The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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wanted to take revenge for the NKVD‘s crimes and had unleashed their grieve in pogroms. He puts this explanation in contrast to older interpretations of the events by insisting on these riots being started before the Germans could motivate the people to such reactions. 44 He further claims that the riots had been of anti-communist character whereas one not only has to understand members of the communist party, but also everyone who had been working with the Soviets. 45 The German troops, according to Bogdan Musial, only took part in already initiated riots. 46 In fact, one has to look at the events from quite a different angle: When the Soviet power crashed, and when troops as well as political personal fled, a vacuum of power appeared of which the local people took advantage. 47 They wanted revenge for everything they had had to endure during the Soviet occupation and without hesitation they turned their violence against those who were the one logical victim. 48 During the years of occupation people adapted to violence and gained the willingness to use violence themselves, on the other hand there were also material interests as well as traditional anti-Semitism and nationalism. 49 The victims that were singled out now were in most cases not the responsible ones, because those had fled eastwards. Following Dieter Pohl, Bogdan Musial has to be corrected: For once, as I showed before, the feeling of revenge had its roots in the whole period of Soviet occupation, and, additionally, the Jews became victims because of their historical role as such and because they were the weakest parts of society. The NKVD‘s 44 MUSIAL, Bogdan: „Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschießen” - Die Brutalisierung des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges im Sommer 1941. Berlin 2001. 172. 45 MUSIAL, Bogdan: „Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschießen” - Die Brutalisierung des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges im Sommer 1941. Berlin 2001. 193. For a similar argumentation see Honigsman, who calls the Jews a scapegoat but who contrary to Musial states that the population had been motivated by the Germans. 138. 46 Parts of the discussion can be seen here: http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/id=546 21.3.2009, http://www.zeit.de/2000/36/Opfer_zu_Taetern_gemacht?page=1 21.3.2009, http://library.fes.de/ fulltext/afs/htmrez/80130.htm 21.3.2009, http://h-net.msu.edu /cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-soz-ukult&month=0105&week=b&msg=ZHvgkM0ea75Uep 82ym%2B8uA&user=&pw= 21.3.2009. In favor of Musial one has to admit that he does not take positions similar to those of the German Historikerstreit of the 1980s. He explains, that he solely compares the national-socialist and soviet terror of 1939-1941, but that he will not deny the singularity of the Holocaust. 220. According to MUSIAL it were not Soviet crimes who triggered German atrocities, but seeing Soviet cruelties had brutalized the German soldiers. 221. Compare GROSS 229.: „Life was more dangerous in many respects under the Soviets than under the Nazis. And, as I have stated before, people at the time compared the two. Many, including thousands of Jews, came to this very conclusion and voted ‚with their feet.” 47 OVERY, Richard: Russlands Krieg - 1941-1945, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 2003. 138. 48 As MUSIAL himself states: „Es kann zwar nicht ausgeschlossen werden, daß es auch ohne die sowjetischen Verbrechen zu Pogromen gekommen wäre. Aber meines Erachtens ist es unwahrscheinlich, daß sie ohne den sowjetischen Terror und die Massenmorde derart ausgeufert wären. […] Sehr oft, um nicht zu sagen meistens, diente der Vorwurf der Kollaboration mit den Sowjets als Vorwand, um mit allen Juden abzurechnen.” 199. 49 POHL, Dieter: Ukrainische Hilfskräfte beim Mord an den Juden. In: PAUL, Gerhard (Ed.): Die Täter der Shoah-Fanatische Nationalsozialisten oder ganz normale Deutsche?, Göttingen, 2002. 220. 178
atrocities were not the reason but the initial for the riots and pogroms. The powervacuum opened the possibility to let loose of grieve and hatred against the weakest part of society, Jews were eagerly accepted as scapegoats altogether. Jews were not haunted because people found the victims‘ bodies. These findings were on the one hand taken as an explanation for the riots - the association of Jews and Soviets - on the other hand one must not underestimate the motivation drawn by the Germans‘ expected arrival. The discovering of the NKVD‘s victims was the occasion rather than the reason for the pogroms in the summer of 1941. The anticipation of German wishes Richard Overy remarks that the riots would never have taken place had they not been encouraged by German propaganda that denounced Jews as nothumans, as vermin that could and should be destroyed. 50 It is quite possible that news about the Germans‘ treating of the Jews in the Western parts of former Poland had reached people in the Eastern regions and that they knew that violence against Jews would be in favour of the Germans. 51 Ben Shepherd and again Richard Overy are eager to explain that the population in former Eastern Poland had as well a reason to hate the Soviets and to see the Germans as liberators from their yoke as they were careful in regard to things that may come as they could not know what the Germans‘ regime would bring. 52 Many Ukrainians took sides with the Germans and in trying to act in their interest they saw pogroms as a favourable means. 53 As Martin Dean shows, no-one had to cooperate with the German units when they first arrived. Those who volunteered to do so had their reasons and power and gain were not least. 54 The German armies‘ approach was a motivation to parts of the population to unleash their anger independently, but as soon as the Germans had arrived they took over control. This is especially important in cases where no corpses were found but riots occurred anyway. As Dieter Pohl states: Besides some villages, the pogroms can not bee seen as spontaneous uprisings but as planned action by German units. But it were local actors who played the active part. 55 50 OVERY, Richard: Russlands Krieg - 1941-1945, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 2003. 224. 51 GROSS, Jan T.: Revolution from Abroad - The Soviet conquest of Poland‘s Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia. Princeton, 2002. 231. and 60. 52 SHEPHERD, Ben: War in the Wild East - The German army and Soviet partisans. Cambridge, 2004. 60. OVERY, Richard: Russlands Krieg - 1941-1945, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 2003. 138. 53 POHL, Dieter: Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941-1944 - Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens. München, 1996. 47. 54 DEAN, Martin: The ‚Local Police‘ in Nazi-occupied Belarus and Ukraine as the ‚Ideal Type‘ of Collaboration - in Practice, in the Recollection of its Members and in the Verdicts of the Courts. In: TAUBER, Joachim (Ed.): ‚Kollaboration‘ in Nordosteuropa - Erscheinungsformen und Deutungen im 20. Jahrhundert. Wiesbaden, 2006. 422. 55 POHL, Dieter: Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941-1944 - Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens. München, 1996. 66. 179
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ISBN 978-963-284-164-9
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Unknown Clauses: The Background Dea
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CONTENTS Foreword (István MAJOROS,
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Foreword The world remembers in 200
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The Historical Judgement of the Mol
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went often on emotional instead of
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What is much more interesting is th
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such an international agreement as
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Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggress
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Done in duplicate, in the German an
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Lachaise, Bernard Historiography of
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Relations) are the focus of special
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Russian agreement (…) would allow
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Europe and on the French communists
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adopted a stance of denying the fac
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Ortolan, Guillaume The 70 th annive
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government (more than twenty) came,
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War. On the contrary, it shows that
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this anniversary and more widely of
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interesting: „Illusions. In summe
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Kretschmann, Vasco The ideological
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One of the most influential associa
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Germanness in the provinces of West
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Prętkiewicz, Przemysław The syste
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interwar period and the treaty was
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situation of rising danger accepted
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Manchukuo and broke relations with
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I would like to finish my article w
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party itself but for the whole Slov
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In summary, the group of the „Mod
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make proposals or suggestions. 6 In
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(Aland), Hanko and the islands of t
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have had a less serious effect on t
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not expect strong resistance and ho
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Winkler, Paul Adolf Eichmann’s Vi
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individual offenders, 10 who used h
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esearch. But how could the suppress
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expert of this matter 29 and had as
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Arendt on the contrary is in the op
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the „matter”, where there was a
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adoption of the model it became cle
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of Eichmann. For that Heydrich deli
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esistance […] but of logistics. N
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British government refused to give
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ole in the defence of Madrid in Nov
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public doubt the democratic idea of
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Republicans. In the refugee camps i
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102
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iron? Where can one find more nicke
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According to his diaries, the main
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announced: „We have no active all
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110
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negative, an analysis of the disapp
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can let think of an imminent war po
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de la guerre [il] ne fait que l'agg
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Party), the enemy of the inside. Of
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120
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Before the Pact M. Coulondre, the F
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Lets us skip a few decades and list
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argain with. Hitler had an offer th
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Page 132 and 133: to reach out for Russia through the
Page 134 and 135: of a war interesting rather on civi
Page 136 and 137: At the same moment, we can note an
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Page 146 and 147: agreement” sound anachronistic. E
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Page 150 and 151: Two ideas emerge from the press: on
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Page 158 and 159: 2.000 German speaking inhabitants).
Page 160 and 161: The Eastern Polish border was not r
Page 162 and 163: Army. The mayor of Lviv did not wan
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Page 166 and 167: Budapest, and for Warsaw. The two c
Page 168 and 169: could not destroy the Polish Air Fo
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Page 172 and 173: importance for the events considere
Page 174 and 175: possible future opposition to the S
Page 176 and 177: ate of communists within the Jews o
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Page 182 and 183: German Reactions A last point that
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The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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