The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

Baranyi, Tamás
„A Surprise of a Very Unpleasant Character”
British Reaction to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact
The signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact caused mayhem throughout
British politics. Suddenly, the Whitehall had to abandon the policy of
„appeasement”, and develop an entirely new approach to international politics.
The present study tries to elaborate on the British opinion and policy responses
given to the Russo-German Pact. The first question to arise is to what extent
were the British politicians aware of the Russo-German approximation, and to
what extent were they surprised by the Russian volte-face? Secondly, the policy
responses given by London needs to be examined. At the same time, the British
pursued three different policies: they had a last attempt to appease Hitler, they
tried to contain German expansionism, and they tried to forge a better
relationship with Moscow. These responses are of utmost interest in the history
of the world war.
Great Britain was seeking peace throughout the 1930s. It was partly due to
the general anti-war sentiment in the British Empire, partly to English
suspicions towards French grandeur politics, and partly to the cautious
recognition of the Empire’s relative weakness. To a certain extent, the Foreign
Office was consistent: they were willing to concede Hitler in his attempts to
revise the Treaty of Versailles, but by no means to re-negotiate spheres of
world influence. 1
As a response to Germany’s new achievements in 1939, Britain decided to
give territorial guarantee to Poland in April, and to commence trilateral
negotiations with France and the USSR, in order to involve the Soviets in an
alliance to contain Hitler’s ambitions. These negotiations were going on from
April to August, 1939. In August, a British military mission was also sent to
Moscow, though their efforts were not of a real significance. 2 British politics
had often been criticized that they were not really committed to make an
alliance with Russia. In fact, as Henry Kissinger pointed out, Stalin acted as if
he was in a bazaar: he had listened to all offers, and then decided who to
1 Secondary works on the British foreign policy in the 1930s generally have the same
conclusion regarding the causes of ’appeasement policy.’ This remarkably compact and essential
summary is given by Gergely Egedy. Cf. EGEDY, Gergely: Nagy-Britannia története. Aula,
Budapest, 1998. 179-181.
2 The British were not really eager to make a pact with Russia. The military mission had chosen
the slowest vehicle to get to Russia (a merchant ship), and there were no front-ranking persons in it,
comparable to their Soviet counterpart, Voroshilov, etc. Cf. WATSON, Derek: Molotov’s
Apprenticehip in Foreign Policy: The Triple Alliance Negotiations in 1939. In: Europa-Asia Studies
2000/4. 713. As TAYLOR, A. J. P. put it, „If British diplomacy seriously aspired to alliance with
Soviet Russia in 1939, then the negotiations towards this end were the most incompetent transactions
since Lord North lost the American colonies...” Qtd. in WATSON, op. cit., 696.
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