The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

argain with. Hitler had an offer that the Western countries could not have
outbid. Therefore, the turning point was not really the willingness of the
Whitehall, but rather profit-based calculations of the Kremlin. There was also a
lot ambiguity regarding the real purposes of the Soviet. As Churchill pointed
out, Russia „is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma”. 3 Still, Western
Powers put their faith in a possible new Entente that would have covered
Britain, France and Russia against Germany. Therefore, the conclusion the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was ultimately a shock to their policies.
Traditional British policy was anything but faithful to Soviet maneuvers.
Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain was disinclined to believe that the
Russians could make a deal with Germany. In a letter to his sister, dated 10
June, 1939, he wrote: „I can’t make up my mind whether the Bolshies are
double crossing us or whether they are only showing the cunning and suspicion
of the peasant. On the whole I incline to the latter view.” On 2 July, 1939, his
suspicion was further crystallized: „The Russian continue to create fresh
difficulties… while I grow more and more suspicious of their good faith.’ 4 ”
Of course, from the end of March, 1939, the British Intelligence and the
Foreign Office were relatively well-informed that German-Soviet talks were in
fact occurring. 5 The conclusion still surprised the British, because they
previously thought that a tripartite agreement in Moscow could be realized. Just
a few people foresaw the conclusion of the Pact, as did Sir Neville Henderson,
then British ambassador to Germany. In a telegram to Foreign Secretary Lord
Halifax, Henderson stated that „the Hammer and the Anvil will one day join
forces”; 6 referring to the strategic ‘pincer movement’ these two country could
facilitate, if agreed upon.
The reaction in Britain to the Pact was anxious and abrupt. Policy-makers were
shocked, but their viewpoints ranged from cynical to depressive. Long-time
Foreign Office official Harold Nicolson wrote the following: the pact „smashes our
peace-front and makes our guarantees to Poland, Rumania and Greece very
questionable. How Ribbentrop must chuckle. […] I fear that it means that we are
humbled to the dust”. 7 Churchill regarded the conclusion of the Pact as ‘sinister
news’, 8 Sir Alexander Cadogan have called that moment „A black day.” 9 On the
3
COLLINS, Thomas: Hand in Glove with Germany: Perspectives of Soviet Neutrality.
University of Leeds, 2008. 4.
4
COLLINS, op. cit., 24.
5
Ibid. 23.
6
Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP) 3, VI, Henderson to Halifax, No. 347, July
18, 1939, p. 385. In: DOOLEY, Jacqueline: The Failure of a Mission: The Diplomacy of Sir
Neville Henderson. University of Leeds, 2008. 48.
7
22 August, 1939. Harold Nicolson. Diaries and Letters. 1930-1964. (OLSON, Stanley ed.).
Collins, London, 1980. 154.
8
COLLINS, op. cit., 25.
9
24 August, 1939. The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan. O. M., 1938-1945. DILKS, David
(ed.), Putnam, New York, 1972. 200.
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