The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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(„Zentralstelle für die Abwanderung der Juden Österreichs”). This office should facilitate the bureaucratic affairs of the Jews. Eichmann passed those blueprints on to Reichskommissar Bürckel, who set up the „Zentralstelle” under the formal leadership of the SD-leader of the SS- Oberabschnitt Donau, Dr. Stahlecker on the 20 th of August 1938, after he had held consultations with Dr. Best. Practically, however, Eichmann led this office. 41 Eichmann claimed in relation to the „Solution of the Jewish Question” between 1938 and 1941 often, that he had the crucial ideas for this plans and wanted to give the impression that he is the inventor of the „Vienna model”. 42 The tasks he defined that way: „…providing opportunities for emigration through negotiations for entrance permits and obtaining foreign currency; establishment and surveillance of retraining centers; supervision of Jewish political organizations; publication of guidelines; and effective, sustained cooperation with all institutions in Vienna involved in the political, policerelated, and financial aspects of Jewish expulsion.” 43 Eichmann installed this system, which was based on the following principles: 1. The emigration should no longer happen on one’s own decision and its organization lays no longer in the hands of the Jews, but run under the supervision of the Security Police. 2. This forced emigration should be carried out by the existing Jewish organizations, who had to act out the instructions of the SD. 3. The economic power of the Jews was to destroy and the assets of the emigrants to confiscate, so that they remained only the amount that was required for entry into the intended country of immigration. 44 In the installation of the „Vienna model” the initiatives and career promotional activities of Adolf Eichmann become clear. Simultaneously he had nothing „invented”. He just took present plans on and passed them on to higher positions. But inside of the Apparatus he let everyone know, that he was the inventor of this frighteningly well-functionating model and therefore he was celebrated by the others. 45 Following an inspection of the „Vienna approach” Hagen praised in his afterwards prepared report on the one hand the rapid bureaucratic completion of 41 SAFRIAN, Hans: Eichmann’s Men. 31. 42 LEGENSTEIN, Roland: Adolf Eichmann - der Schreibtischtäter. Koordinator der „Endlösung” Dipl.-Arb., Wien, 2002. 36. 43 SAFRIAN, Hans: Eichmann’s Men. 31. 44 YĀḤÎL, Lenî: Die Shoa. Überlebenskampf und Vernichtung der europäischen Juden. München, 1988. 161. LEGENSTEIN, Roland: Adolf Eichmann - der Schreibtischtäter. Koordinator der „Endlösung” Dipl.-Arb., Wien, 2002. 37. In the original: „1. Die Auswanderung sollte nicht mehr aus eigener Entscheidung geschehen und ihre Organisation nicht mehr in den Händen der Juden liegen, sondern unter Aufsicht der Sicherheitspolizei ablaufen. 2. Diese erzwungen Auswanderung sollte von den vorhandenen jüdischen Organisationen durchgeführt werden, die aus Anweisung des SD zu handeln hatten. 3. Die Wirtschaftskraft der Juden war zu zerstören und das Vermögen der Emigranten zu konfiszieren, sodass ihnen nur die Summe blieb, die zur Einreise in das vorgesehene Einwanderungsland benötigt wurde.” 45 SAFRIAN, Hans: Eichmann’s Men. 32. 84
the „matter”, where there was a permanent detailed overview of the „emigrant” figures, on the other hand he praised the total collection of the instances by the SD. So the hegemonic position of the SD was a very important matter for the SS leaders. Hagen also noticed in his report that the system is apparently selffinanced, which of course was only possible by the robbery of the fugitives. He considered it necessary to expand his authority and he was considering a possible extension of the „Vienna Approach” throughout the Reich. 46 Eichmann was not the inventor but the driving force behind the „Zentralstelle”. He took care of efficiency and made a million dollar business. The horror of it was that the robbery was not completed by SS men, but by helpless employees of the Jewish Community. The „Desk Murderer” Adolf Eichmann made his victims to „helpers”. 47 As if that fact would not be already sad enough, many of these involuntary „helpers” came after the war under the suspicion of having collaborated willingly with the Nazis. 48 So shortly after the foundation, the „Zentralstelle” was pointing the way for the whole Reich. As Safrian writes, Hagen had recognized the trend-setting significance of the „Vienna model”: 1. Compulsory expulsion of those robbed of their possessions; 2. Payment fort he management of „emigration” either by the victims themselves or through foreign currency provided by Jewish organizations abroad; 3. Extension of the power of the SD by assuming executive privileges 49 . In the practical implementation of their bureaucratic work, Eichmann and his men did not forget to give themselves as „Aryan masters” towards their victims and to harass them. Humiliation and violence were on the agenda. 50 After two months, Eichmann sent the numbers of his previous „work” to Berlin. He proudly told of the increase in the daily „emigration figure” to 350. Until the 20 th of September 1939 therefore 38.000 Jews had „left” the country. Together with the after Nazi views „illegally relocated” Austrian Jews, he came up with a figure of 50.000 displaced persons. 51 These figures were inflated. Of the approximately 40.000 „under supervision” expelled Jews could have been „treated” at most one quarter by the „Zentralstelle”. Eichmann’s superiors were, however, blinded by these figures and took them seriously. 52 Lozowick’s verdict on the year 1938: „In summary, 1938 displayed two new trends: the transition to operational activity, and dwindling active 46 SAFRIAN, Hans: Eichmann’s Men. 32-33. 47 KNOPP: Helfer. 35. LEGENSTEIN, Roland: Adolf Eichmann - der Schreibtischtäter. Koordinator der „Endlösung” Dipl.-Arb., Wien, 2002. 37-38. 48 An interesting as equally sad contribution from the newspaper Profil on the issue No. 28 online at: http://www.vwi.ac.at/ausstellung_jmw/pressespiegel/2007-07-09_Profil_Nr28_IKG- Archiv-Austellung_JMW_k.pdf (1. 4. 2010). 49 SAFRIAN, Hans: Eichmann’s Men. 33. 50 Ibid. 34. 51 Vgl.: Ibid. 35. BURLEIGH, Michael: Die Zeit des Nationalsozialismus. Frankfurt am Main, 2000. 372. Profil: Issue No. 18, 28. April 1995. 62. 52 SAFRIAN, Hans: Eichmann’s Men. 35. 85
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ISBN 978-963-284-164-9
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Unknown Clauses: The Background Dea
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CONTENTS Foreword (István MAJOROS,
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Foreword The world remembers in 200
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The Historical Judgement of the Mol
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went often on emotional instead of
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What is much more interesting is th
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such an international agreement as
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Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggress
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Done in duplicate, in the German an
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Lachaise, Bernard Historiography of
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Relations) are the focus of special
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Russian agreement (…) would allow
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Europe and on the French communists
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adopted a stance of denying the fac
Page 35 and 36: Ortolan, Guillaume The 70 th annive
Page 37 and 38: government (more than twenty) came,
Page 39 and 40: War. On the contrary, it shows that
Page 41 and 42: this anniversary and more widely of
Page 43: interesting: „Illusions. In summe
Page 47 and 48: Kretschmann, Vasco The ideological
Page 49 and 50: One of the most influential associa
Page 51 and 52: Germanness in the provinces of West
Page 53 and 54: Prętkiewicz, Przemysław The syste
Page 55 and 56: interwar period and the treaty was
Page 57 and 58: situation of rising danger accepted
Page 59 and 60: Manchukuo and broke relations with
Page 61: I would like to finish my article w
Page 64 and 65: party itself but for the whole Slov
Page 66 and 67: In summary, the group of the „Mod
Page 68 and 69: make proposals or suggestions. 6 In
Page 70 and 71: (Aland), Hanko and the islands of t
Page 72 and 73: have had a less serious effect on t
Page 74 and 75: not expect strong resistance and ho
Page 77 and 78: Winkler, Paul Adolf Eichmann’s Vi
Page 79 and 80: individual offenders, 10 who used h
Page 81 and 82: esearch. But how could the suppress
Page 83 and 84: expert of this matter 29 and had as
Page 85: Arendt on the contrary is in the op
Page 89 and 90: adoption of the model it became cle
Page 91 and 92: of Eichmann. For that Heydrich deli
Page 93: esistance […] but of logistics. N
Page 96 and 97: British government refused to give
Page 98 and 99: ole in the defence of Madrid in Nov
Page 100 and 101: public doubt the democratic idea of
Page 102 and 103: Republicans. In the refugee camps i
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Page 106 and 107: iron? Where can one find more nicke
Page 108 and 109: According to his diaries, the main
Page 110 and 111: announced: „We have no active all
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Page 114 and 115: negative, an analysis of the disapp
Page 116 and 117: can let think of an imminent war po
Page 118 and 119: de la guerre [il] ne fait que l'agg
Page 120 and 121: Party), the enemy of the inside. Of
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Page 124 and 125: Before the Pact M. Coulondre, the F
Page 126 and 127: Lets us skip a few decades and list
Page 128 and 129: argain with. Hitler had an offer th
Page 130 and 131: secret protocol clarified that the
Page 132 and 133: to reach out for Russia through the
Page 134 and 135: of a war interesting rather on civi
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At the same moment, we can note an
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Faure 2 , remains hostile to war. I
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war can still be avoided in June 19
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acked by a „belligerent” coalit
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142
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agreement” sound anachronistic. E
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1939 between Germany and the Soviet
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Two ideas emerge from the press: on
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soviets didn’t have motive. Blum
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Moscow's line, with the national an
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154
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2.000 German speaking inhabitants).
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The Eastern Polish border was not r
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Army. The mayor of Lviv did not wan
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162
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Budapest, and for Warsaw. The two c
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could not destroy the Polish Air Fo
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independence, Romania was forced to
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importance for the events considere
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possible future opposition to the S
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ate of communists within the Jews o
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the initial positive feeling toward
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wanted to take revenge for the NKVD
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German Reactions A last point that
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The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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