The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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What is much more interesting is the situation of the Soviet Union and the reason why Stalin concluded the agreement. According to a notable and more and more prevailing view, Stalin considered Hitler a more calculable and creditable partner than the Western democracies. Their way of thinking was similar in many perspectives: both of them respected military strength, believed in power and did not think much of the ideas of freedom and equality. For Stalin Hitler’s hostile approach towards the Soviet Union and Communism could not be a telling argument against him, as all the other states’ attitude in the world was similar to that to a certain extent. We can even claim that from the Rapallo Treaty (1922) until Hitler’s seizure of power, the Soviet Union had its closest relations with no other but Germany, 10 thus they had something to proceed from. Nonetheless, the thesis of the almost allied co-operation of the two totalitarian states between 1939 and 1941, the beginning of which was indicated by the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, cannot be accepted without criticism: the co-operation of Moscow and Berlin as pointed out above was only of tactical and temporary nature. However, this collaboration cannot be denied; the relations between Moscow and Berlin warmed up spectacularly after their mutual operations against Poland. 11 The Communist Soviet Union and the Nazi Germany were not compelled to hold a common parade for their soldiers in the occupied Brest-Litovsk on September 22, 1939 and Lvov on September 23, 1939; 12 hence, it is understandable that hearing such pieces of news the sentiments about the collaboration of the two dictatorships appeared that time and even Stalin’s censorship could not eliminate them. We have to realize that Stalin had no other choice. He recognized that during the changes in the international system at the end of the 1930s the isolation of the Soviet Union could not be maintained, or at least was not expedient. Nonetheless, when he tried to look for partners for his growing activity, neither the British, nor the French, and not even Warsaw threatened by the Germans enthused over a close co-operation with Moscow. 13 Due to its Communist nature, the Soviet Union had been treated as an outcast and an unreliable state. This attitude was suspended only for a few years during the HÁDA Béla - LIGETI Dávid - MAJOROS István - MARUZSA Zoltán - MERÉNYI Krisztina (szerk.): Nemzetek és birodalmak. Diószegi István 80 éves. ELTE, Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék, Budapest, 2010. 363. 10 A major consequence of the treaty was that Germany had the weapons, the possession of which was forbidden for them by the Versailles Peace Treaty, tested in the Soviet Union, such as airplanes and armours. 11 The deepening of the co-operation was indicated by the expansion of the German-Soviet Trade Agreement on February 11, 1940, signed originally on August 19, 1939, by the Lithuanian border’s remodification, or by the population exchange agreement of 1941. ERICSON, Edward E: Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany. 1933–1941. Greenwood Publishing, 1999. 150-153. 12 NEKRICH, Aleksandr Moiseevich-ULAM, Adam Bruno; FREEZE, Gregory L.: Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German–Soviet Relations 1922–1941. Columbia University Press, 1997. 131. 13 TAYLOR, A.J.P.: A második világháború okai. Scolar, Budapest, 1998. 308-311. 14
war and the friendly relations broke up after the mutually achieved victory. It is also true that by announcing the „world revolution” and by the continuous lashing of the „western imperialism”, the Soviet Union was responsible for its own segregation. In 1939, nevertheless, Stalin’s position was favourable: the Germans, the French, and also the British wished for negotiating with him about collaboration, who, therefore, could exploit this situation. The indulgent British and French behaviour at the time of signing the Munich Treaty and at its violation, moreover, the inefficiency of their negotiations in July-August, 1939 14 convinced Stalin about the fact that he could not expect support from either London or Paris in case of a potential German-Soviet conflict. As a consequence, opening towards Germany seemed to be logical: 15 as the Soviet Union was not prepared for the war (it was not prepared even in 1941 as it became apparent by the German attack), a tactical partnership with Hitler was not a bad decision. 16 The Germans concluded similar non-aggression agreements, although lacking any secret clause, with Denmark, Estonia and Latvia in 1939, so the treaty was part of a German „peace offensive” – posteriorly regarded a policy with misinforming purposes – which made the communication of signing the treaty easier for Stalin. It is also a fact that London and Paris could not offer the territories marked as Moscow’s sphere of interest in the treaty to Stalin, who was dealing with regaining the areas of the former Tsarist Russia – from another perspective, narrowing the military spring-board against the Soviet Union, – while Hitler did gladly offer, and Stalin decided in favour of the more prosperous choice. 17 It is a different question that the history writing of the „sovietised” counties created a myth from the agreement signed under such circumstances and presented the signing of the pact as a genius decision of the generalissimo, which provided two more years for the Soviet Union to prepare for the war. 18 This is, however, only partially true because, as we will see, the German Empire had strengthened much more by 1941 than the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the main problem of the thesis is not this but that it presented 14 ORMOS, Mária-MAJOROS, István: Európa a nemzetközi küzdőtéren. Osiris, Budapest, 2003. 403. 15 Some historians consider the exchange of Litvinov, the Soviet foreign minister with Jewish descent to Molotov on May 3, 1939 an obvious gesture towards the Germans. Litvinov was mentioned only as Litvinov-Finkelstein in the German media. Albeit, it is also true that besides some other factors, the failure of the British-French-Soviet anti-Fascist co-operation preferred by him contributed to his fall as well. Q. v. LEVIN, Nora: The Jews in the Soviet Union Since 1917: Paradox of Survival. NYU Press, 1988. 330. 16 We could say state that the conquest-seeking Germany was translated as East by the Munich Treaty and as West by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact after the Invasion of Poland. 17 DIÓSZEGI István: A hatalmi politika másfél évszázada. História-MTA TTI, Budapest, 1994. 428. GROGIN, Robert C.: Natural Enemies: The United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War 1917–1991. Lexington Books, 2001. 28. 18 This statement was first announced in Stalin’s speech on radio on July 3, 1941, and became therefore compulsory and absolute for many. DIÓSZEGI István: A hatalmi politika másfél évszázada. História-MTA TTI, Budapest, 1994. 429. 15
Page 2 and 3: ISBN 978-963-284-164-9
Page 5 and 6: Unknown Clauses: The Background Dea
Page 7 and 8: CONTENTS Foreword (István MAJOROS,
Page 9 and 10: Foreword The world remembers in 200
Page 11: The Historical Judgement of the Mol
Page 14 and 15: went often on emotional instead of
Page 18 and 19: such an international agreement as
Page 20 and 21: Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggress
Page 22 and 23: Done in duplicate, in the German an
Page 25 and 26: Lachaise, Bernard Historiography of
Page 27 and 28: Relations) are the focus of special
Page 29 and 30: Russian agreement (…) would allow
Page 31 and 32: Europe and on the French communists
Page 33 and 34: adopted a stance of denying the fac
Page 35 and 36: Ortolan, Guillaume The 70 th annive
Page 37 and 38: government (more than twenty) came,
Page 39 and 40: War. On the contrary, it shows that
Page 41 and 42: this anniversary and more widely of
Page 43: interesting: „Illusions. In summe
Page 47 and 48: Kretschmann, Vasco The ideological
Page 49 and 50: One of the most influential associa
Page 51 and 52: Germanness in the provinces of West
Page 53 and 54: Prętkiewicz, Przemysław The syste
Page 55 and 56: interwar period and the treaty was
Page 57 and 58: situation of rising danger accepted
Page 59 and 60: Manchukuo and broke relations with
Page 61: I would like to finish my article w
Page 64 and 65: party itself but for the whole Slov
Page 66 and 67:
In summary, the group of the „Mod
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make proposals or suggestions. 6 In
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(Aland), Hanko and the islands of t
Page 72 and 73:
have had a less serious effect on t
Page 74 and 75:
not expect strong resistance and ho
Page 77 and 78:
Winkler, Paul Adolf Eichmann’s Vi
Page 79 and 80:
individual offenders, 10 who used h
Page 81 and 82:
esearch. But how could the suppress
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expert of this matter 29 and had as
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Arendt on the contrary is in the op
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the „matter”, where there was a
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adoption of the model it became cle
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of Eichmann. For that Heydrich deli
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esistance […] but of logistics. N
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British government refused to give
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ole in the defence of Madrid in Nov
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public doubt the democratic idea of
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Republicans. In the refugee camps i
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102
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iron? Where can one find more nicke
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According to his diaries, the main
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announced: „We have no active all
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110
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negative, an analysis of the disapp
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can let think of an imminent war po
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de la guerre [il] ne fait que l'agg
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Party), the enemy of the inside. Of
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120
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Before the Pact M. Coulondre, the F
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Lets us skip a few decades and list
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argain with. Hitler had an offer th
Page 130 and 131:
secret protocol clarified that the
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to reach out for Russia through the
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of a war interesting rather on civi
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At the same moment, we can note an
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Faure 2 , remains hostile to war. I
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war can still be avoided in June 19
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acked by a „belligerent” coalit
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142
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agreement” sound anachronistic. E
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1939 between Germany and the Soviet
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Two ideas emerge from the press: on
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soviets didn’t have motive. Blum
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Moscow's line, with the national an
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154
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2.000 German speaking inhabitants).
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The Eastern Polish border was not r
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Army. The mayor of Lviv did not wan
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162
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Budapest, and for Warsaw. The two c
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could not destroy the Polish Air Fo
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independence, Romania was forced to
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importance for the events considere
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possible future opposition to the S
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ate of communists within the Jews o
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the initial positive feeling toward
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wanted to take revenge for the NKVD
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German Reactions A last point that
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