The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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ate of communists within the Jews of former Eastern Poland, who, in fear of the Germans, attached themselves to the Soviet state. He claims that the Soviet occupation was the lesser evil to them. 23 Bogdan Musial on the other hand puts great impetus on the thesis that the Soviet administration of former Eastern Poland was dominated by Jews and that they, enthusiastically took part, especially the youths, because they hoped to become part of a new society. His sources are, as he admits, subjective impressions of the then living. 24 The various nationalities of Eastern Poland had been constantly struggling with each other but it had almost always been the Jews who were the weakest part. The other nationalities could at least always rely on the common victim, a victim who was also socially distinctive from the mostly peasant Ukrainians and White Russians and the Polish upper classes. 25 Pogroms were not uncommon and had only found an end in inter-war Poland but historical relations had so far not had the chance to be overthrown. Jan T. Gross explains that every nation only saw its own suffering following the Soviet invasion with no regard to the others, which he attributes to the already existing animosity between the different nationalities. 26 The non-Jews were thus more than suspicious regarding the Jews‘ role in the new administration: They were helping the Soviet occupying forces and they took over positions that had not been open to them in the past. Their sudden presence could not be not realised. Where there had been no Jewish civil servants at all, the appearance of only a few was already a great change. 27 As Jan T. Gross tries to explain further, the people considered authority as something alien to the peasant society of Eastern Poland to which one had to subdue oneself. To be ruled by the Jews, who were traditionally the lowest 23 GROSS, Jan T.: Revolution from Abroad - The Soviet conquest of Poland‘s Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia. Princeton, 2002. 32. „And here is the principal clue to the joyous atmosphere surrounding the entry of Soviet troops: where they came, the Germans did not.” But, Gross further states, soon many Jews, having fled from the Western part of the country, changed their minds and opted to return there. 206. 24 MUSIAL, Bogdan: „Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschießen” - Die Brutalisierung des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges im Sommer 1941. Berlin 2001. 58. http://h-net.msu.edu/cgibin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-soz-u-kult&month=0105&week=b&msg=ZHvgkM0ea75 Uep82ym %2B8uA&user=&pw= 21.3.2009. For a similar opinion see HONIGSMAN 113. 25 POHL, Dieter: Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941-1944 - Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens. München, 1996. 24. MUSIAL, Bogdan: „Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschießen” - Die Brutalisierung des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges im Sommer 1941. Berlin 2001. 27. 26 GROSS, Jan T.: Revolution from Abroad - The Soviet conquest of Poland‘s Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia. Princeton, 2002. xxii. 27 MUSIAL, Bogdan: „Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschießen” - Die Brutalisierung des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges im Sommer 1941. Berlin 2001. 65. POHL: Judenvernichtung pp. 29-31. For an analysis of the „traditional” connection of Jews and Communism see POHL, Dieter: Der Völkermord an den Juden. In: Borodziej 113. For the connection of nationalism and anti-Semitism see LEY, Michael: Kleine Geschichte des Antisemitismus. München, 2003. 103-111. 174
anks of society was considered an insult by the Soviets. 28 Jews were now associated with the Soviet regime. Terror against society It was the Soviet leadership‘s intention to implement the same political and economic rules in their newly acclaimed territories that had been existing in the Soviet Union for some 20 years. 29 Following Dieter Pohl, the conditions of life in the Soviet-occupied areas worsened constantly. 30 The occupying forces, even if they liked to not see themselves as such, persecuted anyone whom they expected to act against the new regime. Who had been registered as a political enemy was put into prison or was deported. 31 Jan T. Gross and Wanda Krystina Roman show, how the Soviet leadership used existing tensions within the nationalities of Eastern Poland and how the people themselves got rid of possible enemies. 32 The regime soon terrorised its new subjects as it had been doing so with the people in the Soviet Union for over 25 years. While on the one hand, local animosities were used, on the other hand systematic terror was unleashed: It was the NKVD (the Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del, Народный комиссариат внутренних дел), the Soviet secret police, that exercised this terror. Thousands of people were arrested and put into special prisons where they were tortured and killed. The NKVD soon symbolised violence and injustice - and the horrors of occupation - and was one of the main reasons why 28 GROSS, Jan T.: Revolution from Abroad - The Soviet conquest of Poland‘s Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia. Princeton, 2002. 56. 29 OVERY, Richard: Russlands Krieg - 1941-1945, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 2003. 93-95. ROMAN, Wanda Krystina: Die sowjetische Okkupation der polnischen Ostgebiete 1939 bis 1941. In: CHIARI, Bernhard: Die polnische Heimatarmee- Geschichte und Mythos der Armia Krajowa seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. München, 2003. 96-99. 30 POHL, Dieter: Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941-1944 - Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens. München, 1996. 29. 31 SANFORD, George: Katyn and the Soviet massacre of 1940 - Truth, justice and memory. London, 2007. 28. GROSS, Jan T.: Revolution from Abroad - The Soviet conquest of Poland‘s Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia. Princeton, 2002. 149: „Poles were typically sentenced as counterrevolutionaries in the service of the bourgeoisie, Ukrainians were sent to labor camps as nationalists, and Jews were imprisoned as speculators.” And further: „Under the new regime anyone, at any time, in any place and for any reason was vulnerable to arrest.” 151. Numbers related to the deportations vary, to give an impression see ROMAN who states that according to new calculations some 316.000 to 325.000 former Polish citizens were deported into the Soviet Union, including 200.000 Poles, more than 70.000 Jews, 25.000 Ukrainians, 20.000 White Russians and a few thousand Germans, Lithuanians, Czechs and Russians. 105. 32 GROSS, Jan T.: Revolution from Abroad - The Soviet conquest of Poland‘s Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia. Princeton, 2002. 39. ROMAN, Wanda Krystina: Die sowjetische Okkupation der polnischen Ostgebiete 1939 bis 1941. In: CHIARI, Bernhard: Die polnische Heimatarmee- Geschichte und Mythos der Armia Krajowa seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. München, 2003. 93 and 99. 175
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ISBN 978-963-284-164-9
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Unknown Clauses: The Background Dea
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CONTENTS Foreword (István MAJOROS,
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Foreword The world remembers in 200
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The Historical Judgement of the Mol
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went often on emotional instead of
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What is much more interesting is th
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such an international agreement as
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Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggress
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Done in duplicate, in the German an
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Lachaise, Bernard Historiography of
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Relations) are the focus of special
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Russian agreement (…) would allow
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Europe and on the French communists
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adopted a stance of denying the fac
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Ortolan, Guillaume The 70 th annive
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government (more than twenty) came,
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War. On the contrary, it shows that
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this anniversary and more widely of
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interesting: „Illusions. In summe
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Kretschmann, Vasco The ideological
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One of the most influential associa
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Germanness in the provinces of West
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Prętkiewicz, Przemysław The syste
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interwar period and the treaty was
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situation of rising danger accepted
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Manchukuo and broke relations with
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I would like to finish my article w
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party itself but for the whole Slov
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In summary, the group of the „Mod
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make proposals or suggestions. 6 In
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(Aland), Hanko and the islands of t
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have had a less serious effect on t
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not expect strong resistance and ho
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Winkler, Paul Adolf Eichmann’s Vi
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individual offenders, 10 who used h
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esearch. But how could the suppress
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expert of this matter 29 and had as
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Arendt on the contrary is in the op
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the „matter”, where there was a
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adoption of the model it became cle
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of Eichmann. For that Heydrich deli
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esistance […] but of logistics. N
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British government refused to give
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ole in the defence of Madrid in Nov
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public doubt the democratic idea of
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Republicans. In the refugee camps i
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102
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iron? Where can one find more nicke
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According to his diaries, the main
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announced: „We have no active all
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110
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negative, an analysis of the disapp
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can let think of an imminent war po
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de la guerre [il] ne fait que l'agg
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Party), the enemy of the inside. Of
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120
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Before the Pact M. Coulondre, the F
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Page 134 and 135: of a war interesting rather on civi
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Page 146 and 147: agreement” sound anachronistic. E
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Page 158 and 159: 2.000 German speaking inhabitants).
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Page 162 and 163: Army. The mayor of Lviv did not wan
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Page 166 and 167: Budapest, and for Warsaw. The two c
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Page 182 and 183: German Reactions A last point that
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