The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál
The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál
The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál
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have had a less serious effect on the Finnish industry, but the government did not<br />
approve them 19 since the Finns did not want to be dependent of the Soviet Union.<br />
Eventually, on 13 November the negotiations broke down.<br />
Political Situation<br />
<strong>The</strong> Finnish Social Democratic government had the country’s support,<br />
which could be best shown by the fact that when the delegation went to the<br />
Soviet capital, at the Helsinki Railway station was a support demonstration<br />
which indicated that the unity within Finland was solid. 20 Two months later<br />
when the Soviets tried to win the people's trust, the strong unity of the Finns<br />
became a crucial factor. <strong>The</strong> idea of a Soviet protection was just as<br />
unacceptable to the Finnish people as to their government.<br />
In his talks with the Anglo-French delegation Vyacheslav <strong>Molotov</strong><br />
proposed that the three powers (Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union)<br />
should guarantee the security of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland, so the<br />
English and the French government did not believe that the Soviets would<br />
attack the Finns. <strong>The</strong>y told the Finnish ambassador that the Soviets only<br />
wanted to avoid the German advance. 21 <strong>The</strong> Finnish government did not<br />
believe either that the Soviets would attack; they thought that the nonaggression<br />
pact between Berlin and Moscow could revise their relations with<br />
the Soviet Union. 22 At the end of the Polish war, on 2 October the Finnish<br />
ambassador to Berlin, Vourimaa, wanted to clarify the Finnish-German<br />
relations. Weizsäcker, Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, said Germany<br />
would not intervene into Soviet-Finnish relations. 23 <strong>The</strong> Germans suggested<br />
that the Finns should be sensible and give in. 24 Not satisfied with this answer,<br />
the Finnish government now turned to the western democracies. First, they<br />
tried to get the help of the Scandinavian countries, but Stockholm told them not<br />
to expect military aid, only military equipments (such as airplanes, for<br />
example) and supplies. 25 <strong>The</strong> Finnish government considered protesting to the<br />
League of Nations, but finally they decided not to provoke the Soviets' anger. It<br />
19 JACOBSON, Max: Finland in the new Europe. <strong>The</strong> center for strategic and international<br />
studies, Washington, 1998. 29. and MANNERHEIM, Carl Gustav von: Emlékiratok. A téli<br />
háború. (Memoir. <strong>The</strong> winter war). Püski, Budapest, 1997. 16.<br />
20 MANNERHEIM, Carl Gustav von: Emlékiratok. A téli háború. (Memoir. <strong>The</strong> winter war).<br />
Püski, Budapest, 1997. 11.<br />
21 JACOBSON, Max: Finland in the new Europe. <strong>The</strong> center for strategic and international<br />
studies, Washington, 1998. 28.<br />
22 MANNERHEIM, Carl Gustav von: Emlékiratok. A téli háború. (Memoir. <strong>The</strong> winter war).<br />
Püski, Budapest, 1997. 7.<br />
23 HELLER, Michail, NEKRICH, Alexandr: Orosz történelem (Russian history) vols II.<br />
Osiris, Budapest, 2003. 318.<br />
24 MANNERHEIM, Carl Gustav von: Emlékiratok. A téli háború. (Memoir. <strong>The</strong> winter war).<br />
Püski, Budapest, 1997. 29.<br />
25 Ibid. 26.<br />
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