The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

Before the Pact
M. Coulondre, the French ambassador in Berlin, lets G. Bonnet know that
the Soviet Union will do everything to avoid antagonizing Berlin, knowing that
the Soviets have not yet replaced their Headquarters after the purges that
followed the Moscow trials.
The French government understands quickly enough that the USSR has in
mind drawing near Germany. On May 3 rd 1939, Litvinov, a supporter of
collective security, is replaced by Molotov at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. He is Stalin's right hand and he is more pragmatic than his predecessor
was. Between the 15 th and the 20 th of August, France urges Poland to make
concessions on the right of passage the Germans find so important. On August
21 st evening, the French resolve to disregard the Polish refusal and
acknowledge this right to the Russian army, in order to avoid any soviet
alliance with the third Reich.
Bonnet was indignant at the position of the Polish government during the
Czechoslovakia crisis. That day, Bonnet said: „It's Czechoslovakia today, it will be
Poland tomorrow.” France does not want to see Poland isolated between Hitler's
Germany and Stalin's Russia. Nevertheless, G. Bonnet's policy of compromise
reaches its limits because Poland's successive refusals make Germany impatient.
The Munich agreement confirms the dismantling of Czechoslovakia. An opinion
poll shows that 57% of the French population are satisfied with the agreement, but
after the Sudéte crisis, 70% refuse any new concessions. Also, the Soviet Union
does not understand the diplomacy and strategy of France and England. On May
7 th , Coulondres sends a telegram to the Quai d'Orsay, saying: „Soon, they will see
that something is going on in the East.”
In Munich, already, Czechoslovakia had been excluded from the
negotiations about its fate by the four powers. General Syrovy, the President of
the Czechoslovakian Council, said that „by making such a decision, the
Czechoslovakian government lets the world know it protests against a
unilateral decision that was made without its participating in it.”
France tries to avoid a conflict but the Germans put heavier and heavier
pressure on the Poles, as we can see in the telegram the French ambassador in
Warsaw, Léon Noël, sent to G. Bonnet on August 19 th 1939. „Persecutions
against the Poles have taken frightening proportions. During the period
between April 1 st and June 30 th , 976 acts of violence have been reportedly
recorded (...) and since July 1 st the situation is said to have become even
worse.” In the same way the telegrams sent by M. Coulondre or Léon Noël
always mention the German intention to invade Poland.
The French Consul in Hamburg, M. Garreau, lets G. Bonnet know , on august
22 nd 1939, that „the German government hopes to overcome Poland by the end of
the month.The Reich (...) believes Moscow is preparing a big political upheaval
in order to harmonize the ideologies of the two totalitarian regimes.”
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