims grew and it was no longer only certain groups within the Jewish population but the Jews as a group of their own. 58 The German propaganda used the NKVD‘s crimes to justify their own crimes. but after the first wave of violence slowed down, they restricted further riots because they feared to otherwise lose control. 59 It was now solely the Einsatzgruppen‘s duty to persecute the Jewish population, even though they had help of local volunteers. The further atrocities against the Jews were carried out according to plans and can not be compared to the initial spontaneity of actions. 60 Final statements As the controversy of Bogdan Musial‘s theses shows, it is still not easy to discuss violence against Jews during the Second World War. The Holocaust‘s shadow often prevents a view on the local population‘s part in the persecution of their Jewish neighbours. One must not compare one phenomenon with another, but rather regard the Ukrainian and White Russian‘s pogroms as something that happened independent from the later German crimes against the Jews. - And by independent I do not mean on their own initiative, as stated above, but without initial connection to the later events, as they could not be foreseen. 56 DEAN, Martin: The ‚Local Police‘ in Nazi-occupied Belarus and Ukraine as the ‚Ideal Type‘ of Collaboration - in Practice, in the Recollection of its Members and in the Verdicts of the Courts. In: TAUBER, Joachim (Ed.): ‚Kollaboration‘ in Nordosteuropa - Erscheinungsformen und Deutungen im 20. Jahrhundert. Wiesbaden, 2006. 418. 57 POHL, Dieter: Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941-1944 - Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens. München, 1996. 59. 58 Ibidem. 138. 59 Ibidem. 66. HILBERG, Raul: Täter, Opfer, Zuschauer - Die Vernichtung der Juden 1933- 1945, Frankfurt am Main, 1992. 198. 60 OVERY, Richard: Russlands Krieg - 1941-1945, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 2003. 221. POHL, Dieter: Ukrainische Hilfskräfte beim Mord an den Juden. In: PAUL, Gerhard (Ed.): Die Täter der Shoah - Fanatische Nationalsozialisten oder ganz normale Deutsche?, Göttingen, 2002. 212-219, 224. 180
On the other hand one has to be aware that these later crimes, leading ultimately to the Holocaust, did not accidentally take place in former Poland. It was here that the local people had traditionally been rooted in deep anti- Semitism and it was here where many Jews - and especially those matching national-socialist clichés - lived. The pogroms of locals in the summer of 1941 did not activate but prelude to the Eastern European Jew‘s extermination. 181
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ISBN 978-963-284-164-9
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Unknown Clauses: The Background Dea
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CONTENTS Foreword (István MAJOROS,
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Foreword The world remembers in 200
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The Historical Judgement of the Mol
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went often on emotional instead of
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What is much more interesting is th
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such an international agreement as
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Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggress
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Done in duplicate, in the German an
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Lachaise, Bernard Historiography of
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Relations) are the focus of special
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Russian agreement (…) would allow
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Europe and on the French communists
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adopted a stance of denying the fac
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Ortolan, Guillaume The 70 th annive
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government (more than twenty) came,
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War. On the contrary, it shows that
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this anniversary and more widely of
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interesting: „Illusions. In summe
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Kretschmann, Vasco The ideological
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One of the most influential associa
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Germanness in the provinces of West
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Prętkiewicz, Przemysław The syste
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interwar period and the treaty was
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situation of rising danger accepted
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Manchukuo and broke relations with
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I would like to finish my article w
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party itself but for the whole Slov
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In summary, the group of the „Mod
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make proposals or suggestions. 6 In
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(Aland), Hanko and the islands of t
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have had a less serious effect on t
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not expect strong resistance and ho
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Winkler, Paul Adolf Eichmann’s Vi
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individual offenders, 10 who used h
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esearch. But how could the suppress
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expert of this matter 29 and had as
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Arendt on the contrary is in the op
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the „matter”, where there was a
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adoption of the model it became cle
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of Eichmann. For that Heydrich deli
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esistance […] but of logistics. N
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British government refused to give
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ole in the defence of Madrid in Nov
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public doubt the democratic idea of
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Republicans. In the refugee camps i
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102
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iron? Where can one find more nicke
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According to his diaries, the main
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announced: „We have no active all
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110
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negative, an analysis of the disapp
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can let think of an imminent war po
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de la guerre [il] ne fait que l'agg
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Party), the enemy of the inside. Of
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120
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Before the Pact M. Coulondre, the F
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Lets us skip a few decades and list
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argain with. Hitler had an offer th
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secret protocol clarified that the
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Page 134 and 135: of a war interesting rather on civi
Page 136 and 137: At the same moment, we can note an
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Page 146 and 147: agreement” sound anachronistic. E
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Page 158 and 159: 2.000 German speaking inhabitants).
Page 160 and 161: The Eastern Polish border was not r
Page 162 and 163: Army. The mayor of Lviv did not wan
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Page 166 and 167: Budapest, and for Warsaw. The two c
Page 168 and 169: could not destroy the Polish Air Fo
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Page 172 and 173: importance for the events considere
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Page 176 and 177: ate of communists within the Jews o
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The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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